Al-Shabaab

wird bearbeitet von TN

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) (Arabic: حركة الشباب المجاهدين‎; Ḥarakat ash-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn, "Mujahideen Youth Movement" or "Movement of Striving Youth"), more commonly known as al-Shabaab (Arabic: الشباب‎, "The Youth" or "The Boys"), is a militant Islamist group. As of 2011, the outfit controls large swathes of the southern parts of Somalia,where it is said to have imposed its own strict form of Sharia law. Al-Shabaab's troop strength as of May 2011 is estimated at 14,426 militants.

Foreign intervention, specifically the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, had a profound effect on al-Shabaab’s rise. Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. They were the only military force willing to resist the Ethiopians following the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), due to the invasion al-Shabaab was able to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers by playing on deep-seated Somali antipathy toward Ethiopia. Al- Shabaab – a clan based insurgent and terrorist group- has continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia. The group has exerted temporary and at times sustained control over strategic locations in southern and central Somalia by recruiting, at times forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies, African Union peacekeepers and non-governmental aid organizations. Al-Shabaab describes itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam". Alleging ulterior motives on the part of foreign organizations, group members have also reportedly intimidated, kidnapped and killed aid workers, leading to a suspension of humanitarian operations and an exodus of relief agents.

History and ideology

Islamist movements did not merge until the late 1960’s after Britain and Italy withdrew from their administered parts of Somaliland; a new Somali nation was established on the 1. July 1960. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed Siad Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents. A group called Salafiya al Jadiid was established which opposed President Barre’s authoritarian rule of. A second Islamist group was formed in the early 1980’s namely the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya or the Islamic Union (IU), this group was formed because they felt a heavy resentment towards President Barrre’s oppressive dictatorship. The group’s goal was to depose Barre and establish an Islamic state, which would ideally incorporate the entire Horn of Africa. Another aim of the IU was to seize the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, (Ethiopia and Somalia fought a major war in the late 1970’s) in which the majority of the people in this region are ethnically Somali. The IU never achieved its goal of getting rid of President Barre, but the group remained intact after the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid overthrew him in early 1991. In the early 2000’s a small group dedicated to protecting al-Qaeda in East Africa and striking foreign targets inside Somalia broke apart from the IU. The group was led by the former military commander of the IU-Hassan Dahir Aweis- who has been on the U.S list of suspected terrorists since shortly after 9/11 because IU provided shelter to al-Qaeda elements. This small group was then known as al-Shabaab and served as the military wing of an emerging political force called the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU traces its roots back to the 1990’s when clans and warlords set up Shari’a courts because of the political vacuum which was when President Barre’s regime collapsed. At first there was no relationship between the various Shari’a courts, but eventually they earned appreciation of much of the population for bringing order to certain parts of the country. Eventually in 2004 eleven courts merged to form the ICU. There have been several attempts from the international community at establishing an interim government, but most of the country fell under the control of Somali warlords. The competing warlords and longstanding clan rivalry has effected establishing a lasting stability in the country. In October 2004 Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was voted in as President of the second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. This has been Somalia’s lasting ruling body which is composed of Somalia’s biggest ruling clans. In 2009 Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed resigned and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became President. Al-Shabaab shares ideological ties with al-Qaeda and advocates a strict form of Salafi Islam. Their main goal is to establish an Islamic State, implementing the Shari’a and getting rid of foreigners in Somalia.

Ideology

Organization and affiliation to al-Qaeda

Terrorist designation

The outfit has been designated a terrorist organization by several western governments and security services. It is linked to Al Qaeda, an association which the group's leaders denied until early 2010. Al-Shabaab is designated as a terrorist group by Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. On the 29th of February 2008 the US government designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224.

Propaganda

Opposition

The future of al-Shabaab

Literature

Wise Rob, Al-Shabaab, Center For Strategic And International Studies, Homeland Security and CounterTerrorism Program Transnational Threats Project-AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series, Case Study Number 2, July 2011

Shinn David H., Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, Vol.2 issue 3, March 2009

Gartenstein-Ross Daveed, The Strategic Challenge of Somalia's al-Shabaab- Dimensions of Jihad, Middle East Quaterly, pg. 25-36, Fall 2009

Murphy Martin N, Somali Piracy- Why Should We Care?, RUSI Journal, 156:6, pg. 4-11, 2011