George Herbert Mead

Der us-amerikanische Philosoph, Soziologie und Psychologie George Herbert Mead (27.02.1863 South Hadley, Mass. - 26.04.1931) wirkte hauptsächlich an der Universität von Chicago und gilt als wichtiger Vertreter des Pragmatismus.

Mit seinem M.A. (Harvard) ging Mead 1888 nach Leipzig zu Wilhelm Wundt ("Die Geste"), heiratete 1891 und erhielt - obwohl er seine Doktorarbeit nie fertigstellte - in demselben Jahr eine Stelle an der University of Michigan, wo er Charles H. Cooley und John Dewey kennenlernte, die sein Werk stark beeinflussen sollten. 1894 wechselte er mit Mead an die University of Chicago, wo er bis an sein Lebensende lehrte ("Mind, Self, and Society") und auch politisch aktiv war. Er veröffentlichte viel, aber nie ein Buch. Erst nach seinem Tod stellten einige seiner Studenten vier Bände seiner Schriften zusammen: The Philosophy of the Present (1932), hg. v. Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and Society (1934), hg. v. Charles W. Morris; Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), hg. v. Merritt H. Moore; und The Philosophy of the Act (1938), Mead's 1930 Carus Lectures, hg. v. Charles W. Morris.

Zu seinen wichtigsten Werken mit Relevanz für die Kriminologie werden gezählt: “The Social Self” (1913); “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922); “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” (1925); “The Objective Reality of Perspectives” (1926). 25 seiner wichtigen Veröffentlichungen: Andrew J. Reck, Hg.(1964). Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead. Bobbs-Merrill, The Liberal Arts Press.

Pragmatismus und Symbolischer Interaktionismus

Im Gegensatz zu mehr ontologischen Denkern wie Heidegger, die die Enthüllung des Seins aus der Perspektive des erlebenden Menschen betonen, konzentrieren sich Pragmatiker wie Mead auf die Entwicklung des Selbst und die Objektivität der Welt innerhalb des sozialen Bereichs. Sie betonen die wechselseitige Abhängigkeit menschlichen Bewußtseins von geteilten Bedeutungen (vgl. Mead 1982: 5).

Lastly, if we want to understand actors, we must base that understanding on what people actually do. Three of these ideas are critical to symbolic interactionism: 1) the focus on the interaction between the actor and the world 2) a view of both the actor and the world as dynamic processes and not static structures and 3) the actor's ability to interpret the social world. Thus, to Mead and symbolic interactionists, consciousness is not separated from action and interaction, but is an integral part of both.

Mead's theories in part, based on pragmatism and behaviorism, were transmitted to many graduate students at the University of Chicago who then went on to establish symbolic interactionism.[14]

Social Philosophy (Behaviorism)

Mead was a very important figure in 20th century social philosophy. One of his most influential ideas was the emergence of mind and self from the communication process between organisms, discussed in Mind, Self and Society, also known as social behaviorism.[15] This concept of the how mind and self emerge from the social process of communication by signs founded the symbolic interactionist school of sociology. Rooted intellectually in Hegelian dialectics and process philosophy, Mead, like Dewey, developed a more materialist process philosophy that was based upon human action and specifically communicative action. Human activity is, in a pragmatic sense, the criterion of truth, and through human activity meaning is made. Joint activity, including communicative activity, is the means through which our sense of self is constituted. The essence of Mead's social behaviorism is that mind is not a substance located in some transcendent realm, nor is it merely a series of events that takes place within the human physiological structure. This approach opposed traditional view of the mind as separate from the body. The emergence of mind is contingent upon interaction between the human organism and its social environment; it is through participation in the social act of communication that the individual realizes their potential for significantly symbolic behavior, that is, thought. Mind, in Mead’s terms, is the individualized focus of the communicational process. It is linguistic behavior on the part of the individual. There is, then, no “mind or thought without language;” and language (the content of mind) “is only a development and product of social interaction” (Mind, Self and Society 191- 192). Thus, mind is not reducible to the neurophysiology of the organic individual, but is emergent in “the dynamic, ongoing social process” that constitutes human experience (Mind, Self and Society 7).[12]

For Mead, mind arises out of the social act of communication. Mead’s concept of the social act is relevant, not only to his theory of mind, but to all facets of his social philosophy. His theory of “mind, self, and society” is, in effect, a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of a social process involving the interaction of many individuals, just as his theory of knowledge and value is a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of the experiencing individual in interaction with an environment.[12] Action is very important to his social theory and, according to Mead, actions also occur within a communicative process. The initial phase of an act constitutes a gesture. A gesture is a preparatory movement that enables other individuals to become aware of the intentions of the given organism. The rudimentary situation is a conversation of gestures, in which a gesture on the part of the first individual evokes a preparatory movement on the part of the second, and the gesture of the second organism in turn calls out a response in the first person. On this level no communication occurs. Neither organism is aware of the effect of its own gestures upon the other; the gestures are nonsignificant. For communication to take place, each organism must have knowledge of how the other individual will respond to his own ongoing act. Here the gestures are significant symbols.[15] A significant symbol is a kind of gesture that only humans can make. Gestures become significant symbols when they arouse in the individual who is making them the same kind of response they are supposed to elicit from those to whom the gestures are addressed. Only when we have significant symbols can we truly have communication.[16] Mead grounded human perception in an "action-nexus" (Joas 1985: 148). We perceive the world in terms of the “means of living” (Mead 1982: 120). To perceive food, is to perceive eating. To perceive a house, is to perceive shelter. That is to say, perception is in terms of action. Mead's theory of perception is similar to that of J. J. Gibson.

Mead the social psychologist argued the antipositivistic view that the individual is a product of society, or more specifically, social interaction. The self arises when the individual becomes an object to themselves. Mead argued that we are objects first to other people, and secondarily we become objects to ourselves by taking the perspective of other people. Language enables us to talk about ourselves in the same way as we talk about other people, and thus through language we become other to ourselves.[17] In joint activity, which Mead called 'social acts', humans learn to see themselves from the standpoint of their co-actors. It is through realizing ones role in relation to others that selfhood arises.

However, for Mead, unlike John Dewey and J. J. Gibson, the key is not simply human action, but rather social action. In humans the "manipulatory phase of the act" is socially mediated, that is to say, in acting towards objects humans simultaneously take the perspectives of others towards that object. This is what Mead means by "the social act" as opposed to simply "the act" (the latter being a Deweyan concept). Non-human animals also manipulate objects, but that is a non-social manipulation, they do not take the perspective of other organisms toward the object. Humans on the other hand, take the perspective of other actors towards objects, and this is what enables complex human society and subtle social coordination. In the social act of economic exchange, for example, both buyer and seller must take each other's perspectives towards the object being exchanged. The seller must recognize the value for the buyer, while the buyer must recognize the desirability of money for the seller. Only with this mutual perspective taking can the economic exchange occur (Mead was influenced on this point by Adam Smith).

A final piece of Mead's social theory is the mind as the individual importation of the social process. As previously discussed, Mead presented the self and the mind in terms of a social process. As gestures are taken in by the individual organism the individual organism also takes in the collective attitudes others, in the form of gestures, and reacts accordingly with other organized attitudes. This process is characterized by Mead as the "I" and the "Me." The "Me" is the social self and the "I" is the response to the "Me." In other words, the "I" is the response of an individual to the attitudes of others, while the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which an individual assumes.[18] Mead develops William James' distinction between the "I" and the "me." The "me" is the accumulated understanding of "the generalized other" i.e. how one thinks one's group perceives oneself etc. The "I" is the individual's impulses. The "I" is self as subject; the "me" is self as object. The "I" is the knower, the "me" is the known. The mind, or stream of thought, is the self-reflective movements of the interaction between the "I" and the "me." These dynamics go beyond selfhood in a narrow sense, and form the basis of a theory of human cognition. For Mead the thinking process is the internalized dialogue between the "I" and the "me." Mead rooted the self’s “perception and meaning” deeply and sociologically in "a common praxis of subjects" (Joas 1985: 166) found specifically in social encounters. Understood as a combination of the 'I' and the 'me', Mead’s self proves to be noticeably entwined within a sociological existence: For Mead, existence in community comes before individual consciousness. First one must participate in the different social positions within society and only subsequently can one use that experience to take the perspective of others and thus become self-conscious.

Play and Game and the Generalized Other

Mead theorized that human beings begin their understanding of the social world through "play" and "game". "Play" comes first in the child's development. The child takes different roles he/she observes in "adult" society, and plays them out to gain an understanding of the different social roles. For instance, he first plays the role of policeman and then the role of thief while playing "Cops and Robbers," and plays the role of doctor and patient when playing "Doctor." As a result of such play, the child learns to become both subject and object and begins to become able to build a self. However, it is a limited self because the child can only take the role of distinct and separate others, they still lack a more general and organized sense of themselves.[19]

In the next stage, the game stage, it is required that a person develop a self in the full sense of the term. Whereas in the play stage the child takes on the role of distinct others, in the game stage the child must take the role of everyone else involved in the game. Furthermore, these roles must have a definite relationship to one another. To illustrate the game stage, Mead gives his famous example of a baseball game:

But in a game where a number of individuals are involved, then the child taking one role must be ready to take the role of everyone else. If he gets in a ball nine he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all of these roles. They do not all have to be present in consciousness at the same time, but at some moments he has to have three or four individuals present in his own attitude, such as the one who is going to throw the ball, the one who is going to catch it and so on. These responses must be, in some degree, present in his own make-up. In the game, then, there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the appropriate attitudes of the other. (Mead, 1934/1962:151)

In the game stage, organization begins and definite personalities start to emerge. Children begin to become able to function in organized groups and most importantly, to determine what they will do within a specific group.[20] Mead calls this the child's first encounter with "the generalized other", which is one of the main concepts Mead proposes for understanding the emergence of the (social) self in human beings. "The generalized other" can be understood as understanding the given activity and the actors place within the activity from the perspective of all the others engaged in the activity. Through understanding "the generalized other" the individual understands what kind of behavior is expected, appropriate and so on, in different social settings. The mechanism of perspective taking within social acts is the exchange of social positions.

Notes

^ Baldwin, John (2009). George Herbert Mead. Sage. ISBN 0-8039-2320-1. ^ Miller, David (2009). George Herbert Mead: Self, Language, and the World. University of Texas Press. ISBN 0-292-72700-3. ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 352–353. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 353. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. ^ [1] “Suggestions Towards a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” (1900) ^ [2] “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning” (1910) ^ [3] “What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose” (1910) ^ [4] “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness” ^ [5] “The Social Self” (1913) ^ [6] “Scientific Method and the Individual Thinker” (1917) ^ [7] “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922) ^ a b c Cronk, George (2005), "George Herbert Mead", in Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ^ The Mead Project at Brock University ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 347–350. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. ^ a b c Desmonde, William H (2006) [1967]. "Mead, George Herbert (1863-1931)". In Borchert, Donald M.. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 6. Macmillan Reference. pp. 79–82. ISBN 0028657861. ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 356–357. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. ^ Gillespie, Alex (2006). Becoming Other - from Social Interaction to Self-Reflection. Information Age Publishing. ISBN 9781593112301. ^ Margolis, Joseph; Jacques Catudal (2001). The Quarrel between Invariance and Flux. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 360. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. ^ Ritzer, George (2008). Sociological Theory. McGraw-Hill. pp. 360–361. ISBN 978-0-07-352818-2. Bibliography

1932. The Philosophy of the Present. Prometheus Books. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Ed. by Charles W. Morris. University of Chicago Press. 1936. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Ed. by C. W. Morris. University of Chicago Press. 1938. The Philosophy of the Act. Ed. by C.W. Morris et al. University of Chicago Press. 1964. Selected Writings. Ed. by A. J. Reck. University Chicago Press. This out-of-print volume collects articles Mead himself prepared for publication. 1982. The Individual and the Social Self: Unpublished Essays by G. H. Mead. Ed. by David L. Miller. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780608094793 2001. Essays in Social Psychology. Ed. by M. J. Deegan. Transaction Books. (Book review [13])

Literatur

Aboulafia, Mitchell (ed.) (1991) Philosophy, Social Theory, and the Thought of George Herbert Mead. SUNY Press. Aboulafia, Mitchell (2001) The Cosmopolitan Self: George Herbert Mead and Continental Philosophy. University of Illinois Press. Blumer, H. & Morrione, T.J. (2004) George Herbert Mead and Human Conduct. New York: Altamira Press. Conesa-Sevilla, J. (2005). The Realm of Continued Emergence: The Semiotics of George Herbert Mead and its Implications to Biosemiotics, Semiotics Matrix Theory, and Ecological Ethics. Sign Systems Studies, September, 2005, Tartu University, Estonia. Cook, Gary A. (1993) G.H. Mead: The Making of a Social Pragmatist. University of Illinois Press. Gillespie, A. (2005) "G.H. Mead: Theorist of the social act," [14] Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35: 19-39. Gillespie, A. (2006). Games and the development of perspective taking [15]. Human Development, 49, 87-92. Joas, Hans (1985) G.H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought. MIT Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1992) "Individuation through socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s theory of socialization," in Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, translated by William Mark Hohengarten. MIT Press. Honneth, Axel (1996) "Recognition and socialization: Mead's naturalistic transformation of Hegel's idea," in Honneth, Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, translated by Joel Anderson. MIT Press. Lewis, J.D. (1979) "A social behaviorist interpretation of the Meadian 'I'," American Journal of Sociology 85: 261-287. Lundgren, D.C. (2004) "Social feedback and self-appraisals: Current status of the Mead-Cooley hypothesis," Symbolic Interaction 27: 267-286. Miller, David L. (1973) G.H. Mead: Self, Language and the World. University of Chicago Press. Sánchez de la Yncera, Ignacio (1994) La Mirada Reflexiva de G.H. Mead. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Shalin, Dmitri (1988) "G. H. Mead, socialism, and the progressive agenda," American Journal of Sociology 93: 913-951. Silva, F. C. (2007) G.H. Mead. A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. Silva, F. C. (2008) Mead and Modernity. Science, Selfhood and Democratic Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Weblinks

• George Herbert Mead. "The Psychology of Punitive Justice", American Journal of Sociology 23, (1918): 577-602. [[1]]

• Dies ist eine noch zu übersetzende und zu kriminologifizierende Baustelle. Grundlage ist: en.wikipedia [[2]]