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Osama bin Laden's Death: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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**International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not cover this point of view. While written IHL does not define an "armed conflict", it is commonly accepted that - as far as international relations are concerned, ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States’ (cf. common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions GC I–IV). In a non-international armed conflict, there should at least be protracted violence between organized armed groups, i.e. groups whose members should not be protected by civilian immunity and thus should constitute legitimate military targets. A teleological interpretation would restrict the definition of an organized armed group in order not to justify the killing of people who (1) remain civilians during most of the time and do not exercise a so-called ‘continuous combat function’ and who therefore (2) should only lose their immunity for the duration of their combat function. | **International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not cover this point of view. While written IHL does not define an "armed conflict", it is commonly accepted that - as far as international relations are concerned, ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States’ (cf. common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions GC I–IV). In a non-international armed conflict, there should at least be protracted violence between organized armed groups, i.e. groups whose members should not be protected by civilian immunity and thus should constitute legitimate military targets. A teleological interpretation would restrict the definition of an organized armed group in order not to justify the killing of people who (1) remain civilians during most of the time and do not exercise a so-called ‘continuous combat function’ and who therefore (2) should only lose their immunity for the duration of their combat function. | ||
To put on an equal footing soldiers of regular armed forces with civilians who are part of irregular, | "To put on an equal footing soldiers of regular armed forces with civilians who are part of irregular, non-state armed groups – at least with regard to the loss of immunity from attacks – requires something more than mere membership, namely continuous preparation, execution or | ||
non-state armed groups – at least with regard to the loss of immunity from | command of ‘acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities’. Yet, once a civilian is recruited, trained and equipped for that purpose he qualifies as a de facto combatant ‘even before he or she first carries out a hostile act’. - The flipside of this increased risk imposed on de facto combatants is that such risk cannot be imposed upon persons who do not directly participate in hostilities." | ||
requires something more than mere membership, namely continuous preparation, execution or | |||
command of ‘acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities’. | |||
In any case, given the far-reaching consequences associated with the loss of (civilian) immunity from military attack, the requirements to convert a group of terrorist criminals into a party to a conflict governed by IHL should be strict. Thus, the respective group’s features ought to resemble those of a state as the paradigmatic party to a conflict. | |||
The group must demonstrate a minimum degree of collectivity and central organisation, be organised in a hierarchic manner, | |||
and – as required by Additional Protocol II – it should have the capacity ‘to carry out sustained and concerted military operations’. | |||
While, admittedly, the traditional criterion of some | |||
from | form of territorial control, notwithstanding its recognition in Additional Protocol II, has lost importance in light of the new ‘asymmetric’ and highly dynamic conflicts in the so-called | ||
a | ‘new wars’, it still serves as a useful indicator61 for the existence of an ‘organisational policy’. Be that as it may, from the above it follows that what is clearly required in terms of internal | ||
organisation is a centralised military command and a chain of command from top to bottom. These criteria are not met by a loose and decentralised terrorist network such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda lacks the required hierarchic, centralised command structure; as far as is known, it is a global interconnected network of a decentralised character, operating on different continents and in different countries by way of loosely interconnected cells. | |||
There is no headquarters and command structure. | |||
56 GC III (n 11) art 4(A)(2)(a). See also Judith Wieczorek, Unrechtmäßige Kombattanten und humanitäres | 56 GC III (n 11) art 4(A)(2)(a). See also Judith Wieczorek, Unrechtmäßige Kombattanten und humanitäres | ||
Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2005) 75ff. | Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2005) 75ff. | ||