Kriminalpolitik und Rechtsstaat: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

Kriminalpolitik ist intentionale Einwirkung auf Kriminalität. Sie besteht in erster Linie aus Entscheidungen der staatlichen Legislative, aber auch der Exekutive und Judikative sowie der politischen Parteien und weiterer Akteure.

 

Gegenstand der Kriminalpolitik sind z.B. die Schaffung und Abschaffung von materiellen und prozessualen Strafgesetzen, die Festlegung von Strafmündigkeitsgrenzen, die Bemühungen um Kriminalprävention und Resozialisierung, die Gestaltung der Kompetenzen und Organisation von Polizei, Gerichten und Strafvollzug oder auch die Entwicklung und Implementierung von Strategien des Umgangs mit Terrorismus, Wirtschaftskriminalität, Jugendkriminalität usw.

 

Kriminalpolitik kann eher reaktiv, punitiv, unschädlichmachend und exkludierend, sie kann aber auch primärpräventiv, inkludierend, ermächtigend (empowering), restaurativ oder transformativ sein.

 

Natürlich kann Kriminalpolitik auch mehr oder weniger effektiv sein. Ein besonderes Problem der Kriminalpolitik hängt mit ihrer Nähe zu den Legitimationsproblemen von Herrschaft zusammen. Diese kann dazu führen, Fragen der instrumentell-technischen Wirksamkeit kriminalpolitischer Entscheidungen gegenüber symbolisch-legitimatorischen (expressiven) Funktionen in den Hintergrund treten zu lassen.  

(2) '''Polícia militar'''

 

=== La policía, el doble sentido de "política criminal" y el sueño del estado de derecho ===

:*[https://www.amazon.com/Judicial-Response-Police-Killings-America/dp/0521872340 Brinks, Daniel (2008) The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America. Cambridge University Press]: :The book shows how little the democracies of Argentina and Brazil have departed from the “dirty war” tactics employed by their authoritarian predecessors in the 1970s dictatorships. It shows that indeed democracies can prove even more lethal, as exemplified by the 7,500 police killings that took place in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil alone during the 1990s in comparison with the almost 600 assassinations in the whole country during the 1964-85 dictatorship. In fact, the Paulista police killed 1,428 people in the single year 1992. The conviction rates are no less chilling: 5 percent in Sao Paulo and Salvador da Bahia (Brazil), 20 percent in Buenos Aires (Argentina), 40 percent in Córdoba (Argentina), and 50 percent in Uruguay, whose population is comparable to the smaller cities of the other two countries. Yet even in Córdoba, the high conviction rate, always in relation to the other cases, is accompanied by the highest degree of outcome inequality along class lines since “a police officer who kills a middle-class individual is more than twice as likely to be convicted as one who kills a lower income resident” (p. 11). - :Another key piece in this puzzle is the quality of the information presented in the courts, a byproduct of the credibility of the witnesses and the available evidence. Interestingly, the system is not only shaped by the laws that judges apply but also by informational failures and procedural truth, which is, in most cases, a “police-crafted reality” (p. 176). Almost invariably, with the notable exception of Uruguay, the lower-class victims, the undereducated, and the marginalized are more likely to become victims and have fewer resources to craft another reality. The legal system is notably impaired by the police, who investigate their own crimes and commit many other illegal acts, from planting guns to manipulating forensic evidence. As Brinks shows, the social and political support for violent police tactics, much stronger in Brazil than in Argentina and Uruguay, also shapes judicial outcomes. In Salvador da Bahia, where the odds of being shot by the police are sixty times higher than in Uruguay, '''“the laws have been pushed aside to make way for killing the socially undesirable”''' (p. 223).