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*[https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/pls/web/docs/F8956/15_krueger.pdf Krüger, Karen (2004) “They are not different from us, they just look different“. Colonial Stereotypes and Violence in Rwanda 1994] | *[https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/pls/web/docs/F8956/15_krueger.pdf Krüger, Karen (2004) “They are not different from us, they just look different“. Colonial Stereotypes and Violence in Rwanda 1994] | ||
*Longman, Timothy (2001) CHURCH POLITICS AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA. Journal of Religion in Africa 31: 163-186. Darin: "Both because they saw Tutsi as the established elite who needed to be appeased and because they believed in the natural superiority of Tutsi, missionaries initially offered educational and employment opportunities overwhelmingly to Tutsi. As Tutsi themselves entered the priesthood, some used their positions to further advance the interests and prospects of their ethnic group. Most significantly, the court histories written by the priest Alexis Kagame helped justify Tutsi rule over Rwanda (Linden and Linden 1977: 73-185; Rutayisire 1987; Vidal 1991). Following the Second World War, a new breed of Catholic missionary, influenced by social democratic philosophies, questioned the inequalities in Rwandan society and began to foster a Hutu 'counter-elite,' providing education and employment to promising young Hutu. When a peasant uprising in November 1959 drove most Tutsi from political offices, the Hutu counter-elite fostered by the missionaries stepped out of their church functions to assume political leadership, including Gr&goire Kayibanda, who had served as editor of a Catholic newspaper and leader of a Catholic consumers' cooperative and went on to become prime minister, then president (Linden and Linden 1977: 220-281; Lemarchand 1970: 119-260). While the 1959 revolution led to a dramatic shift in the structures of political power in Rwanda, as Hutu assumed nearly all state offices, and marked a partial shift in church support from Tutsi to Hutu, the basic principles of the churches' participation in political struggles and engagement in ethnic politics remained consistent." | *Longman, Timothy (2001) CHURCH POLITICS AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA. Journal of Religion in Africa 31: 163-186. Darin: "Both because they saw Tutsi as the established elite who needed to be appeased and because they believed in the natural superiority of Tutsi, missionaries initially offered educational and employment opportunities overwhelmingly to Tutsi. As Tutsi themselves entered the priesthood, some used their positions to further advance the interests and prospects of their ethnic group. Most significantly, the court histories written by the priest Alexis Kagame helped justify Tutsi rule over Rwanda (Linden and Linden 1977: 73-185; Rutayisire 1987; Vidal 1991). Following the Second World War, a new breed of Catholic missionary, influenced by social democratic philosophies, questioned the inequalities in Rwandan society and began to foster a Hutu 'counter-elite,' providing education and employment to promising young Hutu. When a peasant uprising in November 1959 drove most Tutsi from political offices, the Hutu counter-elite fostered by the missionaries stepped out of their church functions to assume political leadership, including Gr&goire Kayibanda, who had served as editor of a Catholic newspaper and leader of a Catholic consumers' cooperative and went on to become prime minister, then president (Linden and Linden 1977: 220-281; Lemarchand 1970: 119-260). While the 1959 revolution led to a dramatic shift in the structures of political power in Rwanda, as Hutu assumed nearly all state offices, and marked a partial shift in church support from Tutsi to Hutu, the basic principles of the churches' participation in political struggles and engagement in ethnic politics remained consistent." | ||
*[http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7027.pdf Mamdani, Mahmood (2001) When Victims Becme Killers. Princeton] Darin: "Chapter Four focuses on the revolution of 1959 and on the intellectuals who tended to eulogize it. Unlike some who write after the genocide of 1994 and caricature the Revolution, I take its social claims seriously. But | *[http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7027.pdf Mamdani, Mahmood (2001) When Victims Becme Killers. Princeton] Darin: "Chapter Four focuses on the revolution of 1959 and on the intellectuals who tended to eulogize it. Unlike some who write after the genocide of 1994 and caricature the Revolution, I take its social claims seriously. But unlike those who turn the social and economic record of the revolution as reason enough to embrace it, I turn to its political record toproblematize the revolution. The single most important failure of the revolution was its inability to transform Hutu and Tutsi as political identities generated by the colonial power. If anything, the revolution built on and reinforced these identities in the name of justice. The underside of the Rwandan revolution, its political tragedy, was that this relentless pursuit of justice turned into a quest for revenge. That quest was the hallmark of the First Republic." | ||
unlike those who turn the social and economic record of the revolution as reason enough to embrace it, I turn to its political record toproblematize the revolution. The single most important failure of the revolution was its inability to transform Hutu and Tutsi as political identities generated by the colonial power. If anything, the revolution built on and reinforced these identities in the name of justice. The underside of the Rwandan revolution, its political tragedy, was that this relentless pursuit of justice turned into a quest for revenge. That quest was the hallmark of the First Republic." | |||
*Raab, Klaus (2011) Ruandas Präsident lässt mit sich reden. der Freitag Nr. 22, 1.06.2011: 21. | *Raab, Klaus (2011) Ruandas Präsident lässt mit sich reden. der Freitag Nr. 22, 1.06.2011: 21. | ||