Al-Shabaab: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

One of the influential foreigners is: '''Abu Mansour al Amriki (Omar Hammami)''' is an American-born al- Shabaab militant who now commands fighters in the Bay and Bakool regions; he converted to Islam and travelled to Somalia in 2006. He also functions as an English-speaking recruiter for the group.

UN IMG issued a report in November 2011 stating that Eritrea continues to fund al-Shabaab, it also states that Eritrea gives 80,000$ each month to al-Shabaab.

In 2006 the UN estimated there were about 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia in support of the ICU.

A rift appears to be growing between al-Shabaab factions, which are likely to broaden as times passes. There is a high level of tension between Somali nationalist faction and the foreign terrorist faction of al-Shabaab. A split between the nationalist faction led by Sheikh Mukhtar ‘Abu Robow’ and a smaller faction of radical hardliners led by Abu Zubair could well happen regardless whether al-Shabaab succeeds or fails against AMISON and the TFG. In wake of a military defeat the nationalist aim to place their own clans in power, they will continue to play politics and depending on the incentives they are offered could act as influential spoilers or peace makers. The smaller group of hardliners receives foreign support for the Gulf, have a transnational jihadist agenda and aim to target US assets in the region. There are mutual grounds between the nationalist and hardliners, the hardliners have established groundwork within Somalia’s clan system, the nationalist in return have received funding and training from abroad. As al-Shabaab splinters the radical hardliner faction could seek new allies, it might be impossible to hinder these elements from scattering across Africa. The group already has established networks that reach beyond Somalia.

There are several measures that will indicate al-Shabaab’s level of strength and internal coherence: first, whether the group is able to maintain its territorial control over parts of Mogadishu and how far they can expand this control over other parts of Somalia; second, whether Somalia’s business community would actually support the group or not; third, whether Somali’s who live outside Somalia continue to financialy support al-Shabaab through the hawala money transfer system (the transfer of money from one source to another without using any formal channels; such as a bank.) It is not clear how much al-Shabaab receives from outside sources. Finally analysts are watching closely how the Somali government led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed will negotiate with al-Shabaab.

There is no denying al-Shabaab poses a real and imminent threat to the United States and its allies. There is no doubt that al-Shabaab has many elements that have made al-Qaeda so dangerous; strong leadership, technical expertise, and militants from around the world willing to die for a cause as well as controlling large parts of the country similar to the Afghan Taliban. Al-Shabaab’s most important advantage is that they control most of southern and much of central Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a combination of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, fighters are able to train and prepare for attacks because the groups administrative organization have provided training camps for them. Throughout its numerous training camps trainees undergo Islamist indoctrination, receive instructions on how to build and detonate a  bomb, they learn how to operate small arms as well as machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.

Al-Shabaab will continue to train for attacks against the United States as the US appears to be high on al-Shabaabs list of international targets. The group is composed of both Somali and international militants including several from the United States and Europe meaning American or European militants either have relevant travel documents or can easily acquire them, this basically means they can then travel anywhere around the world. For the al-Shabaab to pose any threat to the United States and its allies, the group needs financial support, which they have proved they are not short of, allegedly they receive support from abroad; Eritrea is just one of the assumed countries supporting the militia, through the zakat, through ‘taxing’ pirates. The public is not aware to which extent the United States tracks al-Shabaab’s movements.

Somali political Islam will be with us for a long time. One way forward is to establish a ‘constructive disengagement’ policy, which recognizes al-Shabaab’s Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it does not engage in regional violence or terrorism. If the nationalist faction would succeed in establishing a government, they could get support from the international community by allowing humanitarian aid into the country, by breaking off ties to the radical hardliners within al-Shabaab whose ambitions are for transnational Jihad.

*[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab?page=show "The splintering of al-Shabaab by Bronwyn Bruton and J.Peter Pham, February 2012"]