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By early to mid-1990’s Awlaki had already begun to gain a following among American Muslims. He saw ‘the danger of Western culture diluting and damaging Islam and Muslims by America and its allies and infighting within the ''ummah'' (The global Islamic Nation). He drew substantial inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhoods version of Salafism. He was especially influenced by Yusuf al Qaradawi’s work concerning the spread of Islam in the West. However he only emerged as a public figure in the months following 9/11 where he was seen as a moderate and critic of Al-Qaida. | By early to mid-1990’s Awlaki had already begun to gain a following among American Muslims. He saw ‘the danger of Western culture diluting and damaging Islam and Muslims by America and its allies and infighting within the ''ummah'' (The global Islamic Nation). He drew substantial inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhoods version of Salafism. He was especially influenced by Yusuf al Qaradawi’s work concerning the spread of Islam in the West. However he only emerged as a public figure in the months following 9/11 where he was seen as a moderate and critic of Al-Qaida. | ||
During his time in America, among other roles he was a senior member of the Denver Islamic Society from 1994-1996, an Imam at the Masjid Ar-Ribat al-Islami mosque in San Diego, California, from 1996–2000; according to the 9/11 Commission Report it was during this time spent at the mosque that he first attracted interests of counter terrorism authorities; and later as Imam of the Dar al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia and the Muslim chaplain of George Washington University. His lectures focused primarily on reinvigorating Islam for Western English speaking Muslims, he retold stories from the Koran in Americanized, idiomatic English. He often drew parallels between the time of the Prophet and the present. This ability to connect to young Muslims made him immensely popular and easily accessible. | During his time in America, among other roles he was a senior member of the Denver Islamic Society from 1994-1996, an Imam at the Masjid Ar-Ribat al-Islami mosque in San Diego, California, from 1996–2000; according to the 9/11 Commission Report it was during this time spent at the mosque that he first attracted interests of counter terrorism authorities; and later as Imam of the Dar al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia and the Muslim chaplain of George Washington University. | ||
His lectures focused primarily on reinvigorating Islam for Western English speaking Muslims, he retold stories from the Koran in Americanized, idiomatic English. He often drew parallels between the time of the Prophet and the present. This ability to connect to young Muslims made him immensely popular and easily accessible. | |||
During 1998 and 1999, he served as Vice President for the dubious Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) in San Diego. The charity was founded by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani of Yemen. Brian Murphy an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that the CSSW was a "front organization to funnel money to terrorists". A few years later, in 2004, Zindani was designated by the US Treasury Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the CSSW as a front for Al-Qaeda. Zindani was closely connected to Osama bin Laden. | During 1998 and 1999, he served as Vice President for the dubious Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) in San Diego. The charity was founded by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani of Yemen. Brian Murphy an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that the CSSW was a "front organization to funnel money to terrorists". A few years later, in 2004, Zindani was designated by the US Treasury Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the CSSW as a front for Al-Qaeda. Zindani was closely connected to Osama bin Laden. | ||
The 9/11 Commission Report states that Awlaki was investigated twice by the FBI. The first being a short inquiry in June 1999, which looked into Awlaki’s connections to Ziyad Khalil who was thought to have been a procurement agent for Osama bin Laden. The second investigation was in 2000 which sought to clarify his relationship with the ‘blind sheikh’ Omar Abdel Rahman (who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and plotting to blow up NYC landmarks). The investigations led nowhere so the case had to be dropped, Awlaki fell off the radar. It was, however, during the second investigation that Awlaki first came into contact with future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. According to the Report of the Joint Inquiry, “The FBI closed its inquiry into the activities of the imam in March 2000, approximately two months after al-Hazmi and al Mihdhar arrived in San Diego. In the case closing memorandum, an agent asserted that the imam had been ‘fully identified and does not meet the criterion for further investigation.’ Even though, the imam made contact with other subjects of counterterrorism investigations and that there were concerns of the imam's connections to suspect organizations, the case was closed. | The 9/11 Commission Report states that Awlaki was investigated twice by the FBI. The first being a short inquiry in June 1999, which looked into Awlaki’s connections to Ziyad Khalil who was thought to have been a procurement agent for Osama bin Laden. The second investigation was in 2000 which sought to clarify his relationship with the ‘blind sheikh’ Omar Abdel Rahman (who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and plotting to blow up NYC landmarks). The investigations led nowhere so the case had to be dropped, Awlaki fell off the radar. It was, however, during the second investigation that Awlaki first came into contact with future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. According to the Report of the Joint Inquiry, “The FBI closed its inquiry into the activities of the imam in March 2000, approximately two months after al-Hazmi and al Mihdhar arrived in San Diego. In the case closing memorandum, an agent asserted that the imam had been ‘fully identified and does not meet the criterion for further investigation.’ Even though, the imam made contact with other subjects of counterterrorism investigations and that there were concerns of the imam's connections to suspect organizations, the case was closed. | ||