Al-Shabaab

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) (Arabic: حركة الشباب المجاهدين‎; Ḥarakat ash-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn, "Mujahideen Youth Movement" or "Movement of Striving Youth"), more commonly known as al-Shabaab (Arabic: الشباب‎, "The Youth" or "The Boys"), is a militant Islamist group. Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Al-Shabaab describes itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam". The militia is engaged in combat using guerilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies, African Union peacekeepers and non-governmental aid organizations. Al- Shabaab – a clan based insurgent and terrorist group- has continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia. The militia controls large parts of area in the south where it is believed they have imposed the Shari'a law. Foreign relief organizations have stopped travelling to Somalia, there are reports that the militia have harassed, kidnapped and killed aid workers. Several western governments have designated al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization. It is believed that the al-Shabaab have strong ties to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is opposed to Sufi traditions and has often clashed with the paramilitary Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a. The paramilitary group’s goal is to prevent a strict form of Shari’a being implemented in Somalia.

History and ideology

Islamist movements did not merge until the late 1960’s after Britain and Italy withdrew from their administered parts of Somaliland; a new Somali nation was established on the 1. July 1960. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed Siad Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents. A group called Salafiya al Jadiid was established which opposed President Barre’s authoritarian rule. A second Islamist group was formed in the early 1980’s namely the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya or the Islamic Union (IU), the group was created because alot of people resented President Barre's oppresive dictatorship. The group’s goal was to depose Barre and establish an Islamic state, which would ideally incorporate the entire Horn of Africa. Another aim of the IU was to seize the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, (Ethiopia and Somalia fought a major war in the late 1970’s) in which the majority of the people in this region are ethnically Somali. The IU never achieved its goal of getting rid of President Barre, but the group remained intact after the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid overthrew him in early 1991. In the early 2000’s a small group dedicated to protecting al-Qaeda in East Africa and striking foreign targets inside Somalia broke apart from the IU. The group was led by the former military commander of the IU-Hassan Dahir Aweis- who has been on the U.S list of suspected terrorists since shortly after 9/11 because of providing shelter to al-Qaeda members. This small group was then known as al-Shabaab and served as the military wing of an emerging political force called the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU traces its roots back to the 1990’s when clans and warlords set up Shari’a courts because of the political vacuum which was left when President Barre’s regime collapsed. At first there was no relationship between the various Shari’a courts, but eventually they earned appreciation of much of the population for bringing order to certain parts of the country. Eventually in 2004 eleven courts merged to form the ICU. There have been several attempts from the international community at establishing an interim government, but most of the country fell under the control of Somali warlords. The competing warlords and longstanding clan rivalry has effected establishing a lasting stability in the country. In October 2004 Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was voted in as President of the second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. This has been Somalia’s lasting ruling body which is composed of Somalia’s biggest ruling clans. In 2009 Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed resigned and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became President. Al-Shabaab shares ideological ties with al-Qaeda and advocates a strict form of Salafi Islam. Their main goal is to establish an Islamic State, implementing the Shari’a and getting rid of foreigners in Somalia.

Organization and leaders

Al-Shabaab is not centralized or monolithic in its agenda or goals. Its members come from disparate clans and the group is susceptible to clan politics, internal divisions and shifting alliances. Al-Shabaab is led by Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman "Abu Zubair," though experts say there is a core group of senior leaders that guide its actions. The group is divided into three geographical units: Bay and Bokool regions, led by Mukhtar Roobow "Abu Mansur," the group's spokesman; south-central Somalia and Mogadishu; and Puntland and Somaliland. A fourth unit, which controls the Juba Valley, is led by Hassan Abdillahi Hersi "Turki". There are reports stating that the units appear to operate independently from one another, and there is often evidence of friction between them. It is not clear how many are part of the al-Shabaab, but analysts generally agree that the group contains several thousand fighters. The group was able to expand for two reasons: Somalia has not had a central government since 1991 and many of the clan warlords that filled the power vacuum have proven willing to cooperate with al-Shabaab, at least in Somalia’s south.

Key members: Sheikh Aadan Haashi Ayro was the first leader of al-Shabaab, he received little formal education before joining the Islamic court in the mid-1990’s under the guidance of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweis. He is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan. Ayro was killed in May 2008 by U.S. air strike.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweis is a Somali political figure who was added to the US governments list of terrorist in 2001. Aweis was a former military commander of the IU and was a leader of al- Shabaab before it became an independent entity. He was viewed as being one of the more radical leaders of the Union, who promoted the Shari’a and directed militias that took control of the Somali capital of Mogadishu in June 2006. Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali (Abu Mansur) is the spiritual leader and a main spokesman of al-Shabaab. Abu Mansur was affiliated with the IU and is believed to be a hardline and radical Islamist who trained to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He is believed to have set up the first militant training camps in Somalia. Robow later served as the Deputy Commander of the Islamic Courts Union, which controlled much of the south of Somalia. Mukhtar Abu Zubair (Ahmed Abdi Godane) is the leader of al-Shabaab, assuming command after Ayro’s death. Abu Zubair is believed to have fought and trained in Afghanistan and to have received his religious credentials in Pakistan. He is designated by the United States as a terrorist. Ibrahim Haji Hama (al Afghani) is a leader of al-Shabaab and is responsible for operations in Somaliland and Puntland. Al Afghani is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan and the Kashmir region. One of the influential foreigners is: Abu Mansour al Amriki (Omar Hammami) is an American-born al- Shabaab militant who now commands fighters in the Bay and Bakool regions; he converted to Islam and travelled to Somalia in 2006. He also functions as an English-speaking recruiter for the group. Al-Shabaab is said to have many foreigners within its ranks, particularly at its leadership. Al Shabaab has attracted a large amount of foreigners. Foreigners from Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Afghan-trained Somalis play an important role in the group's leadership ranks due to their combat experience. Most of the foreign Al-Shabaab members come from Yemen, Sudan, the Swahili Coast, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. According to an investigative report from the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Al Shabaab has recruited over 40 Muslim Americans since 2007. These American and foreign recruits play a dual role within the organization as mercenaries and as a propaganda tool for radicalization and recruitment.

Affiliation to al-Qaeda

During the 1990’s cooperation between the IU and al-Qaeda strengthened. The IU allegedly received training, logistical and financial support from al-Qaeda. Some of its leaders travelled to train and fight with bin Laden’s fighters in Afghanistan. One of these fighters was Sheikh Aadan Haashi Ayro, who eventually became leader of al-Shabaab until his death in 2008. The extent to which al-Shabaab and the AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) might be cooperating is a matter of intense speculation. Experts say there are links between individual al-Shabaab leaders and individual members of al-Qaeda, but any organizational linkage between the two groups is weak. However there are a few noticeable ties: 1) Several of al-Shabaab’s leaders trained and fought in Afghanistan, most likely with al-Qaeda and probably had direct contact with Osama bin Laden. 2) It is known that al-Shabaab have provided shelter for top al-Qaeda leaders from East Africa. Al-Qaeda leaders receiving protection from al-Shabaab reciprocates by providing technical assistance to al-Shabaab. The final connection between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is through the media. Al-Shabaab has reportedly sworn to support AQAP, Muktar Robow a rebel leader and spokesperson for al-Shabaab stated in August 2008 “we will take our orders form Sheikh Osama bin Laden because we are his students,’ he further stated that “Most of our leaders were trained in al-Qaeda camps.” There is material suggesting that AQAP had acted as a go between for bin Laden and al-Shabaab and also bin Laden agreed to grant al-Shabaab the same al-Qaeda franchise status as AQAP. Though al-Qaeda appears to support al-Shabaab’s jihad, it is unclear whether al-Shabaab has any ambitions beyond Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s main objective is to defeat the near enemy, the TFG and AMISON supporters and to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, however they have developed an international outlook. On the other hand Somalia holds little sentimental value for al-Qaeda, but it does hold strategic value, especially as a failed state with al-Shabaab in control of large parts of the south and it lies close to Yemen, just a boat ride away. Even though there are no clear links between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab they do however share a long term ambition which is to unify the Muslim Ummah (nation) under a single Islamic Caliphate.

Terrorist designation

The group has been designated a terrorist organization by several western governments and security services. On the 29th of February 2008 the US government designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. It is linked to Al Qaeda, an association which the group's leaders denied until early 2010. Al-Shabaab is recognized as a terrorist group by Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Links to Piracy

Al-Shabaab’s income in 2009-2010 was believed to be $70-100 million, taken from various sources including taxation, extortion, and smuggling and to a limited and uncertain extent the taxation of piracy. It is presumed pirates are funding Islamic terrorist organizations by buying their freedom through paying ‘tax’ and that the links between Somali pirates and the al-Shabaab are growing. It is known that criminal and insurgent groups form alliances of convenience; but this is yet to be proved in the case of Somali pirates. There are reports suggesting that al-Shabaab have made use of pirate groups to ferry weapons and train theirs fighters in naval combat in exchange for protection, but there is no solid evidence for this. There are reports that al-Shabaab first got involved in maritime terrorism in 2007. In February 2011 pirates were held captive by al-Shabaab as they refused to give up a 5th of their income to the terrorist militia. There are reports stating that al-Shabaab receive about 30% of pirates income, in 2009 pirates paid al-Shabaab 27 Million US-Dollars. However the group was responsible for five maritime attacks, between 2007 and 2010, against ships and harbor facilities. Even though there is no concrete knowledge of the group collaborating with Somali pirates there is a growing concern on this development. According to the head of the U.N.'s counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, Al-Shabaab has increasingly sought to cooperate with other criminal organizations and pirate gangs in the face of dwindling funds and resources. Steed, however, acknowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties between the Islamist militants and the pirates. Detained pirates indicated to UNODC officials that some measure of cooperation on their part with Al-Shabaab militants was necessary, as they have increasingly launched maritime raids from areas in southern Somalia controlled by the militia.

Propaganda

Al- Shabaab uses various mediums in order to expand their propaganda. Besides traditional radio, the internet is mostly used by al-Shabaab as it is the easiest and most cost-effective way to reach a large audience. As the internet is especially popular with today's youth, al- Shabaab is using online forums and chat rooms in order to recruit young followers to their cause. This has led to an influx of foreign fighters as well as funds from a variety of donors. Al-Shabaab's official website, which has since been taken-down, featured posts, videos and official statements in English, Arabic and Somali, as well as online classrooms to educate followers. On December 7, 2011, al-Shabaab also reportedly began using the Twitter social media network. Most of al-Shabaab's messages on Twitter are in English, with authorities suggesting that they are intended for an outside audience and potential recruits in the West. The American government has stated that one of the top terrorism threats to the United States is the potential for American militants to travel to Somalia to learn to fight with the al-Shabaab and then return home to wreak havoc. Officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, are exploring legal ways to terminate the account, although they acknowledge that doing so might raise free speech concerns. American officials claim they may have authority to demand that Twitter close the al-Shabaab’s account, @HSMPress, which has attracted over eight thousand followers.

Supporting al-Shabaab

In 2006 the UN estimated there were about 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia to support the ICU. In December 2009, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea, accusing the country of arming and providing financial aid to militia groups in southern Somalia's conflict zones, including Al-Shabaab. There are speculations that al- Shabaab is recieveing financial support from Eritrea. Anti- government rebels in southern Somalia are said to be getting plane loads of weapons from Eritrea. Despite the sanctions already placed against Eritrea, the UN International Monitoring Group (IMG) published a report in 2010, stating that the country continued to support rebel groups in southern Somalia. The Eritrean administration emphatically denied the accusations, describing them as "concocted, baseless and unfounded" and demanding concrete evidence to be made publicly available, with an independent platform through which it may in turn issue a response. UN IMG issued a report again in November 2011 stating that Eritrea continues to fund al-Shabaab, it also states that Eritrea gives 80,000$ each month to al-Shabaab.

The future of al-Shabaab

A rift appears to be growing between al-Shabaab factions, which are likely to broaden as times passes. There is a high level of tension between Somali nationalist faction and the foreign terrorist faction of al-Shabaab. A split between the nationalist faction led by Sheikh Mukhtar ‘Abu Robow’ and a smaller faction of radical hardliners led by Abu Zubair could well happen regardless whether al-Shabaab succeeds or fails against AMISON and the TFG. In wake of a military defeat the nationalist's aim is to place their own clans in power, and depending on the incentives they are offered could act as influential spoilers or peace makers. The smaller group of hardliners receives foreign support from the Gulf, have a transnational jihadist agenda and aim to target US assets in the region. There are mutual grounds between the nationalist and hardliners, the hardliners have established groundwork within Somalia’s clan system, the nationalist in return have received funding and training from abroad. As al-Shabaab splinters the radical hardliner faction could seek new allies, it will mostl likely be impossible to hinder these elements from scattering across Africa. The group already has established networks that reach beyond Somalia.

If the TFG is defeated there are two major concerns. 1) if the group is not able to defeat the TFG in the next couple of years, its direction and focus should be of concern to international governments. Also 2) if AMISON withdraws and the TFG collapses this could also lead to a rift, meaning if AMISON does withdraw it could lead to many nationalist al-Shabaab members and supporters to abandon the struggle as their goals have been accomplished. All in all a split between the nationalist and foreign factions seems to be inevitable. There are several measures that will indicate al-Shabaab’s level of strength and internal coherence: first, whether the group is able to maintain its territorial control over parts of Mogadishu and how far they can expand this control over other parts of Somalia; second, whether Somalia’s business community would actually support the group or not; third, whether Somali’s who live outside Somalia continue to financialy support al-Shabaab through the hawala money transfer system (the transfer of money from one source to another without using any formal channels; such as a bank.) It is not clear how much al-Shabaab receives from outside sources. There is no doubt that al-Shabaab shares many elements that have made al-Qaeda so dangerous; strong leadership, technical expertise, and militants from around the world willing to die for a cause as well as controlling large parts of the country similar to the Afghan Taliban. Al-Shabaab’s most important advantage is that they control most of southern and much of central Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a combination of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, fighters are able to train and prepare for attacks because the groups administrative organization have provided training camps for them. Throughout its numerous training camps trainees undergo Islamist indoctrination, receive instructions on how to build and detonate a bomb, they learn how to operate small arms as well as machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. The group is composed of both Somali and international militants including several from the United States and Europe. This could be an issue as American or European militants either have relevant travel documents or can easily acquire them, which basically means they can then travel anywhere around the world. For the al-Shabaab to pose any threat to the United States and its allies, the group needs financial support, which they have proved they are not short of, allegedly they receive support from abroad; Eritrea is just one of the assumed countries supporting the militia, through the zakat(Islamic charity, one of the 5 key pillars of Islam) and through ‘taxing’ pirates. Somali political Islam will be around for a long time. One way forward is to establish a ‘constructive disengagement’ policy, which recognizes al-Shabaab’s Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it does not engage in regional violence or terrorism. If the nationalist faction would succeed in establishing a government, they could get support from the international community by allowing humanitarian aid into the country, by breaking off ties to the radical hardliners within al-Shabaab whose ambitions are for transnational Jihad.

Literature

• Wise Rob, Al-Shabaab, Center For Strategic And International Studies, Homeland Security and CounterTerrorism Program Transnational Threats Project-AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series, Case Study Number 2, July 2011

• Shinn David H., Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, Vol.2 issue 3, March 2009

• Gartenstein-Ross Daveed, The Strategic Challenge of Somalia's al-Shabaab- Dimensions of Jihad, Middle East Quaterly, pg. 25-36, Fall 2009

• Murphy Martin N, Somali Piracy- Why Should We Care?, RUSI Journal, 156:6, pg. 4-11, 2011

• Schneider Patricia, Maritimer Terrorismus: Tätergruppen und Anschlagstypen, Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedenforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 157, Januar 2012

Weblinks

• Al-Shabaab in: en.wikipedia
• Al-Shabaab in: de.wikipedia
• "CIA Worldfactbook"
• "The Splintering of al-Shabaab: Foreign Affairs"
• "Al-Shabaab: Council on Foreign Relations"
• "Al-Shabaab: Anti Defamation League"
• "Al-Shabaab: United States National Counter Terrorism Calander"
• "Combating Maritime Piracy: Council on Foreign Relations"
• "U.S. Considers Combating Somali Militants Twitter Use: New York Times"

--Tiao 16:06, 2. Mär. 2012 (CET)