Against Prisons: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

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In the case of mentally sane offenders, though, not only victims' families feel a strong need for something more than just instrumental reactions to happen. It is one thing to forego punishment in the case of mentally ill offenders. It is another to do so with the sane and cold-blooded authors of heinous crimes. This becomes clearer when we imagine the case that either the child killer or the mafia killer could be set free after experts confirm a successful psychological treatment and come to the conclusion that the person in question does not pose a risk of continued offending anymore.  
In the case of mentally sane offenders, though, not only victims' families feel a strong need for something more than just instrumental reactions to happen. It is one thing to forego punishment in the case of mentally ill offenders. It is another to do so with the sane and cold-blooded authors of heinous crimes. This becomes clearer when we imagine the case that either the child killer or the mafia killer could be set free after experts confirm a successful psychological treatment and come to the conclusion that the person in question does not pose a risk of continued offending anymore.  


Most people would probably not consider it just if the offenders were to walk out of their preventive confinement without having had to "pay" for what they had done. There is a strong and very widespread emotion that those who committed heinous acts should be responded to by the intentional infliction of retributive harm upon them. One might even say that there is a kind of natural law logic that crimes must be responded to with punishment. Where there is crime, there must be punishment, not only damage repair or a sanitary reaction of preventing future occurrences.
Most people would probably not consider it just if the offenders were to walk out of their preventive confinement without having had to "pay" for what they had done. There is a strong and very widespread emotion that those who committed heinous acts should be responded to by the intentional infliction of retributive harm upon them. One might even say that common sense and jurisprudence both believe in a kind of natural law logic that crimes must be responded to with punishment: crime requires punishment. Not only the reduction of risks.


But what exactly is punishment and what are the needs it responds to? First of all, punishment is "the intentional delivery of pain" (Nils Christie), it is a strong affirmation of a negative value judgement concerning the punished person's past violation of an important norm. For the punished person, punishment is - in the words of South African judge Thokozile Masipa uttered at the occasion of the sentencing of Oscar Pistorius in 2016 - "unpleasant, it is inconvenient, it is painful, it is certainly not what you would chose to do.” And that is the very sense of it being a punishment.
But what exactly is punishment and what are the needs it responds to? First of all, punishment is "the intentional delivery of pain" (Nils Christie), it is a strong affirmation of a negative value judgement concerning the punished person's past violation of an important norm. For the punished person, punishment is - in the words of South African judge Thokozile Masipa uttered at the occasion of the sentencing of Oscar Pistorius in 2016 - "unpleasant, it is inconvenient, it is painful, it is certainly not what you would chose to do.” And that is the very sense of it.


The idea of punishment is to demonstrate emphatically that it was wrong for the offender to commit the crime, and that society is not ready to tolerate such a behavior. Punishment sends a strong symbolic message to the offender and to the public, but also to the victims of crime. It is a symbolic response to an event in the past, and a response of sorts to affirm the continuing validity of the broken norm.
By its emphatic negation of the offender's deed and by making the offender suffer for what he did, the court declares in the name of state and society that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated, and that offenders will have to live with the consequences. Punishment sends a strong symbolic message to the offender and to the public, but also to the victims of crime. It is a symbolic response to an event in the past, and a response of sorts to affirm the continuing validity of the broken norm.


Punishment is a specific reaction because of its expressive symbolism. Its fourfold meaning lies - at last according to Joel Feinberg (1970/1994) - in manifesting an authoritative disavowal of the act in question, a symbolic nonacquiescence to what happened, but it also emphatically reaffirms the law, and last not least it relieves others of suspicion and blame by way of concentrating guilt on those who are found to deserve the punishment.
Punishment is a specific reaction because of its expressive symbolism. Its fourfold meaning lies - at last according to Joel Feinberg (1970/1994) - in manifesting an authoritative disavowal of the act in question, a symbolic nonacquiescence to what happened, but it also emphatically reaffirms the law, and last not least it relieves others of suspicion and blame by way of concentrating guilt on those who are found to deserve the punishment. The expressive symbolism of punishment aspires to reach three target groups (Günther 2002: 218):  (1) the victims of crime (who are reassured that the community does not regard the event as simply bad luck or fate, but as the result of unjustified and intolerable actions), (2) the offenders (who are told that their actions are seen as responsible for that what happened and that their behaviour is seen as strongly reprehensible), and (3) the general public (who is being told that the negative consequences are being defined not as accidental, but as an injustice that cannot be tolerated and that this injustice is neither to be blamed on the victim nor on the public).


Klaus Günther (2002: 218) resumes the core significance of punishment as being a public declaration that a certain event was an injustice perpetrated by individuals, and that this injustice is not and will not be tolerated by the community. This declaration, according to Günther, has three addressees (1) the victim (who is reassured that the community does not regard his harm as simply bad luck or fate, but as the result of unjustified and untolerated actions), (2) the offender (who is told that his actions are seen as responsible for that what happened and that his behaviour is seen as strongly reprehensible), and (3) the general public (who is being told that the negative consequences are being defined not as accidental, but as an injustice that cannot be tolerated and that this injustice is neither to be blamed on the victim nor on the public).
In the course of history, punishment has played a central role ever since the emergence of proto-states, and the function of symbolic reprobation has been associated with certain forms of hard treatment. For a long time, public executions were the most conventional symbols of symbolic reprobation. Later on, the prison assumed this role. There is no natural law that can prevent coming changes. Other forms of hard treatment will become conventional expressions of symbolic reprobation in the future. Even if we suppose punishment to persist for a long time to come, one thing is certain: the prison has not been there forever, and it will not be there forever. It is but one form of punishment - and forms of punishment come and go.  
 
In the course of history, punishment has played a central role ever since the emergence of proto-states, and the function of symbolic reprobation has been associated with certain forms of hard treatment. For a long time, public executions were the most conventional symbols of symbolic reprobation. Later on, the prison assumed this role. There is no natural law that can prevent coming changes. Other forms of hard treatment will become conventional expressions of symbolic reprobation in the future.  
 
The relativity of crime (what used to be a clear hanging matter some centuries ago can be an accepted lifestyle option today) does not make punishments go away. It just moves punishment from one behavior to others, newly criminalized ones (e.g. from being gay to anti-gay discrimination). Punishments do change. What does not change is the function of punishment as a symbolic reprobation of the respective punishable acts.




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at the future. It wants to prevent the offender from re-offending, it wants to heal wounds of the victims as good as it can, and it wants to calm public anxiety that may have been fuelled by disturbing crimes. All these are (secondary) purposes of punishing offenders, but they are not what lies at the root of normative theories of punishment. If it was different, i.e. if the basic justification of punishment were only to lie in the prevention of recidivism, then "security measures" with no punitive element were to prefer over "punishment". And in those cases in which there was no recidivism to be feared, and in which, additionally, the victim had forgiven the offender and did not want to see him punished, there would be no need and no justification for punishment anymore. But still, there often are strong feelings in a community that the to restore peace and order, there was a need to respond to the crime in question by an authoritative ''actus contrarius''.
It wants to prevent the offender from re-offending, it wants to heal wounds of the victims as good as it can, and it wants to calm public anxiety that may have been fuelled by disturbing crimes. All these are (secondary) purposes of punishing offenders, but they are not what lies at the root of normative theories of punishment. If it was different, i.e. if the basic justification of punishment were only to lie in the prevention of recidivism, then "security measures" with no punitive element were to prefer over "punishment". And in those cases in which there was no recidivism to be feared, and in which, additionally, the victim had forgiven the offender and did not want to see him punished, there would be no need and no justification for punishment anymore. But still, there often are strong feelings in a community that the to restore peace and order, there was a need to respond to the crime in question by an authoritative ''actus contrarius''.


Think of the Roman Polanski case: the film director's rape victim, then 13, and now in her 40s, had filed a statement in court asking for dismissal. An editorial of the Los Angeles Times stated the reasons why the court procedure should still go on, even against the victim's explicit will, saying:  
Think of the Roman Polanski case: the film director's rape victim, then 13, and now in her 40s, had filed a statement in court asking for dismissal. An editorial of the Los Angeles Times stated the reasons why the court procedure should still go on, even against the victim's explicit will, saying:  
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