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Agonal Autism in the Syrian Conflict

Some tentative observations concerning agonal autism and the Syrian conflict

The Syrian conflict is in its seventh year. With no realistic chance for any of the warring parties to terminate it by one-sided military action, conflict resolution depends more than ever on a strategy of communication between the parties. Paradoxically, though, the use of communicative strategies to resolve armed conflicts is much easier in large-scale "old" wars between two or more states than in the unconventional "new" (Kaldor 1999) or "small wars" (Clausewitz 1810/1966) which unfortunately characterize much of today's world (cf. Daase 1999, 2001).

Even though the country lies in ruins - and chances are that no government will ever be able to rule all of what used to be the modern state of Syria (Jenkins 2014) - communication attempts under the auspices of the United Nations failed in both 2012 and 2014, and none of the more recent talks at different places yielded substantive results. One of the reasons for failure has been seen in the West's reticence to talk with all regional stakeholders, combined with its attitude of self-righteousness that forbids negotiations with "Axis of Evil" governments as well as with terrorist organizations (Lüders 2015: 63).

Expanding on this observation one might say that it was the advantage of "old" wars that they were culturally embedded in a network of practices, customs, rules, and meta-rules that allowed for institutionalized communication even under the conditions of war and hence for shared understanding of when and how to reach out over the front line to start talking about armistice and peace. Ethnologist Wilhelm E. Mühlmann (1940) had referred to such phenomena as "agonal partnership".

While German and British fighter pilots in World War I were the deadliest of enemies, stories of chivalry are not as rare as might be expected. In one case, German pilot Oswald Boelke shot down a British plane in January, 1916. Boelke then landed and was delighted so see that he had brought down the enemy plane with its two-person crew alive. He had a long talk with the pilot, saw to it that they were both taken in a car to the hospital, and later visited crewmember Fomilli in hospital, who wrote a letter to a Captain Babington of the Royal Flying Corps telling that they were alive and wanted their families to know that. The Germman pilot took the letter and dropped it over the British lines where it reached the captain and ultimately the crew member's family ("Gentlemen of the skies: German flew behind enemy lines to deliver letter from Brit he shot down. MailOnline 8 September 2012).

It is hard to imagine such chivalry between warring parties in today's Syria, and especially, when it comes to communication between Western military and muslim militias branded as terrorists.

The reasons are not difficult to discover. Whereas enemy fighter pilots in 1916 shared a common social class background, a similar education and self-image including a common elite code of honour, thus making it easy to feel empathy and to establish reciprocal relations based on mutual understanding, none of this holds true for the warring parties in asymmetrical armed conflicts like the Syrian one. One might be tempted to speak of "agonal autism" as an antonym to Mühlmann's agonal partnership.

In the psycho-sciences, autism is defined as a severe personality disorder marked by fundamental dysfunctions in social communication and interaction, especially a lack of reciprocity in everyday rituals like meeting and leaving, asking, giving and thanking, smiling etc. When Eugen Bleuler coined the term in 1911, he meant it as one central symptom of schizophrenia, a certain preponderance of the inner thought-life of a person and restricted, stereotypical repertories of interests and activities. For Freud, autistic was more or less synonymous with narcissistic, and today the concept is also used more generally to refer to living in one's own imagination, or a very marked, excessive self-centeredness.

Extreme self-centeredness is a natural developmental phase in the first months of a human baby's life. According to Sigmund Freud, the Ego-Ideal can be seen as its inheritance in the adult (just like the Super-Ego can be seen as the inheritance of the Oediupus conflict). In developmental criminology, some theorists (e.g. Kaplan 1980) contend that the need for a defense against low self-esteem (brought about by low performance in school) can be seen as a motivating factor for delinquent behavior (with defensiveness operationalized as a discrepancy between scores on measures of high conscious self-esteem and low unconscious esteem). In social psychology, a certain self-centeredness in the service of the defense of self can be seen manifesting itself in husband-wife conflicts. Here, each partner tends to have his/her own narrative of who treated whom unfairly first. This is what interactionist communication researchers have come to refer to as the phenomenon of discrepant punctuation in a sequence of events (Watzlawick et al. 1967). Whereas stimulus-response psychologists typically confine their attention to short sequences of interchange making it possible to label one item of input as 'stimulus' and another item as 'reinforcement', while labelling what the subject does between these two events as 'response', in a longer chain of events every item in the sequence can simultaneously be seen as stimulus, response, and reinforcement:

"A given item of A's behavior is a stimulus insofar as it is followed by an item contributed by B and that by another item contributed by A. But insofer as A's item is sanwiched between two items contributed by B, it is a response. Similarly A's item is a reinforcement insofar as it follows an item contributed by B. The ongoing interchanges, then, which we are here discussing, constitute a chain of overlapping triadic links, each of which is comparable to a stimulus-response-reinforcement sequence. We can take any triad of our interchange and see it as a single trial in a stimulus response learning experiment. - If we look at the conventional learning experiments from this point of view, we observe at once that repeated trials amount to a differentiation of relationship between the two organisms concerned - the experimenter and his subject. The sequence of trials is so punctuated that it is always the experimenter who seems to provide the 'stimuli' and the 'reinforcements', while the subject provides the 'responses'. These words are here deliberately put in quotation marks because the role definitions are in fact only created by the willingness of the organisms to accept the system of punctuation. The 'reality' of the role definitions is only of the same order as the reality of a bat on a Rorschach card - a more or less over-determined creation of the perceptive process. The rat who said 'I ahve got my experimenter trained. Each time I press the lever he gives me food' was declining to accept the punctuation of the sequence which the experimenter was seeking to impose. - It is still true, however, that in a long sequence of interchange, the organisms concerned - especially if these be people - will in fact punctuate the sequence so that it will appear that one or the other has initiative, dominance, dependency or the like. That is, they will set up between them patterns of interchange (about which they may or may not be in agreement) and these patterns will in fact be rules of contingency regarding the exchange of refinforcements. While rats are too nice to re-label, some psychiatric patients are not, and provide psychological trauma for the therapist! (Bateson & Jackson, 1964, pp. 273-74).

According to Watzlawick et al. (1967), disagreement about how to punctuate a sequence of events is at the root of countless relationship struggles:

"Suppose a couple have a marital problem to which he contributes passive withdrawal, while her 50 per cent is nagging criticism. In explaining their frustrations, the husband will state that withdrawal is his only defense against' her nagging, while she will label this explanation a gross and willful distortion of what 'really' happens in their marriage: namely, that she is critical of him because of his passivity. Stripped of all ephemeral and fortuitous elements, their fights consist in a monotonous exchange of the messages 'I withdraw because you nag' and 'I nag because you withdraw.' (...) It can be seen that the husband only perceives triads 2-3-4, 4-5-6, 6-7-8, etc., where his behavior (solid arrows) is 'merely' a response to her behavior (the broken arrows). With her it is exactly the other way around; she punctuates the sequence of events into the triads 1-2-3, 3-4-5, 5-6-7, etc., and sees herself as only reacting to, but not determining, her husband's behavior. In conjoint psychotherapy with couples one is frequently struck by the intensity of what in traditional psychotherapy would be referred to as 'reality distortion' on the part of both parties. It is often hard to believe that two individuals could have such divergent views on many elements of joint experience. And yet the problem lies primarily in an area already frequently mentioned: their inability to metacommunicate about their respective patterning of their interaction. This interaction is of an oscillatory yes-no-yes-no-yes nature which theoretically can go on ad infinitum and almost invariably is accompanied, as we shall see later, by the typical charges of badness or madness."

Nothing is more tempting than to transfer the husband-wife-conflict with its mutually exclusive narratives about causes and responsibilities ("you started it all") onto the level of international conflicts and to refine it a little bit by adding game theoretical concepts. As a matter of fact, Watzlawick et al. (1967) themselves suggested the application of the concept of discrepant punctuation to the arms race. In a way, though, such a focus on faulty communication tends to belittle the relevance of socio-economic interests, power structures, and legitimizing discourses. To say that conflict parties just do not talk enough and that they do not talk enough because they have different perceptions of who started it all and who is responsible for the conflict ("discrepant punctuation") simply does not grasp the fact that international politics are not governed by naively distorted perceptions, but that - as a rule - they at least contain a large portion of strategic modelling for purposes of generating sufficient support on the home front. In the end, the official political discourse and the mainstream media discourse might look very similar to the one-sidedness of a husband's narrative in a couple conflict, but while the husband may be given the benefit of naiveté, the White House Syria (or Iran) narrative should be given credit for having been more carefully constructed to serve the foreign policy interests as defined by those in that house.

In other words: political actors in asymmetric conflicts are all too often not really unable to develop communicative strategies, but rather unwilling to do so for rational reasons.

The rationality of irrational action

In a couple conflict, the inability of spouses to reach a meta-level of communication and to have a distant look at what is happening, can prevent mutual understanding, self-reflection, and a negotiated peace accord. In the Syrian conflict, it may seem that it is exactly the same thing that is lacking, but the difference is that in the latter, there are institutions and elaborate policy bodies that should be able to extensively check options and rationally chose the best one sine ira et studio. Therefore, an assumption of a higher rationality should be justified - even though such an assumption leads directly to a new riddle - the paradox of higher rationality and low-quality outcome.

Barbara Tuchman (1984) spoke of the "March of Folly" and tried to explain "one of the most compelling paradoxes of history: the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests", by the somehow tautological idea that those in charge are sometimes too stupid to do the right thing, even though they know that there are alternative paths of action.

This is not very satisfactory, and this is where a bit of game theory can do some good. What seems irrational to informed observers of the Syrian conflict - the West's refusal to talk with the Iranian leadership to solve the Syrian conflict, e.g. - may not appear so irrational at all when the Syrian conflict is not regarded in isolation, but as just one "game" among others. The theory of nested games


Elemente des agonalen Autismus: 

   Ursachen-Narrativ selbstbezogen und selbstgerecht (diskrepante Interpunktion).
   Eskalation im Vertrauen auf den totalen Sieg.
   Dämonisierung des Feindes
   Regellosigkeit der Gewalt

Chances for peace

“We should have prevented this from happening because this is a self-made disaster, this flow of refugees to our countries in Europe,” Ahtisaari said. “I don’t see any other option but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.”
  • "Die beiden großen Syrien-Konferenzen der UN, im Juni 2012 und im Januar 2014 in Genf, sind gescheitert, weil die 'Freunde des syrischen Volkes' auf einer Übergangsregierung bestanden, der Assad und idealerweise das gesamte Regime nicht mehr angehören sollten. Warum hätte er sich, warum hätten sich Russland und der Iran darauf einlassen sollen? Zur ersten Syrien-Konfernz war Teheran gar nicht erst eingeladen worden. Bei der zweiten suchte UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon, diesen Fehler zu korrigieren und lud die iranische Führung ein , um sie kurz vor Konferenzbeginn in einem beispiellosen Akt der Demütigung auf amerikanischen Druck hin wieder ausladen zu müssen. Die Politik der USA zwischen beiden Konferenzen war wesentlich darauf fokussiert, immer wieder Moskau und Peking zu geißeln. Vor allem Außenministerin Hillary Clinton tat sich hervor mit verbalen Angriffen: Russland und China würden ihre Unterstützung Assads 'teuer bezahlen', beider Verhalten sei 'verabscheuungswürdig', sie betrieben 'Obstruktion' und 'missbrauchten' die Vereinten Nationen, und so weiter. Im Übrigen wurden weitere Sanktionen gegen Damaskus verhängt, drohten die USA wiederholt mit militärischem Eingreifen, sagten aber die allseits erwartete Intervention nach dem Einsatz von Chemiewaffen im August 2013, mutmaßlich durch das Regime, überraschend ab. (...) Fehlende Diplomatie udn Kompromissbereitschaft im Umgang mit Russland und dem Iran haben ebenso wie das Festhalten an der vermeintlichen Alternative einer 'gemäßigten' Opposition den Weg geebnet für den weiteren Staatszerfall und den Vormarsch des 'Islamischen Staates' auch in Syrien. Gleichzeitig wurde Syrien neben dem Irak zum Schlachtfeld eines Stellvertreterkrieges zwischen Saudi-Arabien und dem Iran, eines zunehmend gefährlicheren Showdowns zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, dessen Folgen noch gar nicht abzusehen sind." (Lüders 2015: 73 f.).
  • Dem "Wehklagen, wäre Assad rechtzeitig gestürztworden, hätte es auch den Siegeszug des 'Islamischen Staates' nicht gegeben, sei entgegnet: Das Gegenteil ist richtig. Die Absicht, Assad um jeden Preis zu stürzen, hat den IS in Syrien erst stark gemacht. Und wäre der Diktator tatsächlich gestürzt worden, wären heute in Damaskus die Gotteskrieger an der Macht" (Lüders 2015: 78 f.).
  • The war in Syria opened a window of opportunity for ISIL. Hama sunnites were looking for help against the shiite government forces, and ISIL saw a chance of toppling the shiite regime in Damascus. In 2012 and 2013, ISIL became active in Syria: holy scripture saying that the final victory will be handed to sunni moslems north of Aleppo close to the Turkish border at Al-A'maq or Dabiq against 42 armies (Lüders 2015: 88).
  • Den Iran "auf Distanz zu halten, obwohl er ein natürlicher Verbündeter gegen sunnitische Extremisten wäre, ist ideologisch motivierter Unsinn und falscher Rücksichtnahme Israel und den Golfstaaten gegenüber geschuldet (...) Die Lage ist so verfahren, dass westliche Regierungen mit allen Beteiligten reden und verhandeln müssten. DAs schließt Russland und China ... mit ein. Geschehen wird das gleichwohl nicht, weil die amerikanische Politik einer hegemonialen Vernunft folgt, die nicht auf ein Gleichgewicht der Kräfte abzielt, sondern die politische und wirtschaftliche Vorherrschaft der USA weltweit zu sichern sucht. Vermutlich wird dieser fehlende Pragmatismus am Ende den Niedergang der Weltmacht noch beschleunigen." (Lüders 2015: 100).


1980s

  • 1982: Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad, ordered a military crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, which killed between 10,000-40,000 people and flattened much of the city. That accounts for the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition to Bashar al-Assad.

2011

  • January: first limited articulations of public dissent, inspired by North African revolts. January 31: Assad declares himself ready for political reforms in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. He rules out that North African revolts could happen in Syria, because the situation is different.
  • February: An oppositional call for a "day of wrath" (4 and 5 February) elicits little response. - But on Feb. 15, anti-Assad graffiti on a school building in the southern city of Deraa leads to harsh reactions. Arrest of 15 school children.
  • March: March 17 a UN resolution allows intervention in Libya. - At the same time, waves of demonstrations and repression with many victims in Deraa (Darʿā). Object of protest: Rami Machluf, a cousin of the President and symbol of corruption. Object of repression: A mosque used as a makeshift hospital. Inconsistent reactions between brutaliy and concessions. Demonstrations still limited to Deraa, with only insignificant protest in Kurdish town of Qamishli and little dissent in Damascus proper. 25 March Assad announces reforms, later also repeal of emergency laws. Cabinet steps down.
  • April: the repeal of emergency laws fulfills a central request of demonstrators. Infamous seurity courts to be abolished. By now, protests have spread, and dissatisfaction has radicalized. US start sanctions; UN Human Rights Council starts investigation. Exiled Muslim brotherhood supports protests. 500 people dead since beginning of the year.
  • May: Assad deploys army in anti-terrorism actions. Countrywide mass protests. The mutilated corpse of 13 year old Hamza al-Chatib released. He had disappeared 29 April near Deraa and had been tortured and killed by security. He becomes a symbol in the ensuing revolt.
  • June: June 20, Assad promises reforms in his third public speech since January. June 26, government permits meeting of opposition that calls for more democratization, end of regime violence, and liberation of all political prisoners. - Human Rights Watch publishes report; Australian PM wants Assad before a UN court. - Mass protests and violence continue. Snipers keep playing a role.
  • July: National Dialogue; permission of political parties. - USA and France challenge authorities by non-announced visits to Hama in solidarity with protesters. Anti-US demonstrations in Damascus. - Defectors announce formation of a Free Syrian Army.
  • August: Turkey calls for end of regime violence; US, France, Britain, Germany declare that Assad regime has "lost all legitimacy".
  • September: Oil embargo. Opposition creates Syrian National Council in Istanbul to prepare transition.
  • October: Start of work on a new constitution. Assad admits great mistakes of security forces in interview with Sunday Telegraph on 30 October, promises that only terrorists would be targeted.
  • November: Agreement between government and Arab League to end violence. Agreement cannot be implemented. Suspension of Syrian membership.
  • December: Local elections. - Observer mission of Arab League. - Russia and China ready to support anti-government-violence resolution of Security council, but no sanctions. - Mass protests in Syria continue.

Although the initial protests in 2011 were mostly non-sectarian, armed conflict led to the emergence of starker sectarian divisions. Minority religious groups, but also the Sunni business world, tend to support the Assad government, while the overwhelming majority of opposition fighters are impoverished Sunni Muslims, many of whom victims of the severe drought that plagued the country 2007-10, spurring as many as 1.5 mio. to migrate into the cities, exacerbating poverty and social unrest. - Syria's security establishment, on the other hand, is dominated by Alawites, of which Assad is a member. Besides Deraa and Homs, the center of protests is Hama, a Sunni town where Assad's father had killed 30 000 in his fight against the muslim brotherhood in 1982. Of Syria's 23 mio inhabitants, more than half have become (internal and external) refugees.

  • As soon as 2011, the lack of compromise was tangible. While it seems that Assad himself repeatedly tried to reach out to opponents, his security forces (and non-identified snipers) continued a repression that was countered by uncompromising opposition refusing anything short of regime change - an opposition strongly supported by Saudi Arabia, the USA, and others.
  • As soon as 2012, a secret weapon supply by air was inaugurated for the opposition: Arab regimes and Turkey were helped by the CIA to ship weapons and war materials to the opposition forces (NYT; Lüders 2015: 76).

2012

  • June: UN Syria conference
  • July: Assassination of Assad's brother-in-law marks attack at inner circle of Damascus regime.

The Free Syrian Army combines a bundle of militias attacking government strongholds like Damascus and Aleppo and thus provoking regime repression and destruction in these large urban centers. Unable to build a working administration in its occupied territories, the FSA does produce the image of a civil war and is instrumental in transforming the Syrian conflict into a proxy war of outside powers. On the one hand, the Western countries including Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states under leadership of Saudi Arabia, who want regime change, and on the other hand, Russia, China, and Iran, trying to prevent exactly that.

Since no Western power was ready to pressure Israel to return the Golan to Syria after 1967, Syria moved closer to Russia. With the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Syria gained another ally. And when Hizbollah emerged in the 1980s as a reaction to the israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon (1982-2000), this shiite liberation group was another ally. This axis between Hizbollah, Assad, and Iran is one of the main objects of Israeli concern. Much of the foreign policy of Israel, the USA, and the West, can be explained as the attempt to do as much as possible to destroy this axis and each of its parts (Lüders 2015: 70):

  • The West pressured Syria to take out its troops from Syria that had been stationed since the beginning of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), after the Hariri-assassination in 2005
  • The West organized the "Friends of Syria" (France, West, Turkey, Gulf, under leadership of the US). Aim: regime change. Assad = Hitler. Officially for democracy, in reality global politics with the hope of establishing a Western regime without connections to Iran and Hizbollah.
  • The aftermath of Libyan regime change: intensified unrest in Northern Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Mali. Secondary interventions in Mali by France and Germany. - Russia and China remain cautious with UN Security Council resolutions that purportedly "protect civilians" against regime violence. They block UN resolutions on Syria.

2013

  • In spite of considerable pressure, US President Barack Obama does not intervene directly to topple the al-Assad government after it allegedly used chemical weapons (thus crossing a "red line"). Russia helps de-escalate the situation and al-Assad starts to dismantle his arsenal of chemical weapons. Despite that 1,300 tonnes of sarin nerve gas and its precursors were removed from Syria, chemical weapons have been a recurring footnote in the bloody narrative of Syria's civil war.
  • April 9, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claims union with Nusra-Front; Nusra resistance leaves 6000 dead in clashes between ISIL and Nusra. Both gain ground in Syria.
  • July 3, military coup in Egypt topples elected government of muslim brotherhood's Mursi
  • Jane's Defense Weekly estimates more than 1000 groups, militias and other entities in the armed conflict at the end of the year.

2014

  • January: Second Syrian Conference in Geneva.
  • April 7, the US carried its first direct military action against Assad's forces, launching 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian air force base from which US officials believe a chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun had been launched. Since then, an international coalition led by the United States has bombed targets of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). - video: The origins of ISIL (47:29)
  • Sisi wins presidential election in Egypt with 96.31 per cent of votes.
  • June: 29 June, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimes Caliphate in Mossul.
  • July & August: Israel attacks Gaza (Protective Edge)
  • December: Times of Israel reports on 13 December: "Report by international High Level Military Group blasts UN commission, says Israel set a standard no other army could match."

2015

  • September: Russia launches a bombing campaign against what it referred to as "terrorist groups" in Syria, which included ISIL as well as rebel groups backed by western states. Russia has also deployed military advisers to shore up Assad's defences.
  • September 7: Nikolas Busse criticizes the West for inaction in Syria. "Krieg in Syrien. Bewährungsprobe für die EU. Iran und Saudi-Arabien liefern sich auf syrischem Boden einen Stellvertreterkrieg. Die Europäer müssen nun ihre diplomatische und militärisch Strategie überdenken, um vereint Druck auf diese Regierungen auszuüben. Zu den großen Versäumnissen der Europäer gehört es, dass sie den syrischen Krisenherd anderen Akteuren überlassen haben. Seit Jahren ist bekannt, welche Gefahren und Belastungen für die EU vom Bürgerkrieg in diesem Land ausgehen. Aber weder diplomatisch noch militärisch haben sich die Europäer bisher sonderlich um eine Stabilisierung Syriens bemüht. Die politischen Verhandlungen führen die Vereinten Nationen; der Fortgang des Krieges wird maßgeblich von den Vereinigten Staaten, der Türkei, den Golf-Staaten, Iran und Russland beeinflusst – über Waffenlieferungen oder durch direkte Interventionen. Die Interessen dieser Länder decken sich aber nur zum Teil mit denen Europas. Für die meisten stehen geostrategische Aspekte im Vordergrund, von Flüchtlingsströmen sind sie (mit Ausnahme der Türkei) kaum betroffen. Frankreich will das durch einen Eintritt in den Luftkrieg nun ändern. Ähnliche Überlegungen gibt es auch in Großbritannien. Grundsätzlich ist ein stärkeres europäisches Engagement zu begrüßen, allerdings stellt sich schon die Frage, ob gerade Luftschläge dazu das geeignete Mittel sind. Es ist ja nicht so, dass es der von Amerika geführten Allianz gegen den „Islamischen Staat“ an Flugzeugen mangelt. - Woran es in Syrien fehlt, sind westlich orientierte Bodentruppen, die sowohl gegen den IS als auch gegen das Assad-Regime vorgehen könnten. Die Amerikaner sind mit dem Aufstellen einer solchen Truppe bisher nicht weit gekommen. Die Entsendung von Bodentruppen schließt Präsident Hollande aber kategorisch aus. Deshalb sollte man sich von seinem Vorstoß nicht allzu viel erwarten. Die geplante Fokussierung auf den IS könnte sogar noch Assad in die Hände spielen, der militärisch derzeit in großer Bedrängnis ist. - Wenn die Europäer ihre Passivität gegenüber dem Hauptherkunftsland der Flüchtlinge endlich überwinden wollen, dann sollten sie ihre gesamte regionale Diplomatie überdenken. Die beiden wichtigsten Protagonisten sind Iran und Saudi-Arabien, die sich auf syrischem Boden einen Stellvertreterkrieg liefern. Wenn die Europäer beginnen würden, vereint Druck auf diese Regierungen auszuüben, statt getrennt ihren geschäftlichen Interessen nachzugehen, könnte das durchaus Wirkung entfalten. Auch das ist eine Bewährungsprobe für die EU.
...es ist durchaus nicht so, daß die EU in syrien passiv das geschehen verfolgt. es gibt die gegen das land syrien mit seiner rechtmäßigen regierung verhängten sanktionen. es gibt die einseitige unterstützung dubioser bewaffneter verbände durch die sogenannten "freunde syriens" [inklusive der EU-staaten] gegen die rechtmäßige regierung syriens etc. pp. die jetzige fluchtbewegung ist nicht zuletzt folge dieser politik - die schuld einseitig den USA zuzuweisen, greift da wohl zu kurz. ich kann mich auch noch an die festnahme einer zweistelligen anzahl französischer geheimdienstoffiziere durch syrische behörden erinnern - das war noch vor der aufnahme der abkürzung "IS" in den duden. und die britische regierung berichtet heute im unterhaus über einen bereits erfolgten militärischen angriff auf syrischem staatsgebiet. das zusammen ist jedenfalls kein "nicht-engagement". und die anwerbung der gebildeten syrischen mittelschicht als flüchtlinge auch nicht.
  • October: the US scrapped its controversial programme to train Syrian rebels, after it was revealed that it had spent $500m but only trained 60 fighters.

2016

  • In December 2016, the Syrian army announced that Aleppo has been fully recaptured from rebel fighters, the government's biggest victory in the nearly six-year civil war. Syrian government forces used chemical weapons in rebel-held areas of Aleppo during the final weeks of the battle to retake the key city, killing at least nine people and wounding hundreds more, according to Human Rights Watch. Since Assad's forces recaptured Aleppo, a new military alliance of rebel groups in northern Syria was formed with the aim to consolidate military control over Idlib province, the western part of Aleppo province and parts of Latakia province, according to an FSA commander.
  • Whereas several rounds of peace talks have failed to stop the fighting, the Syrian government and the opposition groups have agreed to 13 evacuations. Evacuation deals allow opposition fighters to safely leave government-besieged cities and towns for areas under opposition control in Northern Syria.
  • Rebel groups have jockeyed for power, and frequently fight one another. Fighting has occasionally spilled over from Syria into Lebanon, contributing to the country's political polarisation.

2017

  • February: the CIA froze funding and logistical support for rebel factions in northern Syria.
  • March: according to Free Syrian Army (FSA) sources, the funding was restored to a certain extent by late March. In March, the alliance of US-backed fighters said it has begun a new phase of its campaign on the ISIL-held city of Raqqa in northern Syria, aiming to complete its encirclement and sever the road to the group's strongholds in Deir Az Zor province. - Also in March, fighting in and around Damascus has intensified after surprise attacks by rebel fighters in the northeastern parts of the city. The United Nations said fighting around Syria's capital has cut off 300,000 people from humanitarian assistance and pauses in the conflict are needed to allow aid convoys to get to the area.
  • A suspected chemical attack that killed at least 80 civilians in the Idlib opposition-held town of Khan Sheikhoun is being investigated by the UN as a potential war crime, while Bashar al-Assad said it was a " fabrication" to justify US military intervention.
  • April: Over 110 were killed on April 15, during an evacuation deal between the rebels and the goverment. The attack targeted the evacuation convoys from the rebel-besieged towns of Foua and Kefraya in Idlib.
  • May 4: Russia, Iran and Turkey have called for the setup of four "de-escalation zones" in Syria, in which Syrian and Russia fighter jets that Syrian government fighter jets are not expected to fly over for six months.
  • At the UN Security Council, Russia has vetoed eight Western-backed resolutions on Syria, while China vetoed six resolutions.
  • US administration claims it found evidence of a crematorium in the notorious Saydnaya prison. According to the reports, the Syrian regime is using the crematorium to cover up the number of those killed in prison.
  • According to the SDF, Tabqa and the adjacent dam were recaptured from ISIL, which leaves no other major ISIL-held urban settlements on the eastern road to Raqqa. EXPLAINED: Re-taking ISIL's capital
  • In addition to Aleppo, the Syrian government currently controls the capital, Damascus, parts of southern Syria and Deir Az Zor, much of the area near the Syrian-Lebanese border, and the northwestern coastal region. Rebel groups, ISIL, and Kurdish forces control the rest of the country.

The Syrian Government and its Supporters

  • Iran and Iraq support Assad, as does Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Russia.

The Revolutionaries and their Supporters

  • Since the Free Syrian Army formed in 2011, many new rebel groups have joined the fighting in Syria, including ISIL, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Iran-backed Hezbollah, Iranian and Afghan fighters, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). The FSA has weakened as the war has progressed, while explicitly Islamist groups such as the al-Nusra Front became empowered. ISIL emerged in northern and eastern Syria in 2013 after overrunning large portions of Iraq. The group quickly gained international notoriety for its brutal executions and its energetic use of social media. The ranks of ISIL include a sizeable number of fighters from around the world. - al-Nusra Front leader, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, announced in 2016 his group's name changed to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, or The Front for liberation of al-Sham, and severed ties with al-Qaeda. - The rebel group Falcons of al-Ghab, in: en.wikipedia.org (2012-15) associated with the FSA, after the killing of its leader in 2015 by Al Nusra Front, the group was dissolved and integrated into Jaysh al-Nasr (Army of Victory).
  • Several Arab states, along with Turkey, have provided weapons and materiel to rebel groups in Syria. Sunni-majority states including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others staunchly support the rebels.
  • Turkish troops and special forces backed by the Free Syria Army, launched in August 2016 operation " Euphrates Shield" against ISIL to liberate the strategic Syrian city of Jarablus on the border with Turkey and to stop the advance of Kurdish militia fighters. Turkey's government fears its large native Kurdish population may grow more restive and demand greater autonomy as a result of increased Kurdish control in northeast Syria.
  • In March 2017, Turkey officially ended the Euphrates Shield military operation, but struck again in April against Kurdish PKK targets in the Karachok Mountains. Turkey's top officials have also criticised the US' decision to arm Kurdish fighters battling ISIL in Syria.
  • Israel also carried out air strikes inside Syria, the latest of which on Damascus and Quneitra. Purportedly hitting Hizbollah arms deliveries. Israel and Syria are technically at war since 1948, but the border remained largely quiet since 1973. - WATCH: Syria: Under Russia's Fist (25:00). WATCH: US strike in Syria: Game changer or deterrent? (25:00)

USA

Die USA verkünden westliche Werte, akzeptieren Wahlergebnisse aber nur, wenn der Gewinner genehm ist: Algerien 1992, Staatsstreich gegen Mursi 2013. Keine Einwände gegen Annullierung der ägyptischen Wahlen 2011/12 durch das Mubarak-treue Oberste Gericht. - Wer sich dem Hegemonieanspruch der USA widersetzt, wird mit Sanktionen überzogen. Iran, Syrien, Irak, Libyen, Russland ... Wenn ein Staat implodiert, antworten die USA mit unerklärten schmutzigen Kriegen, vielfach von Söldnern geführt, stets auf der Jagd nach Terroristen Drohnen in Pakistan, Jemen, Somalia, Libyen, Irak und zunehmend auch Syrien. "Über die Zahl der Todesopfer dieser offiziell meist geleugneten Einsätze lässt sich nur spekulieren, allein in Afghanistan sollen es i nden Jahren der Besatzung (2001-2014) über 10 000 gewesen sein, mehrheitlich Zivilisten, die meist als 'Kollatoralschaden' geführt werden (Lüders 2015: 112).

Verbündete der USA sind vorzugsweise Diktatoren und Feudalherrscher. Aber auch terroristische Organisationen. Das Ideal ist der "delegierte Krieg": andere bis hin zu guten Dschihadisten übernehmen, gewissermaßen im Franchise-Verfahren, Ordnungsaufgaben im Sinne der USA. (112 f.).

Amerikas Freunde sind Ägypten und Saudi-Arabien, Kuweit und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate sowie - vor allem Israel. Sie bilden eine reaktionäre Heilige Allianz à la 1815, die im Namen der Terrorbekämpfung jeden Ansatz demokratischen Aufbegehrens in der Region zu unterdrücken sucht.

Die Parteinahme für reaktionäre Autokratien beruht nicht zuletzt auf der Annahme, sie würde freiheitliche und liberale Werte gegenüber den Muslimbrüdern verteidigen. Man glaubt, dass sich die religiösen Überzeugungen von Islamisten nicht vereinbaren ließen mit der Respektierung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und Frauenrechten. Vor allem aber haben die Islamisten bestimmte vage Vorstellungen von einer arabischen Welt, mit Selbstbewusstsein und Unabhängigkeitsstreben - was man von den Allianzpartnern der USA glücklicherweise nicht zu befürchten hat. (vgl. Lüders 2015: 127 f.).

Wer den Wahabismus, Al-Qaida oder den IS geschwächt sehen möchte, tut gut daran, in den Muslimbrüdern eine Alternative zu erkennen. (130). Westliche Politik begeht aber den Fehler, sich immer enger an die wahabitischen Saudis und an das Dreieck Saudi-Arabien, Ägypten, Israel anzulehnen und (ausgerechnet) die Muslimbrüder als Bedrohung zu sehen. Richtig wäre es andersherum.

Der zweite große Fehler besteht in dem Glauben, eine sunnitische Koalition aus Golfstaaten und Türkei könnte den IS besiegen. Das kann aber nicht gelingen. So laufen die USA und Europa Gefahr, "in einen Krieg der Golfstaaten gegen die Schiiten im Irak und im Iran hineingezogen zu werden" (134).

Der dritte große Fehler ist die Iran-Politik: seit 1993 "dual containment" against Irak and Iran. Auf Israel-Lobby zurückzuführen. Hat auch mit der israelischen Hizbollah-Obsession zu tun. Hatte Israel nach langer Besatzung (1982-2000) zum Abzug genötigt. Israel und AIPAC April 1995: Comprehensive U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action.. - AIPAC verfolgt zwei geostrategische Ziele: Iran politisch und wirtschaftlich zu isolieren und Gründung eines palästinensischen Staates verhindern (135). Reformer Chatami (1997-2005) läuft gegen eine Wand. Nach 11. September 2001 geht Bush von Containment zur Strategie regionaler Transformation über: Regimewechsel in Irak und Iran. Nachdem Iran 2002 zur Achse des Bösen kam, erschienen 2003 reihenweise Artikel, die auf einen Krieg gegen Iran und regime change hinarbeiteten. Mit erstaunlichem Erfolg überzeugt Israel die USA und Europa, dass eine Atommacht Iran mit allen Mitteln verhindert werden müsse (136). Ahmadineschad (2005-2013) war Wasser auf die israelischen und amerikanischen Mühlen. El Baradei beschreibt, wie die USA vielfach in letzter Minute eine Einigung im Atomstreit verhinderten und stattdessen die Sanktionsschraube weiter andrehten (136-138).

Der vierte große Fehler ist der Glaube, dass wir die Guten und die anderen die Bösen sind. Wir übersehen dabei, dass ein Großteil der Menschheit ein Leben in Ohnmacht führt, vielfach entrechtet und ohne Chance. Wir begreifen nicht, dass es an der Zeit ist, die Selbstgerechtigkeit und den heuchelnden Moralismus abzulegen. Wenn Menschenrechte dazu dienen, eigene Machtpolitik zu tarnen oder unliebsame Politiker anzugehen, während sie sonst - man denke an die Verbündeten Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien u.a. - keine Rolle spielen, werden sie zu Worthülsen und machen den Westen nicht gerade zum Lieblingskind derjenigen, die das Spiel durchschauen.

Weblinks and Bibliography

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