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 :The second debt to the Bethlehem principles (Principle 8) and the DOJ White Paper evident in the Prime Minister’s statement is an extended concept of imminence. The necessity of striking Khan is explained as the “only feasible means of effectively disrupting the attacks planned and directed by this individual.” Self-evidently, killing Khan was not the only way of disrupting his planned attacks because British security services are also stated to have foiled more than one attack on the UK or its allies. So the concept of imminence here is not in the sense of “interception” of an unfolding plot. Rather, the Prime Minister’s language intimates that killing Khan was necessary because it was the only way to stop him trying again. As such, evaluating the “imminence” of the threat posed by Khan would appear to be in the nature of a probabilistic risk assessment of his (high) propensity to plan and direct another terrorist attack in the UK; by virtue of his pattern of activity, his very continued life constituted an imminent risk. Also included in this extended concept of imminence is whether other opportunities to kill the target will present themselves, should he not be targeted now. The language of the DOJ White Paper is perhaps more explicit about this than the Bethlehem principles, but in my view they boil down to the same position:
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+::First, the condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future … Consequently, with respect to Al-Qa’ida leaders who are continually planning attacks , the United States is likely to have only a limited window of opportunity within which to defend Americans in a manner that has both a high likelihood of success and sufficiently reduces the probabilities of civilian casualties … Furthermore a “terrorist war” does not consist of a massive attack across an international border, nor does it consist of one isolated incident … It is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks. It is very difficult to know when and where the next incident will occur.
+::… By its nature, therefore, the threat posed by Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate. In this context, imminence must incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks…
+::… A high-level [US] official could conclude that an individual poses an “imminent threat” of violent attack against the United States where he is an operational leader of Al-Qa’ida or an associated force and is personally and continually involved in planning terrorist attacks against the United States … and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities …
+:Several aspects of this concept of imminence are noteworthy. First, the concept of imminent threat – terminology drawn from the debate over the legality of anticipatory self-defence within the UN Charter framework – is here radically subjectivized (that is, made the quality or characteristic of an individual subject). It becomes a question, as noted above and evident in the language of Cameron’s statement, about whether this person’s continued existence amounts to an on-going threat, even if we cannot identify a plan to attack at this moment; past conduct and continued intention are decisive. Second, the logic of the targeting rationale is not “interceptive” (to use Dinstein’s terminology, Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th edition, Cambridge, 2005, p.191) or even “anticipatory” in the sense of the various archetypal scenarios against we are accustomed to measure the meaning of this term (see, for example, the cases discussed by Gray in her cautious treatment: Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3rd edition, Oxford, 160-64). Rather, the logic is preventive.
+:It is often noted that anticipatory self-defence vis-a-vis state actors remains controversial and uncertain. But it seems to me that preventive killing of the kind claimed to be legally justified by Cameron, is not a version of anticipatory self-defence; rather it amounts to a new kind of claimed exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force, an exception predicated on a legal argument in which the lines between crime and casus belli, terrorism and armed attack, criminal and enemy, state war and non-state war, are deliberately blurred – with the result that the conceptual distinctions that have hitherto formed a fragile scaffolding by which we have differentiated between defensive force, and something else, are hollowed out and transformed to licence a kind of conflict that (on both sides) destroys these distinctions.
+:Preventive killing is, self-evidently, a kind of manhunting. It rests not only on an asymmetry of means and methods of warfare, but also on a thick juridical asymmetry: one side, the state claiming self-defence, has complete legal and political personality, protected by international law as a bearer of jus ad bellum rights and duties. On the other side, the targeted person is at once criminal and military threat; they may have a legal equality vis-a-vis other persons as a bearer of human rights, but these are highly attenuated by their purported subsumption under the jus ad bellum as an “imminent threat”. To the extent that one’s pattern of conduct and continued presumed intention to plan terrorist attacks render one’s life by its nature an imminent threat, one’s right to life is highly conditional.
+:This juridical asymmetry has consequences for what we understand to be the purpose of the strict limits placed on the use of force by the Charter framework. The framework protects states’ right to defend themselves, but balances this with the aim of restraining as much as possible uses of force which could escalate into larger conflicts. As such, the Charter framework presumes and indeed requires that temporary defensive uses of force between states can be quickly subjected to peaceful forms of dispute resolution, where the underlying clash of interests leading to the outbreak of conflict can be mediated or even adjudicated. All of this presupposes the legal symmetry of states, and that each state’s interests have in principle the possibility of being recognized and negotiated, as means of containing the use of force. It is in light of this logic that we might understand the strict conceptualizations of armed attack and imminent threat that have governed the orthodox understanding of self-defence: states are not considered to have implacable and inevitable enmity towards each other (even if they are perpetual competitors or ideological enemies), but rather capable of changing their positions, even at the 11th hour, in light of the changing constellation of forces being brought to bear upon them that may affect their understanding of their interests and how best to achieve them.
+:Preventive killing is not assimilable to this logic. The targeted individual is not expected to change their views or their perception of their interest; at best, they may remove themselves from ongoing participation in the armed activities of the terrorist group, out of fear. But even this seems unlikely and indeed unexpected by those charged with evaluating the individual’s status as a target. There is no dispute with this individual to be resolved as a way of short-circuiting the use of force; there is only a threat to be disrupted, and a constant vigilance concerning the emergence of new such threats must be maintained.
+:With at least 500 British citizens estimated to be fighting with ISIL since 2014, the number of individuals that could in principle be targetable on this basis is not negligible, entailing a more or less perpetual posture of readiness for preventive killing. Other states with significant numbers of citizens who have joined ISIL over the last 12 months, such as France, have also indicated that they are preparing strikes to address threats to France.
+:Apart from Syria, other ungoverned territories may be included among those states in which there are no feasible options for arrest or detention – Libya, Mali and Somalia are easily susceptible to such categorization. With no risk of inter-state retaliation from such weak states, and the real prospect that killing militants said to threaten national security may be politically popular at home (given also that no military personnel are put at direct risk in such operations), the temptations of preventive killing as a policy option are numerous. But we ought to be under no illusion that – practised like this, and justified in these terms – it represents anything but significant alteration to how we have hitherto understood the law governing the use of force.
 *Cox, Edward L. (2008) The Legality of U.S. Targeted Killings in the War on Terror. aufgerufen am 14.06.08 unter http://blog.left-handedelephant.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/the-legality-of-targeted-killings.pdf
 *David, Steven R. (2002) Targeted Killing has its Place. Los Angeles Times, 25.07., S. 13.