Osama bin Laden's Death: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

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There is no headquarters and command structure.  
There is no headquarters and command structure.  


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2.3 TERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN (THE ‘SPILLOVER EFFECT’)?
While it is beyond dispute that an armed conflict between the Karzai government and the Taliban
While it is beyond dispute that an armed conflict between the Karzai government and the Taliban
takes place in Afghanistan,71 the international or non-international nature of this conflict is less
takes place in Afghanistan, the international or non-international nature of this conflict is less
clear. One may consider the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force72 as an extension
clear. One may consider the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force as an extension
of the Karzai government and thus as a party on the government side in its non-international
of the Karzai government and thus as a party on the government side in its non-international armed conflict against the Taliban; or one may argue that the alliance is an actor which internationalises
Monde/La-mort-de-Ben-Laden-ne-met-pas-fin-au-terrorisme-_NG_-2011-05-02-607984. See also Jason Burke,
the conflict. Be that as it may, what is of relevance for the spillover argument is
Al-Qaida, La veritable histoire de l’islam radical (La Découverte 2005) 19 and 25ff; Leah Farrall, ‘How al
that the Taliban, or at least a part of it, has been an ally of Al Qaeda. As may be recalled, the
Qaeda Works’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 128, 133; Felix Boor, ‘Der Drohnenkrieg in Afghanistan und
Pakistan‘ (2011) 24 Humanitäres Völkerrecht-Informationsschriften 97, 101; Rudolf and Schaller (n 25) 18. In
the same sense, see Wieczorek (n 56) 189 and Lubell (n 55) 119 (‘al Qaeda franchises’).
66 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘In Long Pursuit of Bin Laden, The ’07 Raid, and Frustration’, New York
Times, New York, 6 May 2011, A1.
67 See n 57.
68 With regard to the qualification of these groups as organised armed groups, see Laurie R Blank, ‘Finding Facts
but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare’ (2010–11) 43 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 279 passim. See also Laurie R Blank, ‘The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A
Critical Commentary’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 347, 401, in which the Hamas is
described as ‘a non-state entity’.
69 Farrall (n 65) 135.
70 Ian Hamel, L’énigme Oussama Ben Laden (Payot 2008) 299; Alain Rodier, Al-Qaida, les connexions mondiales
du terrorisme (Ellipses 2006) 190.
71 Adam Roberts, ‘Afghanistan and International Security’ in Michael N Schmitt (ed), The War in Afghanistan: A
Legal Analysis (Department of the Navy 2009) 3, 9; Boor (n 65) 100.
72 For a detailed description of the western military coalition in Afghanistan, including Operation Enduring
Freedom, dominated by the US, see Alan Cole, ‘Legal Issues in Forming the Coalition’, in Schmitt (n 71) 141.
350 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2
armed conflict against the Taliban;73 or one may argue that the alliance is an actor which internationalises
the conflict.74 Be that as it may, what is of relevance for the spillover argument is
that the Taliban, or at least a part of it, has been an ally of Al Qaeda.75 As may be recalled, the
NATO war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, authorised by the UN Security
NATO war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, authorised by the UN Security
Council after September 11,76 was waged because the then Taliban government offered Al
Council after September 11,76 was waged because the then Taliban government offered Al
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against Afghanistan was in fact a war against the Taliban, as the then Afghan government,
against Afghanistan was in fact a war against the Taliban, as the then Afghan government,
and Al Qaeda, as its ally, so that an armed conflict between NATO and the Taliban/Al
and Al Qaeda, as its ally, so that an armed conflict between NATO and the Taliban/Al
Qaeda existed.77 Yet, this situation changed with the fall of the Taliban government and the
Qaeda existed. Yet, this situation changed with the fall of the Taliban government and the
retreat of its forces and, above all, Al Qaeda to Pakistan and other countries.78 At the current
retreat of its forces and, above all, Al Qaeda to Pakistan and other countries. At the current
state of affairs, given the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in Pakistan, one could qualify, at
state of affairs, given the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in Pakistan, one could qualify, at
best, the conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban operating on Pakistani territory as a noninternational
best, the conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban operating on Pakistani territory as a noninternational
armed conflict79 (although Pakistan itself does not engage, by and large, in armed
armed conflict (although Pakistan itself does not engage, by and large, in armed
operations against Taliban or Al Qaeda terrorists and, in any case, only speaks of a ‘law enforcement
operations against Taliban or Al Qaeda terrorists and, in any case, only speaks of a ‘law enforcement
operation’).80
operation’).
As for the involvement of the US, one would have to argue, with a view to an armed conflict
 
between the US and Al Qaeda in Pakistan, that the conflict in Afghanistan, in geographic terms,
As for the involvement of the US, one would have to argue, with a view to an armed conflict between the US and Al Qaeda in Pakistan, that the conflict in Afghanistan, in geographic terms,
‘spills over’ to Pakistan and thus the US carries the fight against the Taliban (and Al Qaeda) in
‘spills over’ to Pakistan and thus the US carries the fight against the Taliban (and Al Qaeda) in
73 cf Generalbundesanwaltschaft (German Attorney General), Press release 8/2010, 19 April 2010 (case of
 
Oberst Klein regarding bombing of tanks in Kunduz), para 1, available at http://www.generalbundesanwalt.
 
de/de/showpress.php?themenid=12&newsid=360; Kai Ambos, ‘Afghanistan-Einsatz der Bundeswehr und
Christian Schaller, ‘Gezielte Tötungen und der Einsatz
Völker(straf)recht’ (2010) 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1725, 1726.
74 See Yoram Dinstein, ‘Terrorism and Afghanistan’ in Schmitt (n 71) 43, 51 and 53; generally, for an international
armed conflict if the territorial state is assisted by external forces: Rosemary Abi-Saab, Droit humanitaire
et conflits internes (Pedone 1986) 109ff.
75 Bruce Riedel, ‘Pakistan: The Critical Battlefield’ (2008) 107 Current History 355, 355; Shaun Gregory, ‘The ISI
and the War on Terrorism’ (2007) 30 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 1013, 1019; Dinstein (n 74) 52 (‘intimate
relationship’).
76 UNSC Res 1368(2001), UN Doc S/RES/1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, para 3; UNSC Res 1373(2001), UN
Doc S/RES/1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, Preamble.
77 In this vein, see Lubell (n 55) 88.
78 On the Taliban in Pakistan, see Gregory (n 75) 1024ff; Bruce Riedel, ‘Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the
Storm’ (2008) 618 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 31, 32; Thiessen
(n 2) 78ff; Amir Mir, Talibanization of Pakistan (Pentagon Press 2009) 1; Nasreen Akhtar, ‘Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and the Taliban’ (2008) XXV International Journal on World Peace 49, 50. On Al Qaeda’s presence
in Pakistan, see Imtiaz Gul, The Al Qaeda Connection, The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
(Penguin Global 2009) 26ff; Riedel (n 75) 355. For a description of a growing co-operation between the
Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda, see Mir ibid 9 and 14; Christian Schaller, ‘Gezielte Tötungen und der Einsatz
von Drohnen – Zum Rechtfertigungsansatz der Obama-Administration’ (2011) 24 Humanitäres Völkerrecht-
von Drohnen – Zum Rechtfertigungsansatz der Obama-Administration’ (2011) 24 Humanitäres Völkerrecht-
Informationsschriften 91, 95.
Informationsschriften 91, 95.
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