Al-Shabaab: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

One of the influential foreigners is: '''Abu Mansour al Amriki (Omar Hammami)''' is an American-born al- Shabaab militant who now commands fighters in the Bay and Bakool regions; he converted to Islam and travelled to Somalia in 2006. He also functions as an English-speaking recruiter for the group.

A connection to al-Qaeda goes back as far as the 1990’s. During the 1990’s cooperation between the IU and al-Qaeda strengthened. The IU allegedly received training, logistical and financial support from al-Qaeda. Some of its leaders even travelled to train and fight with bin Laden’s fighters in Afghanistan. One of these fighters was Sheikh Aadan Haashi Ayro, who eventually became leader of al-Shabaab until his death in 2008.

The extent to which al-Shabaab and the AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) might be cooperating is a matter of intense speculation, most of it uninformed. Experts say there are links between individual al-Shabaab leaders and individual members of al-Qaeda, but any organizational linkage between the two groups is weak. However there are a few noticeable ties: 1) Several of al-Shabaab’s leaders trained and fought in Afghanistan, most likely with al-Qaeda and probably even had direct contact with Osama bin Laden. 2) It is known that al-Shabaab have provided shelter for top al-Qaeda leaders from East Africa. Al-Qaeda leaders receiving protection from al-Shabaab most likely reciprocate by providing technical assistance to al-Shabaab. The final connection between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is through the media. Al-Shabaab has reportedly sworn to support AQAP, Muktar Robow a rebel leader and spokesperson for al-Shabaab stated in August 2008 “we will take our orders form Sheikh Osama bin Laden because we are his students,’ he further stated that “Most of our leaders were trained in al-Qaeda camps.”

There is material suggesting that AQAP had acted as a go between for bin Laden and al-Shabaab and bin Laden agreed to grant al-Shabaab the same al-Qaeda franchise status as AQAP. Though al-Qaeda appears to support al-Shabaab’s jihad, it is unclear whether al-Shabaab has any ambitions beyond Somalia, as they apparently refuse to shift their focus away from Somalia and onto western targets or to change the group’s name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, because they fear this would enhance US interests. Although there are no clear links between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab they do however share a long term ambition which is to unify the Muslim Ummah (nation) under a single Islamic Caliphate. Al-Shabaab’s main objective is to defeat the near enemy, the TFG and AMISON supporters and to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, however they have developed an international outlook. On the other hand Somalia holds little sentimental value for al-Qaeda, but it does hold strategic value, especially as a failed state with al-Shabaab in control of large parts of the south and it lies close to Yemen, just a boat ride away.

Al-Shabaab’s income in 2009-2010 was believed to be $70-100 million, taken from various sources including taxation, extortion, and smuggling and to a limited and uncertain extent the taxation of piracy. Speculation is, pirates are funding Islamic terrorist organizations by buying their freedom through paying ‘tax’ and that the links between Somali pirate groups and the al-Shabaab are growing. It is known that criminal and insurgent groups form alliances of convenience; but this is yet to be proved in the case of Somali pirates. There are reports suggesting that al-Shabaab have made use of pirate groups to ferry weapons and train theirs fighters in naval combat in exchange for protection, but there is no solid evidence for this.  There are reports that al-Shabaab first got involved in maritime terrorism in 2007. In February 2011 pirates were held captive by al-Shabaab as they refused to give up a 5th of their income to the terrorist militia. There are reports stating that al-Shabaab receive about 30% of pirates income, in 2009 pirates paid al-Shabaab 27 Million US-Dollars. Between 2007 and 2010 the group was responsible for five maritime attacks which were carried out against harbor facilities as well as ships. Even though there is no concrete knowledge of the group collaborating with Somali pirates there is a growing concern on this development. According to the head of the U.N.'s counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, Al-Shabaab has increasingly sought to cooperate with other criminal organizations and pirate gangs in the face of dwindling funds and resources. Steed, however, acknowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties between the Islamist militants and the pirates. Detained pirates indicated to UNODC officials that some measure of cooperation on their part with Al-Shabaab militants was necessary, as they have increasingly launched maritime raids from areas in southern Somalia controlled by the insurgent outfit.

While Al-Shabaab has been reduced in power and size since the coordinated operation between the Somalian military and the Kenyan army began, the group has continued its efforts at recruitment and territorial control. The group maintains training camps within areas near Kismayo in the southern regions of Somalia.  

 

Al- Shabaab uses various mediums in order to expand their propaganda. Besides traditional radio, the internet is the most heavily utilized by al-Shabaab as it is the easiest and most cost-effective way to reach a large audience. As the internet is especially popular with today's youth, al- Shabaab is using online forums and chat rooms in order to recruit young followers to their cause. This has led to an influx of foreign fighters as well as funds from a variety of donors. Al-Shabaab's official website, which has since been taken-down, featured posts, videos and official statements in English, Arabic and Somali, as well as online classrooms to educate followers.

UN IMG issued a report in November 2011 stating that Eritrea continues to fund al-Shabaab, it also states that Eritrea gives 80,000$ each month to al-Shabaab.

In 2006 the UN estimated there were about 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia in support of the ICU.

A rift appears to be growing between al-Shabaab factions, which are likely to broaden as times passes. There is a high level of tension between Somali nationalist faction and the foreign terrorist faction of al-Shabaab. A split between the nationalist faction led by Sheikh Mukhtar ‘Abu Robow’ and a smaller faction of radical hardliners led by Abu Zubair could well happen regardless whether al-Shabaab succeeds or fails against AMISON and the TFG. In wake of a military defeat the nationalist aim to place their own clans in power, they will continue to play politics and depending on the incentives they are offered could act as influential spoilers or peace makers. The smaller group of hardliners receives foreign support for the Gulf, have a transnational jihadist agenda and aim to target US assets in the region. There are mutual grounds between the nationalist and hardliners, the hardliners have established groundwork within Somalia’s clan system, the nationalist in return have received funding and training from abroad. As al-Shabaab splinters the radical hardliner faction could seek new allies, it might be impossible to hinder these elements from scattering across Africa. The group already has established networks that reach beyond Somalia.

There are several measures that will indicate al-Shabaab’s level of strength and internal coherence: first, whether the group is able to maintain its territorial control over parts of Mogadishu and how far they can expand this control over other parts of Somalia; second, whether Somalia’s business community would actually support the group or not; third, whether Somali’s who live outside Somalia continue to financialy support al-Shabaab through the hawala money transfer system (the transfer of money from one source to another without using any formal channels; such as a bank.) It is not clear how much al-Shabaab receives from outside sources. Finally analysts are watching closely how the Somali government led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed will negotiate with al-Shabaab.

There is no denying al-Shabaab poses a real and imminent threat to the United States and its allies. There is no doubt that al-Shabaab has many elements that have made al-Qaeda so dangerous; strong leadership, technical expertise, and militants from around the world willing to die for a cause as well as controlling large parts of the country similar to the Afghan Taliban. Al-Shabaab’s most important advantage is that they control most of southern and much of central Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a combination of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, fighters are able to train and prepare for attacks because the groups administrative organization have provided training camps for them. Throughout its numerous training camps trainees undergo Islamist indoctrination, receive instructions on how to build and detonate a  bomb, they learn how to operate small arms as well as machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.

Al-Shabaab will continue to train for attacks against the United States as the US appears to be high on al-Shabaabs list of international targets. The group is composed of both Somali and international militants including several from the United States and Europe meaning American or European militants either have relevant travel documents or can easily acquire them, this basically means they can then travel anywhere around the world. For the al-Shabaab to pose any threat to the United States and its allies, the group needs financial support, which they have proved they are not short of, allegedly they receive support from abroad; Eritrea is just one of the assumed countries supporting the militia, through the zakat, through ‘taxing’ pirates. The public is not aware to which extent the United States tracks al-Shabaab’s movements.

Somali political Islam will be with us for a long time. One way forward is to establish a ‘constructive disengagement’ policy, which recognizes al-Shabaab’s Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it does not engage in regional violence or terrorism. If the nationalist faction would succeed in establishing a government, they could get support from the international community by allowing humanitarian aid into the country, by breaking off ties to the radical hardliners within al-Shabaab whose ambitions are for transnational Jihad.

*[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab?page=show "The splintering of al-Shabaab by Bronwyn Bruton and J.Peter Pham, February 2012"]