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'''Crises contemporâneas e justiça criminal'''
== Ontological insecurity ==
Jock Young (1991) The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime, and Difference.
The velocity of social change since the 1960s contributes to the sense of disorientation. Cultural change: from material values to aesthetic values (post-materialist); liberalisation of life-style. Backlash since 1971 (War on Drugs), 1974 (Nothing Works). Street crime wave in NYC and elsewhere. 1980s: crack epidemic, high crime rates, rising imprisonment, punitive turn (Sentencing guidelines, minimum sentences, truth in sentencing). Cuts in welfare: neo-liberalism. Externalisation of labour and jobs. Threat to the middle class. Middle class squeeze. Loss of job security. Education becomes commodity. Economic insecurit. Negative outlook for generation of children. Migration. Status anxieties. Parallel to early 20th century.
David Garland (2002) The Culture of Control. Crime & Social Order in contemporary society.
Acting out, mass incarceration, three strikes laws. Penal excess. Anti-migration.
== Vicious Circle ==
The economic laws of organized crime and stronger than the penal law of prohibition.
Imprisonment does little to reduce crime. Five years after release, many are back. But it does a lot to increase crime: (1) whoever had a function in the drug market outside will be replaced by new recruits from the mass of unemployed youths out there, so every new inmate creates a new delinquent on the outside. The more go to prison, the more people will be dragged into crime on the outside. (2) The inside can be used as a headquarter for organized crime giving orders to the outside.
It also turns the clock of prison evolution backwards in two or even three ways: (1) attempts to prevent inside criminal organisation lead to a renaissance of solitary confinement (this time without religion), (2) overcrowding leads to a return to congregate indiscriminate warehousing - the type of incarceration that had motivated John Howard to his 1777 classic "The State of the Prisons". (3) The evident ineffectiveness of incarcerating drug delinquents (who make up a large share of inmates) leads to "acting out" by the state.
Acting Out: increasing police powers, caveiroes, militarisation. War-making by the state and para-state. Extrajudicial killings like in a war against combatants. Spies, provocations, surveillance, torture.
'''Latin America'''
Instituto Igarapé Thursday, 26 April 2018:  2.5 million murders 2000-2017. - 33% of worldwide homicides - 8% world population. - 25% of all homicides in only these four countries: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela.
Almost 50% of all victims: 15-29.
Guns: 75% (world: 40%).
2017: Bloodiest year yet in Mexico. Elections first of July, 2018. Jaime Rodríguez: chop hands off thieves
Social policy Brazil: PEC 55  20 years freeze on social and educational spending. (Dec. 2016).
== Prisons and the Polarisation of Drug Policies ==
And, every year, this report is, unfortunately, hardly a surprise – we read about
the degrading conditions in which people are imprisoned, and about
their growing number. Yet the level
of crime in most societies is constantly decreasing. The question that remains unanswered, therefore, is why our societies focus their response to unlawful behaviours so often on prison? Where is the proportionality
in sentencing when we punish non- violent offences with lengthy prison sentences? Is this the only response we can offer?
The chapter on drugs and imprisonment in this report highlights that a high number of prisons in the world are overcrowded due to the incarceration of people for drug-related offences, in particular non-violent offences involving use and possession for personal use. This directly
re ects our contemporary addiction
to punishment and showcases the disproportionality of punishment in relation to the offence. The use of harsh prison sentences for people
who use drugs or for those who play
a minor role in the drug trade also shows the inef ciency, limitations and perverse effects of current drug control policies. Not only are punishment
and incarceration becoming the sole instruments used to enforce the law, but also they are serving to implement moral norms which have no link with the reality of the offence that they are supposed to punish.
This trend of over-incarceration and punishment of people who use drugs is seen on every continent. The deep impact it has on prison systems
and on people in prison and their communities has sparked the current global debate on drug policy reform. In recent years, more and more countries have been introducing amendments
to their drug laws; for example, by decriminalising the use of drugs
in Norway and Colombia, and by replacing prison terms with monetary  nes in Ghana and Tunisia or with community service, as envisaged
in Senegal. Other countries have
gone even further. Ecuador gave an amnesty to drug couriers and released thousands of prisoners. Countries
that have traditionally adopted harsh stances on drugs, such as Malaysia and Iran, are reviewing their death penalty policies for drug offences,
and removing people from death row.
These changes and reforms are
being discussed and implemented
in a global environment that remains highly stigmatising, where drugs are still considered ‘evil’ and prohibition approaches prevail. They are therefore born out of a real need – the need for societies to stop exposing their citizens to greater risks from arrests related to drug use than come from the act of using drugs.
The need for reforms was also highlighted at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs held in 2016. In their decisions there, member states called for more proportionate sentencing and for alternatives to incarceration. At the Global Commission on Drug Policy,
we call for these commitments to be implemented, taking account of the fact that over-incarceration as
a result of out-of-date drug policies stalls progress on implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, notably for Goal 3 on health, Goal 5 on gender equality, Goal 10 on reducing inequality, and Goal 16 on peaceful societies.
Drug policies need reforms, and there are two urgent ones to enact. First, we need to accept that behaviours and actions of others that are not aligned with our own moral perspectives do not need to be turned into criminal offences. Second, we need to introduce proportionate sentencing and alternatives to imprisonment for minor drug supply-related offences. This will ease pressure on prison systems so that they can ful l their purpose as set down in the UN Nelson Mandela Rules: to play a rehabilitative role and focus on social reintegration, and to distance from the criminal justice system those who should not be subject to it, including people who use drugs.
Rt Hon Helen Clark
Member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy; Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1999–2008; Former Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009–2017.'''Zone of War.'''
From: Foreword to Global Prison Trends 2018 pdf.
Increasing number of states introduce death penalty in response to inefficient drug policy. From 10 to 33 between the 1970s and today.
In some countries, like the Philippines: Zone of Internal Total War. Death penalty for nonviolent drug offenses. Trump. 4 levels of barbarisation: (1) tough talk (chop hands off, kill them), (2) tough laws (capital punishment for non-violent drug offenses), (3) hypocritical extrajudicial killings, (4) open policy of extrajudicial killings.
The less effective, the more investment in the war on drugs. And the bigger the problem gets. From drugs to deaths and destroyed families, and from there to corruption and militias and a war against the underclass.
== Virtuous Circle ==
1. Legally controlled policing: training, command structure, accountability, prosecution, courts. Internal and external control of legality. Stop extralegal killings. Stop militias. Stop corruption. Demilitarise police work. Nodal policing à la Clifford Shearing. Alex Vitale (2017) The End of Policing.
2. Reducing the role of prisons
Abolish minimum sentences
Decriminalise marihuana and drug use in general (Portugal)
Alternative sentences for nonviolent crime
Regulation instead of criminalisation for drugs
3. Holland, Portugal, California, Uruguay: which way to go?
4. Legal obstacles:
#Modification
#Amendment
#Denunciation
#Reservation
#Modification inter se
#Emergency exit
'''Zone of Pragmatism'''
 
'''How does the political and economic crisis - both on a national and international level - affect the criminal justice system (legislation, police, prosecution, judiciary, prisons)? How does it, more specifically, affect individual rights, the balance of powers, and the democratic order?'''
'''How does the political and economic crisis - both on a national and international level - affect the criminal justice system (legislation, police, prosecution, judiciary, prisons)? How does it, more specifically, affect individual rights, the balance of powers, and the democratic order?'''
Winners and Losers of Globalization
Global: winners are the top 1% and the middle classes of emerging countries. Losers are rich country middle classes and the very poor.
Nancy Birdsall (2017): "Cornell economist Robert Frank argues that the growth in wealth and income at the top has hurt working and middle class households in ways
hard to capture in income differences alone. The new rich, for example, push up house sizes and prices in good neighborhoods—making middle class residents “house-poor” as they spend larger shares of their income to live in neighborhoods with good public schools. Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton have documented the increase in mortality and morbidity of white men in the United States whose loss of secure income and social status is associated with alcohol and opiate addiction— not unlike the rise in male mortality in Russia following the collapse of its
planned economy with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Carol Graham of the Brookings Institution has recorded a large gap in the United States in the idea that hard work gets you ahead and are thus optimistic about the future (as in the American dream), between the middle and top quintiles of the income distribution—a gap that is larger in the United States than in countries surveyed in Latin America where the “middle” of the distribution is much poorer on average.
 
Brexit, Trump, and the rise of the populist right in Europe (even when the populist right loses, as it did in France, it captures a large share of votes) are as much about anxiety and insecurity as about immediate economic realities. Even the better-off upper middle class in the West is restless and fearful for the future of its children. After all, globalization broadly defined has meant not only the creation of a Davos-style, unmoored elite, but the more rapid spread of new technologies. Robots and the rise of the gig economy are eating away not only at manufacturing jobs, but at the secure white-collar office and retail salaried jobs that were the bedrock of postwar 20th century middle class prosperity in the West.
Meanwhile, there is the aftermath of the financial crisis. In the United States, steps taken by the federal government to rescue the economy from a financial panic and meltdown included “saving” the banks and, more problematically, saving the bankers, but did little to nothing for over- leveraged working and middle-class mortgage holders. In Europe, too, as the Eurozone crisis unfolded, French and German and US bankers were (at least apparently) bailed out—while German taxpayers and Greek pensioners lost out.
Culture has followed economics: What is behind the new anti-globalist culture reflected in Brexit, the popularity of Le Pen, the rise of populist right parties in Europe, the election of Donald Trump in the United States? Structural changes in the contours of a globally integrated economy have almost surely mattered. Even if most adherents to the populist right are only vaguely aware of a new middle class in China and Mexico, and have no statistics at hand about the richest 1 percent in their own countries, they correctly grasp that these have to do with something vaguely defined as “globalization” and the capture of its benefits by a globalist elite and its like-minded professional experts."
Arab countries: An Aug 20, 2010, report from Beirut stated: "Throughout most of the Arab world, poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy rates are on the rise while the quality of education, healthcare, and social safety-nets for the poor and elderly are falling to unprecedented levels."
After the Arab revolts of 2011, [https://books.google.com.br/books?id=7jCYDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA102&lpg=PA102&dq=antidemocratic+trends+arab+world&source=bl&ots=RHLvUoIB8X&sig=Wjt2Sz1xZETkkwNRjdGPJtmpnYc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwijken2-7_aAhUFC5AKHRV9A6UQ6AEISzAF#v=onepage&q=antidemocratic%20trends%20arab%20world&f=false widespread armed conflict destroyed economies and an authoritarian backlash destroyed democratic hopes].


Decline of Democracy Yascha Mounk &  Roberto Stefan Foa  (2016/2017) The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. July 2016. Journal of Democracy. And January 2017. The Signs of Deconsolidation. - Political scientists long assumed that “democratic consolidation” was a one-way street, but survey evidence of declining support for democracy from across the established democracies suggests that deconsolidation is a genuine danger. The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. In recent years, parties and candidates challenging key democratic norms have won unprecedented popular support in liberal democracies across the globe. Drawing on public opinion data from the World Values Survey and various national polls, we show that the success of anti-establishment parties and candidates is not a temporal or geographic aberration, but rather a reflection of growing popular disaffection with liberal-democratic norms and institutions, and of increasing support for authoritarian interpretations of democracy. The record number of anti-system politicians in office raises uncertainty about the strength of supposedly “consolidated” liberal democracies. Guatemala. Italy. Hungary. Greece Tsipras. Turkey. (Wilders. AfD. Denmark, Finland, Norway ...).  
Decline of Democracy Yascha Mounk &  Roberto Stefan Foa  (2016/2017) The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. July 2016. Journal of Democracy. And January 2017. The Signs of Deconsolidation. - Political scientists long assumed that “democratic consolidation” was a one-way street, but survey evidence of declining support for democracy from across the established democracies suggests that deconsolidation is a genuine danger. The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. In recent years, parties and candidates challenging key democratic norms have won unprecedented popular support in liberal democracies across the globe. Drawing on public opinion data from the World Values Survey and various national polls, we show that the success of anti-establishment parties and candidates is not a temporal or geographic aberration, but rather a reflection of growing popular disaffection with liberal-democratic norms and institutions, and of increasing support for authoritarian interpretations of democracy. The record number of anti-system politicians in office raises uncertainty about the strength of supposedly “consolidated” liberal democracies. Guatemala. Italy. Hungary. Greece Tsipras. Turkey. (Wilders. AfD. Denmark, Finland, Norway ...).  
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Judiciary:  
Judiciary:  
The State of the Prisons between the State's Presence and Absence


Prisons: Overload. They used to be symbols of state pride and power (Takagi). Today they are the same in the U.S. - a return to old splendor with little humanity. But they are a symbol of the state's absence and impotence in other coutnries. Large rund-down prisons.  
Prisons: Overload. They used to be symbols of state pride and power (Takagi). Today they are the same in the U.S. - a return to old splendor with little humanity. But they are a symbol of the state's absence and impotence in other coutnries. Large rund-down prisons.  
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=== The Prison Crisis ===
=== The Prison Crisis ===
*The State and the Prison
*The State and the Prison
Paul Takagi (1975): Walnut Street served to legitimize the idea of a state prison, which meant the creation of a state apparatus. To put it differently, the transformation that was to occur had implications far beyond the matter of penal reform. The political process toward creating a state prison system re ected in miniature the problems of the Confederation in centralizing the powers of the state. The demand for a strong centralized government was to guarantee the development of a new economic order on the one hand, and on the other, to solve the problem of law and order.
Paul Takagi (1975): Walnut Street served to legitimize the idea of a state prison, which meant the creation of a state apparatus. To put it differently, the transformation that was to occur had implications far beyond the matter of penal reform. The political process toward creating a state prison system re-enacted in miniature the problems of the Confederation in centralizing the powers of the state. The demand for a strong centralized government was to guarantee the development of a new economic order on the one hand, and on the other, to solve the problem of law and order.
 
Eastern State Penitentiary (1829) had cost nearly $780,000, and was one of the - if not ''the'' - most expensive buildings of its day in the United States.  


Eastern State Penitentiary (1829) had cost nearly $780,000, one of the most expensive buildings of its day in the United States.  
"The growth of the penitentiary network, with mass incarceration and extreme overcrowding of prison establishments, has produced a situation whereby the prisons are effectively self-managed by the inmates, and thus by these organised groups. This has created a scenario where the state can only rely on the prisoners themselves – through complex and perverse power relations that they have established amongst themselves – to maintain order in the prisons, as well as to safeguard the lives of inmates. This is not a case of people being under state custody. Instead, it is a case of people inside state establishments living under the custody of criminal groups." [https://shoc.rusi.org/informer/incarceration-spider-producing-web-organised-crime-brazil Dias, Camila Nunes (2018) Incarceration: The Spider ...]


"Prisons in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are run not so much by prison guards as by inmates. In circumstances of severe overcrowding and acute staff shortage, prisoners are recruited or organise themselves, not only to perform clerical and janitorial work, but also to provide for welfare, discipline ..." [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hojo.12010 Darke, Sacha (2013) Inmate Governance in Braszilian Prisons]
"In some prisons Human Rights Watch visited, guards only patrol the outside perimeter and some prison grounds and do not enter cellblocks." (HRW 2017 Brazil: Regain Control of Prison System
Protect Prisoners from Violence Behind Bars).


*What does it look like? What does it look like in rich and in poor countries? In ex-slaveholder and ex-convict republics?
*What does it look like? What does it look like in rich and in poor countries? In ex-slaveholder and ex-convict republics?
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*[http://www.mtctrains.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mass_Incarceration_Solutions.pdf MTC (2017) America’s Mass Incarceration Problem: Can Prison Contractors Actually Be Part of the Solution?]
*[http://www.mtctrains.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mass_Incarceration_Solutions.pdf MTC (2017) America’s Mass Incarceration Problem: Can Prison Contractors Actually Be Part of the Solution?]
*[https://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PRI_Global-Prison-Trends-2018_EN_WEB.pdf Prison Reform International (2018) Global Prison Trends 2018]


*[http://harvardpolitics.com/world/cleaning-up-the-brazilian-judiciary-roots-out-corruption/ Ruales, Vanessa (2018) Cleaning Up: The Brazilian Judiciary Roots Out Corruption. Harvard Political Review]
*[http://harvardpolitics.com/world/cleaning-up-the-brazilian-judiciary-roots-out-corruption/ Ruales, Vanessa (2018) Cleaning Up: The Brazilian Judiciary Roots Out Corruption. Harvard Political Review]
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== See also==
== See also==
[[Prisons]] in Krimpedia
*[[IBCCrim 2018]] in Krimpedia
*[[Prisons]] in Krimpedia
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