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Travis Hirschi: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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*[http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/38170_6.pdf Lilly, J. Robert; Francis T. Cullen; Richard A. Ball (2015) Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences. Chapter 6: The Complexity of Control. Hirschi’s Two Theories and Beyond. Thousand Oaks, London ..., Sage 6th ed.: 114-148] | *[http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/38170_6.pdf Lilly, J. Robert; Francis T. Cullen; Richard A. Ball (2015) Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences. Chapter 6: The Complexity of Control. Hirschi’s Two Theories and Beyond. Thousand Oaks, London ..., Sage 6th ed.: 114-148] | ||
:Relatedly, although Gottfredson and Hirschi may have identified a crucial link in the chain of conditions causing crime, they remained silent on the larger structural conditions that might affect family well-being, the ability to deliver quality parenting, | :Relatedly, although Gottfredson and Hirschi may have identified a crucial link in the chain of conditions causing crime, they remained silent on the larger structural conditions that might affect family well-being, the ability to deliver quality parenting, and the inculcation of self-control. Currie (1985) called this omission the “fallacy of | ||
and the inculcation of self-control. Currie (1985) called this omission the “fallacy of | |||
autonomy—the belief that what goes on inside the family can usefully be separated | autonomy—the belief that what goes on inside the family can usefully be separated | ||
from the forces that affect it from outside: the larger social context in which families | from the forces that affect it from outside: the larger social context in which families | ||
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Risk Youth, 1993). | Risk Youth, 1993). | ||
:Finally, Tittle, Ward, and Grasmick (2004, p. 166) have illuminated the “conceptual | :Finally, Tittle, Ward, and Grasmick (2004, p. 166) have illuminated the “conceptual incompleteness”of self-control theory. They proposed that the construct of self-control | ||
incompleteness”of self-control theory. They proposed that the construct of self-control | |||
is not a single trait or predisposition but rather involves two elements: the capacity for self-control and the desire for self-control. Gottfredson and Hirschi have largely theorized about how people differ in their capacity or ability to exercise self-control. Tittle et al. suggested, however, that individuals may also vary in their interest in exercising self-restraint. Although a beginning study, Tittle et al. (2004) present evidence drawn from a community survey of Oklahoma City adults showing that self-control capacity and desire can have independent and interactive effects on forms of misbehavior (see also Cochran, Aleska, & Chamlin, 2006). | is not a single trait or predisposition but rather involves two elements: the capacity for self-control and the desire for self-control. Gottfredson and Hirschi have largely theorized about how people differ in their capacity or ability to exercise self-control. Tittle et al. suggested, however, that individuals may also vary in their interest in exercising self-restraint. Although a beginning study, Tittle et al. (2004) present evidence drawn from a community survey of Oklahoma City adults showing that self-control capacity and desire can have independent and interactive effects on forms of misbehavior (see also Cochran, Aleska, & Chamlin, 2006). | ||
:In developing the concept of desire for self-control, Tittle et al. (2004) made an effort | :In developing the concept of desire for self-control, Tittle et al. (2004) made an effort | ||
to bring motivation—what Hirschi had always taken for granted—back into control theory. They noted that one type of motivation is the desire to commit a crime; this is the kind of motivation that traditional theories, such as strain and social learning approaches, try to explain. By contrast, Tittle et al. contended that the desire for self-control was a qualitatively distinct kind of motivation; it was the motivation to resist the lure of offending. These two types of motivation—the desire to offend and the desire to exercise restraint—are not two ends of the same continuum. Rather, Tittle et al. asserted that they are likely competing motivational forces whose comparative strength may determine whether a criminal act occurs. | to bring motivation—what Hirschi had always taken for granted—back into control theory. They noted that one type of motivation is the desire to commit a crime; this is the kind of motivation that traditional theories, such as strain and social learning approaches, try to explain. By contrast, Tittle et al. contended that the desire for self-control was a qualitatively distinct kind of motivation; it was the motivation to resist the lure of offending. These two types of motivation—the desire to offend and the desire to exercise restraint—are not two ends of the same continuum. Rather, Tittle et al. asserted that they are likely competing motivational forces whose comparative strength may determine whether a criminal act occurs. | ||