Krimpedia – das Kriminologie-Wiki

Rechtsstaat

Version vom 23. Februar 2015, 17:51 Uhr von Tiao (Diskussion | Beiträge) (→‎Weblinks und Literatur)

Deutschland und viele andere Staaten bezeichnen sich selbst als Rechtsstaaten und werden auch von anderen so bezeichnet. Das Grundgesetz lässt keinen Zweifel daran. Interessanterweise wird das selten empirisch überprüft: die Selbst-Bezeichnung scheint zu genügen. Selbst Wikipedia hat keine Rubrik für empirische Überprüfung oder Kritische Stimmen.

Was bedeutet der Indikativ (Aktiv oder Passiv) in Gesetzestexten?

Welches sind die Kriterien des Rechtsstaats und inwiefern werden sie erfüllt?

Was würde alles auf eine Rechtsstaats-Checkliste gehören?

Quantitativ: mehr oder weniger rechtsstaatlich.

Qualitativ: welche Alternativen gibt es zur Klassifikation als Rechtsstaat, wenn die Kriterienerfüllung eine gewisse Schwelle nicht erreicht?

Unrechtsstaat? Diktatur? Autoritärer Staat?

Vorschlag: Doppelstaat. Begriffsproblematik: historisch/analytisch (Bezug auf eine exkludierte Gruppe...).

Für die gibt es dann keinen Rechtsstaat. Subjektiv, partiell. Aber ist die Gesamtheit dann noch Rechtsstaat oder nur noch Normenstaat?

Drogen und Terrorismus als Avantgarde der Transformation des Rechtsstaats. Karam. Albrecht.

Beispiele. Macchiavell als Gegenprinzip zum Rechtsstaat: der Zweck heiligt die Mittel. Beispiele für diese Haltung. (Todenhöfer).


Weblinks und Literatur

O estado de direito é uma situação jurídica, ou um sistema institucional, no qual cada um é submetido ao respeito do direito, do simples indivíduo até a potência pública. O estado de direito é assim ligado ao respeito da hierarquia das normas, da separação dos poderes e dos direitos fundamentais.

Em outras palavras, o estado de direito é aquele no qual os mandatários políticos (na democracia: os eleitos) são submissos às leis promulgadas.

Considera-se o livro Die deutsche Polizeiwissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates (A Ciência Policial Alemã de acordo com os princípios do estado de Direito), do escritor alemão Robert von Mohl, como a obra seminal, inauguradora do pensamento teórico sobre o "império da lei". A obra foi escrita entre 1832 e 1834 e publicada em 1835. Além disso, existe corrente teórica do pensamento político alemão, que foi comandada pelo influente filósofo político Friedrich Hayek, que considera os escritos de Immanuel Kant como a base sobre a qual se construiria, mais tarde, o pensamento político de von Mohl.
"For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."
Die Auflösung des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts in ein Bürgerstrafrecht einerseits und ein Feindstrafrecht andererseits ist der ständige Wegbegleiter des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts, der stets und immer wieder dessen Erosion betreibt. Der Rechtswissenschaftler Günther Jakobs hat diesen Prozess der rechtsstaatlichen Erosionen beschrieben und bezeichnet das trefflich als gefährliche „Durchmischung allen Strafrechts mit Einsprengseln feindstrafrechtlicher Regelungen“.
All das ist ein Ausdruck der Erosion und des Niedergangs rechtsstaatlicher Strafrechts-Standards. Diese Entwicklungen, die schon 1995 im 50. Band der Frankfurter kriminalwissenschaftlichen Studien als „unmöglicher Zustand des Strafrechts“ und später – 1999 – als „Irrwege der Strafgesetzgebung“ (Band 69) bezeichnet wurden, können nur noch mit Kapitelüberschriften wie Übergriffe, Versäumnisse, Verschärfungen, Verformungen und Zerstörungen rechtsstaatlicher Grundlagen beschrieben werden. Der jüngste, 100. Band trägt den Endzeit-Titel „Jenseits des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts“, was sogar den Beifall des Vizepräsidenten des Bundesverfassungsgerichts findet. Anstatt aber Unabwägbarkeiten und Unverfügbarkeiten – so wie er es noch als Wissenschaftler tat – anzumahnen, fordert der Richter Hassemer nunmehr ein „rechtsstaatliches Sicherheitsstrafrecht“, welches auf die „normative Desorientierung, Verbrechensfurcht und Kontrollbedürfnisse einer Risikogesellschaft“ antworten soll. Nicht mehr der Schutz des Bürgers vor dem machtvollen Zugriff des Staates wird als Aufgabe der Grundrechte gesehen, sondern „die ‚gefühlte’ Bedrohung, die Verbrechensfurcht der Wählerinnen und Wähler wird am Ende über die reale Kriminalpolitik entscheiden – und das, im demokratischen Staat, zu Recht“, so der Richter Hassemer. Eine derartige Position des ambivalenten Abwägens von Vor -und Nachteilen des Präventions- und Sicherheitsstaates ohne Ankoppelung an einen absoluten Schutz der Menschenwürde und andere verfassungsrechtliche Unabwägbarkeiten führt direkt hinein in das Jakobssche Bild einer dichotomisierten Gesellschaft von Wählern und Feinden. Bei einem Innenminister würde einen eine derartige Positionierung kaum noch verwundern. Aus der Feder eines Hüters der Verfassung ist die Position indes schon selbst Beleg für die fortschreitende Erosion des Rechtsstaates.
Jakobs bezeichnet diesen Prozess der Rechtserosion im materiellen und Verfahrensrecht als Weg des Gesetzgebers, gefährlichen Straftätern den Bürgerstatus abzusprechen und diesen nicht als Bürger zu behandeln, sondern als „Feind“ zu „bekriegen“. Legitimation hierfür sei das Recht der Bürger auf Sicherheit, davor müsse jeder Feind in die Knie gehen, habe damit auch nicht mehr das Recht auf eine strafrechtliche Behandlung als Person. Derartige Nichtpersonen seien nicht durch das Recht zu behandeln, „vielmehr ist der Feind exkludiert“. Der Prozess der Erosionen des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts wird von Jakobs so skizziert: „Der Staat hebt in rechtlich geordneter Weise Rechte auf“. Das Modell hierfür sind die Notverordnungen der späten Weimarer Republik.
Wie soll nun eine Gruppe bekämpft werden, die ihrerseits die Rechtsstaaten bekämpft und den gegebenen Grundrechtsschutz umkehrt, um nicht greifbar zu sein?
Entweder der Rechtsstaat gibt seine Prinzipien auf und läuft Gefahr, seine Identität zu verlieren. Mehr und mehr gerät er in die Rolle, in die er hineingezwängt werden soll.
Hält er an seinen Leitlinien fest, droht er, durch seine eigenen Waffen geschlagen zu werden. Sehr häufig endet die Terrorismusbekämpfung mit der Beendung der Existenz des jeweiligen einzelnen Gegners, unabhängig davon, ob die dahinter stehenden Netzwerke und realpolitischen Zusammenhänge weiterhin bestehen oder nicht. So ist die heutige Form des Terrors nicht nur ein simples Symptom einer menschenverachtenden Weltansicht, die mit dem Islam nur wenig gemeinsam hat. Schon angesichts der verschiedenen Strömungen des Islams, ob Schiismus, Schiitismus oder die ausgeprägte Form des Wahabismus, aus der sich der extremistische Fundamentalismus nährt, kann nicht von einem islamischen Fundamentalismus gesprochen werden. Wohl wird in Großteilen der Medien ein Bild geprägt, welches befürchten ließe, die gesamte arabische Welt stünde im „Kriege“ mit „unserer Welt“. Aber es kann definitiv nicht einfach so ein schwarzer Strich durch die Glaubensgemeinschaften gezogen werden, wo doch alle gleichermaßen von einem Phänomen betroffen sind, welches dem Tode näher ist als dem Leben. Es sind sowohl demokratisch ausgerichtete Staaten, autokratische Republiken, feudale Monarchien und totalitäre Regimes in ihren Grundfesten betroffen. Integrationspolitik, Sozialpolitik, Sicherheitspolitik sowie Außenpolitik sind hier gleichermaßen gefordert. Denn man darf nicht vergessen, daß der gegenüberstehende Gegner die Fehler und Lücken jeglicher Ressorts gnadenlos zu seinen Vorteilen ausnutzt und sich der religiösen Institutionen unter dem Deckmantel der Religionsfreiheit zur Ressourcengewinnung bedient. Folge Dem Rechtsstaat bleibt angesichts der Gefahren nur sehr wenig Spielraum, will er eine Problematik beheben, die sich mit ihm gegen ihn richtet, sei es auch nur, wenn es sich um ein Kopftuch handelt. Er selbst muß in Dingen der Religion neutral bleiben, darf aber nicht selbst Religion werden, um keinerlei Angriffsfläche für Dritte zu bieten. Steht ihm verfassungsfeindliches Element entgegen, das ihn zu immobilisieren vermag, so muß er lang- und kurzfristig diejenigen schützen, die ihm anvertraut sind, ohne den zu treffen, der es nicht vermag.



S. 1318 ff.: III. THE GERMAN RECHTSSTAAT AS STATE RULE THROUGH LAW

Any attempt to put more flesh and bones on the concept of the rule of law should be mindful that diverse conceptions of the rule of law have taken root in different traditions. A brief comparison among these traditions will allow for a better grasp of certain key nuances concerning the rule of law and thus make it easier to appreciate its scope and limitations, with a view to testing its legitimacy in the context of a pluralist constitutional democracy. Accordingly, I shall focus on the salient differences among the three major traditions that have given shape to the rule of law, namely the German, French, and Anglo-American traditions. The German Rechtsstaat , the French É tat de droit, and the corresponding British and American conceptions all endorse the rule of law in the narrow sense but otherwise diverge significantly from one another. 46 Moreover, some of these traditions are more ancient than others, and all of them have evolved over the years, though some of them have done so more than others. Since my primary focus is conceptual and directed to issues of legitimacy in pluralist settings, I shall only refer to the history and evolution of these traditions, with an eye to gaining further insights into the potential, limitations, and multiple dimensions of the rule of law. The Rechtsstaat is often treated as the German equivalent to the concept of the rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition. 47 Both concepts share some important elements in common. Chief among these is the relationship between the state and the institutionalization of a legal regime or, in other words, the state ’ s duty to wield its power through laws in accordance with fundamental principles of legality — including consistent implementation of publicly disseminated, generally applicable rules giving citizens notice regarding what conduct is subject to legal sanctions, coupled 46. The rule of law in the narrow sense has a much more ancient pedigree than the traditions being considered as it dates back at least as far as Aristotle. See P OLITICS B K . III, 15 – 16. 47. See, e.g. , Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law , 1997 U TAH L. R EV . 963, 967 – 71 (1997). 2001] LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1319 with fair procedural safeguards. Beyond that, however, the two concepts differ significantly, particularly in terms of their understanding of the relationship between the state and the law. Whereas the American conception of the rule of law is rooted in a somewhat antagonistic relationship between the state and the rule of law — which gives prominence to the above-noted paradox between the law as dependent on, and independent from, the state 48 — its German counterpart is squarely predicated on a veritable symbiosis between the law and the state. In the broadest terms, in the Rechtsstaat, law becomes inextricably tied to the state as the only legitimate channel through which the state can wield its power. Accordingly, “ state rule through law ” would be a much better approximation in English for “ Rechtsstaat ” than “ rule of law. ” If any state rule through law would do, then the Rechtsstaat would boil down to little more than the rule of law in the narrow sense. In actuality, though, the concept has significantly evolved since its implantation in the nineteenth century; the Rechtsstaat has always stood for much more than the rule of law in the narrow sense. The Rechtsstaat, which had its intellectual origins in Kant ’ s theory, 49 stood in the first half of the nineteenth century for rational state rule encompassing universal protection of formal rights for every individual within the ambit of a unified legal order, crafted by legislation and administered through a separate and independent process of adjudication. In contrast to the American notion of separation of powers, so long as legislation was kept separate from adjudication, the nineteenth century Rechtsstaat was equally compatible with a government (as opposed to a staat ) that was monarchic as with one that was democratic. 50 As it evolved from its Kantian roots toward more positivistic configurations in Bismarck ’ s late nineteenth century Germany, the Rechtsstaat became increasingly tied to issues of form rather than substance. 51 What binds together both the Kantian and the positivistic conceptions of the Rechtsstaat , however, is the rejection of older notions that anchored the state ’ s legitimacy in the pursuit and implementation of 48. See supra text accompanying notes 11 – 12. 49. See H ANS R EISS , K ANT ’ S P OLITICAL W RITINGS 11 (1991). 50. See D ONALD P. K OMMERS , T HE C ONSTITUTIONAL J URISPRUDENCE OF THE F EDERAL R EPUBLIC OF G ERMANY 36 (2d ed. 1997). 51. See Rainer Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and É tat de Droit , in C ONSTITUTIONALISM , U NIVERSALISM AND D EMOCRACY

A C

OMPARATIVE A NALYSIS 269, 278 – 81 (Christian Starck ed., 1999). 1320 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1307 transcendental religious or ethical values. 52 Accordingly, the Rechtsstaat opened the door to a state rule — through law that could function properly without having to rely on a value system derived from any particular religion or transcendental conception of ethics. In other words, the Rechtsstaat made possible the systematic deployment of a legal regime poised to accommodate a plurality of conceptions of the good. 53 The severance of the Rechtsstaat from the external constraints of transcendental religion or ethics further specifies what state rule through law is not, without revealing what it ought to be or whether it could ever altogether escape from the grip of contested religious or ethical values which might stubbornly linger within it. To better appreciate the potential for positive contribution of the nineteenth century Rechtsstaat, it is necessary to compare its Kantian and its positivist dimension and to examine how these might be reconciled. For Kant, a legal regime is legitimate if it is grounded in the right. Acknowledging that citizens have different interests and competing ideas about the pursuit of happiness, Kant recognizes that nothing like an actual consent of the entire citizenry could ever validate any piece of legislation. 54 Consistent with this, legitimacy cannot be established at the level of interests or of the good, but only at that of the just and the right — that is, by categorically treating all citizens as free and equal and as ends in themselves. In other words, a law can be legitimate only if it is reasonable for every citizen to accept it as being right and just. Pursuant to this criterion, the legislator is obligated, in Kant ’ s own words: to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will. This is the test of rightfulness of every public law. 55 Kant ’ s test thus sets a counterfactual against which the rightness of law is to be measured. Regardless of how citizens actually feel or whether they would have voted for a law, the key question is whether it is proper for citizens — conceived as free and equal and as treating one another as ends in 52. Id. at 279. 53. Significantly, this is precisely what the anti-pluralist Carl Schmitt reproached to the late nineteenth century conception of the Rechtsstaat. See Carl Schmitt, The Liberal Rule of Law, in W EIMAR

A J

URISPRUDENCE OF C RISIS 294, 297 – 99 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000). 54. See Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: “ This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice, ” in K ANT ’ S P OLITICAL W RITINGS 61, 80 (1991) [hereinafter Kant]. 55. Id. at 79. 2001] LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1321 themselves — to have enacted the law in question as legislators and to have willingly accepted to be bound by it as citizens. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the law is legitimate. As Kant ’ s counterfactual test does away with the consideration of interests or of the good, it raises the question of whether the just and the right can be found beyond the realm of interests or whether it remains altogether beside it. In other words, is satisfaction of the counterfactual dependent on there being a realm of justice compatible with all conflicting interests and all competing conceptions of justice (a very strong requirement), or is it possible to satisfy the counterfactual regardless of what interests or conceptions of the good may be involved (a seemingly weak requirement)? A close look at Kant ’ s argument reveals that his conception of the just and the right lies both beyond and beside the realm of interests. More precisely, the right ascends beyond the good in connection with the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, but remains beside it when it comes to the criterion of self-legislation. As a consequence, Kant ’ s counterfactual criterion of self-legislation ultimately seems extremely weak. Under the test of self-legislation, as Kant explains, if a law is: such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it (for example if it is stated that a certain class of subjects must be privileged as a hereditary ruling class), it is unjust; but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the law as just, even if the people is at present in such a position or attitude of mind that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted. 56 Kant ’ s test for self-legislation thus boils down to a requirement of formal equality before the law. So long as laws are equally applied to all, they must be deemed legitimate regardless of their content. When placed in its Enlightenment context, this test is by no means trivial, as it delegitimates all vestiges of status-based legislation typical of the Ancien R é gime . In today ’ s world, where feudal hierarchy has been widely banished from constitutional democracy, however, Kant ’ s test of self- legislation rings rather hollow. This can be illustrated, moreover, through Kant ’ s own example. Kant argues that if a proportional tax is imposed on the entire citizenry in order to finance an unpopular war, this would meet the test of self-legislation for it would be possible for all to accept the tax if 56. Id. (emphasis in the original). 1322 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1307 they supported the war. 57 If the tax were imposed only on part of the citizenry, on the other hand, those singled out for that burden would have good reason not to accept it voluntarily even if they enthusiastically supported the war. While all this may be true, it seems largely beside the point. Without any meaningful consent for the war — whether directly or indirectly through endorsement of the decisionmaking process responsible for the war policy — it is difficult to conceive the tax as a plausible product of self-legislation. 58 Fundamental rights and freedoms seem to rest on more solid ground than self-legislation in so far as they can be legitimated beyond the realm of interests. Such legitimation, moreover, may depend on these rights being beyond interests in the sense of remaining consistent with all conceivable differences in interests. Otherwise, they could be beyond interests by stacking up against them, and thus, imposing boundaries on the legitimate pursuit of interests. The key right for Kant is the right to individual autonomy, 59 which he envisages as requiring freedom, equality, and the right to own property. 60 Also, in organized society, preservation of the individual ’ s autonomy depends on others treating that individual as an end in him or herself rather than merely as a means. If Kantian autonomy requires treating every individual only as an end, then the criterion of legitimacy for law is clear, but legitimate law is impossible. If, on the other hand, Kantian autonomy may be satisfied by treating every individual as more than a mere means — for example, through implementation of some version of the rights to liberty, equality, and property which would not foreclose all treatment as means — then law is certainly possible but could never be more than partially legitimated. 61 57. Id . 58. Arguably, confronted with an unpopular war, citizens could still agree that it ought to be financed to avoid disaster and that the resulting burden ought to fall equally on all rather than being disparate. Nevertheless, the latter agreement would fail the weak consent test set out above. 59. Kant, supra note 54, at 77 – 78. 60. Id . at 74 – 79. 61. It may seem that those difficulties might be avoided by charging legislators with the duty to treat citizens as ends without extending that duty to citizens in their interactions with fellow citizens. Thus, laws could cast persons as ends regardless of the positions espoused by legal actors. This possibility must be rejected, however, for at least two crucial reasons. First, consistent with Kantian autonomy, for any legislation to be normatively justified, it must in some sense qualify as self- legislation, thus invalidating any normative distinction between the legislator and those subjected to legitimate legal norms. And, second, the legislator cannot, in the last analysis, remain above contested (or contestable) interests. Accordingly, given that in a complex society it is virtually impossible to remain self-sufficient in the quest to satisfy one ’ s interests, all legal norms requiring citizens to act to


Verletzungen des Rechtsstaatsprinzips durch Terrorismusbekämpfung

Siehe auch

Abgerufen von „https://www.krimpedia.de/index.php?title=Rechtsstaat&oldid=65432“