Kriminalpolitik und Rechtsstaat: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

 
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:[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFzbjRNFNzE Polícia prende 17 do PCC em tribunal do crime]
:[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFzbjRNFNzE Polícia prende 17 do PCC em tribunal do crime]


(2) '''Grupos de extermínio (da polícia militar):'''
(2) '''Polícia militar'''
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0dplKd59FA  Military Police in Rio 2014]
 
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkK2N9aTW2g Military Police in Rio 2017]


*[http://www.eldiario.es/theguardian/Escuadrones-secretos-Filipinas-asegura-asesinatos_0_566943317.html Así funcionan los escuadrones de muerte (2016)]
*[http://www.eldiario.es/theguardian/Escuadrones-secretos-Filipinas-asegura-asesinatos_0_566943317.html Así funcionan los escuadrones de muerte (2016)]
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(3) '''Milícias (Rio de Janeiro):'''
(3) '''Milícias (Rio de Janeiro):'''
*[https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milicia_(R%C3%ADo_de_Janeiro) Milícia Rio (es.wikipedia)]
Milizen sind zunächst mafiaähnliche parastaatliche Gegenbanden um starke Männer herum, die zur Basis hin über eine cosca und nach oben hin über einen partito verfügen. Sie brauchen keinen Drogenhandel, weil sie von Zwangs-Abonnements (illegales Kabelfernsehen), von Monopolstellungen bei Gasflaschen und kurzfristigen Kreditgewährungen (Kredithaie) leben können. Notfalls ziehen sie auch einfach Steuern ein oder Schutzgeld.
Milizen sind zunächst mafiaähnliche parastaatliche Gegenbanden um starke Männer herum, die zur Basis hin über eine cosca und nach oben hin über einen partito verfügen. Sie brauchen keinen Drogenhandel, weil sie von Zwangs-Abonnements (illegales Kabelfernsehen), von Monopolstellungen bei Gasflaschen und kurzfristigen Kreditgewährungen (Kredithaie) leben können. Notfalls ziehen sie auch einfach Steuern ein oder Schutzgeld.


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:[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKO1ouUPZzg Eduardo Paes dizendo que a milícia é uma solução]
:[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKO1ouUPZzg Eduardo Paes dizendo que a milícia é uma solução]


=== El doble sentido de "política criminal" y el sueño del estado de derecho ===
=== La policía, el doble sentido de "política criminal" y el sueño del estado de derecho ===
Wenn Verbrechensbekämpfung sich krimineller Methoden der Eliminierung von Delinquenten bedient, wie es bei den Todesschwadronen und den Milizen der Fall ist, dann können sich zwischen den verschiedenen Kollektiven Privatfehden mit vielen Todesopfern entwickeln. *[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XASLhdNBcE8 Notícias de uma guerra particular (anos 90)]
Wenn Verbrechensbekämpfung sich krimineller Methoden der Eliminierung von Delinquenten bedient, wie es bei den Todesschwadronen und den Milizen der Fall ist, dann können sich zwischen den verschiedenen Kollektiven Privatfehden mit vielen Todesopfern entwickeln. *[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XASLhdNBcE8 Notícias de uma guerra particular (anos 90)]


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:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MQo9FLJWbk  An audio tape obtained by Saharareporters has revealed how Nigerian Senator Dino Melaye compromised Justice Akon Ikpeme, the tribunal judge who handled his election case in 2015]
:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MQo9FLJWbk  An audio tape obtained by Saharareporters has revealed how Nigerian Senator Dino Melaye compromised Justice Akon Ikpeme, the tribunal judge who handled his election case in 2015]
:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9t9Kee4NT8 Ghanaian Judges Caught Collecting Bribes (2015)]
:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9t9Kee4NT8 Ghanaian Judges Caught Collecting Bribes (2015)]
:*[https://www.amazon.com/Judicial-Response-Police-Killings-America/dp/0521872340 Brinks, Daniel (2008) The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America. Cambridge University Press]:  
:*[https://www.amazon.com/Judicial-Response-Police-Killings-America/dp/0521872340 Brinks, Daniel (2008) The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America. Cambridge University Press]: :The book shows how little the democracies of Argentina and Brazil have departed from the “dirty war” tactics employed by their authoritarian predecessors in the 1970s dictatorships. It shows that indeed democracies can prove even more lethal, as exemplified by the 7,500 police killings that took place in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil alone during the 1990s in comparison with the almost 600 assassinations in the whole country during the 1964-85 dictatorship. In fact, the Paulista police killed 1,428 people in the single year 1992. The conviction rates are no less chilling: 5 percent in Sao Paulo and Salvador da Bahia (Brazil), 20 percent in Buenos Aires (Argentina), 40 percent in Córdoba (Argentina), and 50 percent in Uruguay, whose population is comparable to the smaller cities of the other two countries. Yet even in Córdoba, the high conviction rate, always in relation to the other cases, is accompanied by the highest degree of outcome inequality along class lines since “a police officer who kills a middle-class individual is more than twice as likely to be convicted as one who kills a lower income resident” (p. 11). - :Another key piece in this puzzle is the quality of the information presented in the courts, a byproduct of the credibility of the witnesses and the available evidence. Interestingly, the system is not only shaped by the laws that judges apply but also by informational failures and procedural truth, which is, in most cases, a “police-crafted reality” (p. 176). Almost invariably, with the notable exception of Uruguay, the lower-class victims, the undereducated, and the marginalized are more likely to become victims and have fewer resources to craft another reality. The legal system is notably impaired by the police, who investigate their own crimes and commit many other illegal acts, from planting guns to manipulating forensic evidence. As Brinks shows, the social and political support for violent police tactics, much stronger in Brazil than in Argentina and Uruguay, also shapes judicial outcomes. In Salvador da Bahia, where the odds of being shot by the police are sixty times higher than in Uruguay, '''“the laws have been pushed aside to make way for killing the socially undesirable”''' (p. 223).
:The book shows how little the democracies of Argentina and Brazil have departed from the “dirty war” tactics employed by their authoritarian predecessors in the 1970s dictatorships. It shows that indeed democracies can prove even more lethal, as exemplified by the 7,500 police killings that took place in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil alone during the 1990s in comparison with the almost 600 assassinations in the whole country during the 1964-85 dictatorship. In fact, the Paulista police killed 1,428 people in the single year 1992. The conviction rates are no less chilling: 5 percent in Sao Paulo and Salvador da Bahia (Brazil), 20 percent in Buenos Aires (Argentina), 40 percent in Córdoba (Argentina), and 50 percent in Uruguay, whose population is comparable to the smaller cities of the other two countries. Yet even in Córdoba, the high conviction rate, always in relation to the other cases, is accompanied by the highest degree of outcome inequality along class lines since “a police officer who kills a middle-class individual is more than twice as likely to be convicted as one who kills a lower income resident” (p. 11).
:Another key piece in this puzzle is the quality of the information presented in the courts, a byproduct of the credibility of the witnesses and the available evidence. Interestingly, the system is not only shaped by the laws that judges apply but also by informational failures and procedural truth, which is, in most cases, a “police-crafted reality” (p. 176). Almost invariably, with the notable exception of Uruguay, the lower-class victims, the undereducated, and the marginalized are more likely to become victims and have fewer resources to craft another reality. The legal system is notably impaired by the police, who investigate their own crimes and commit many other illegal acts, from planting guns to manipulating forensic evidence. As Brinks shows, the social and political support for violent police tactics, much stronger in Brazil than in Argentina and Uruguay, also shapes judicial outcomes. In Salvador da Bahia, where the odds of being shot by the police are sixty times higher than in Uruguay, '''“the laws have been pushed aside to make way for killing the socially undesirable”''' (p. 223).


=== Resultat 1: Rechtswidriger Strafvollzug ===
=== Resultat 1: Rechtswidriger Strafvollzug ===
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*[[Doppelstaat]]
*[[Doppelstaat]]
*[[Kriminalpolitik außerhalb des Rechtsstaats]]
*[[Kriminalpolitik außerhalb des Rechtsstaats]]
*[[Política criminal y estado de derecho]]
*[[Rechtsstaat]]
*[[Rechtsstaat]]
*[[Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht]]
*[[Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht]]
*[[Rechtsstaatlichkeit]]
*[[Rechtsstaatlichkeit]]
*[[Rule of Law]]
*[[Rule of Law]]
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