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Thirdly, what the abolition of prisons does not mean is to keep all those prisoners in prison and only change the name of the institution and its inmates to “hospital/patients”, “treatment center/clients”, or “prevention house/residents”. Fraudulent labelling is a real danger, because it is both seductive (as a kind of subversive resistance open to all those who are part of the system and who are either unable or unwilling to accept a radical de-institutionalization) and sometimes hard to distinguish from a valid label (e.g., a correct risk assessment). It is also a real danger, because today’s prisons are fulfilling a hybrid function of both inflicting pain on inmates because of their past crimes (= deprivation of liberty as a punishment)  and preventing them from committing more crimes in the future (= deprivation of liberty as a preventive measure).  
Thirdly, what the abolition of prisons does not mean is to keep all those prisoners in prison and only change the name of the institution and its inmates to “hospital/patients”, “treatment center/clients”, or “prevention house/residents”. Fraudulent labelling is a real danger, because it is both seductive (as a kind of subversive resistance open to all those who are part of the system and who are either unable or unwilling to accept a radical de-institutionalization) and sometimes hard to distinguish from a valid label (e.g., a correct risk assessment). It is also a real danger, because today’s prisons are fulfilling a hybrid function of both inflicting pain on inmates because of their past crimes (= deprivation of liberty as a punishment)  and preventing them from committing more crimes in the future (= deprivation of liberty as a preventive measure).  
Germany is an interesting case in point. Some convicts, after completing their sentence, were held in prison for indeterminate periods, under the label of "security detention" (Sicherungsverwahrung). This was regarded as a security measure, not as a punishment. Therefore, normal criminal law priciples (like the prohibition of retroactivity) were not seen as applicable, until they  European Court for Human Rights that finally intervened: "The concept of “penalty” in Article 7 is autonomous in scope. To render the protection afforded by Article 7 effective the Court must remain free to go behind appearances and assess for itself whether a particular measure amounts in substance to a “penalty” within the meaning of this provision (see Welch v. the United Kingdom, 9 February 1995, § 27, Series A no. 307‑A; Jamil v. France, 8 June 1995, § 30, Series A no. 317‑B; and Uttley, cited above). The wording of the second sentence of Article 7 § 1 indicates that the starting-point in any assessment of the existence of a penalty is whether the measure in question is imposed following conviction for a “criminal offence”. Other relevant factors are the characterisation of the measure under domestic law, its nature and purpose, the procedures involved in its making and implementation, and its severity (see Welch, cited above, § 28; Jamil, cited above, § 31; Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42293/98, 26 January 1999; Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 29514/05, ECHR 2006‑XV; and Kafkaris, cited above, § 142). The severity of the measure is not, however, in itself decisive, since, for instance, many non-penal measures of a preventive nature may have a substantial impact on the person concerned (see Welch, cited above, § 32; compare also Van der Velden, cited above". ([Case of M.v.Germany_17._12._2009  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96389]).
Germany is an interesting case in point. Some convicts, after completing their sentence, were held in prison for indeterminate periods, under the label of "security detention" (Sicherungsverwahrung). This was regarded as a security measure, not as a punishment. Therefore, normal criminal law priciples (like the prohibition of retroactivity) were not seen as applicable, until they  European Court for Human Rights that finally intervened: "The concept of “penalty” in Article 7 is autonomous in scope. To render the protection afforded by Article 7 effective the Court must remain free to go behind appearances and assess for itself whether a particular measure amounts in substance to a “penalty” within the meaning of this provision (see Welch v. the United Kingdom, 9 February 1995, § 27, Series A no. 307‑A; Jamil v. France, 8 June 1995, § 30, Series A no. 317‑B; and Uttley, cited above). The wording of the second sentence of Article 7 § 1 indicates that the starting-point in any assessment of the existence of a penalty is whether the measure in question is imposed following conviction for a “criminal offence”. Other relevant factors are the characterisation of the measure under domestic law, its nature and purpose, the procedures involved in its making and implementation, and its severity ... The severity of the measure is not, however, in itself decisive, since, for instance, many non-penal measures of a preventive nature may have a substantial impact on the person concerned". ([Case of M.v.Germany_17._12._2009  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96389]).


== What is to be done? ==
== What is to be done? ==
1.005

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