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= A March of Folly? = | |||
The Western world sees itself as a community of values. Even when it comes to questions of military intervention, the heads of state and governments never fail to mention this vital aspect of their mission. At countless meetings, official statements solemnly declare their commitment to the heritage of Enlightenment, and their proud military alliance is no exception to the rule when it routinely affirms that "NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law" [http://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm see: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon 2010]. | |||
The problem is that the interventions undertaken by Western governments in the name of such good intentions - from Vietnam to Iraq, Libya, and Syria - tend to produce paradoxical results. Their secret manoeuvres, harsh sanction regimes and military interventions starved, maimed, tortured, displaced, repressed and/or killed literally millions all over the globe, toppled democratically elected governments, supported military coups, and forged the most reactionary alliances with ruthless dictators. More often than never, such actions were also doomed to failure in the sense that the "cure" did more harm than the original "disease" that had prompted the interventions. | |||
In all those cases, the risks were known to those in office, and alternative routes of action had been suggested to them by well-informed advisers, but had been ignored when the fatal decisions were being made. The frequency and the terrible consequences of such constellations in history had prompted Barbara Tuchman (1984) to write her bestselling book ''The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam.'' | |||
Michael Lüders' ''Wer den Wind sät. Was westliche Politik im Orient anrichtet'' (2015) can justly be seen as an equally successful sequel to this 30 years old March-of-Folly discourse. Lüders starts his account with the West's original sin of overthrowing Mossadegh in Iran (1953), and argues in impressive detail his case that the West is betraying its own values while at the same time pursuing a foolish policy that cannot but backfire against its own interests. The basic idea of the book is this: if we (the West) only did the right thing in terms of political values (respect democratic movements and human rights, refrain from supporting autocrats and hypocrites), it would create a win-win situation for both itself and the rest of the world. | |||
known and suggested to the respective Western governments, taken in the name of values and good intentions these values are also routinely being betrayed by Western governments. When it comes to geopolitics, our countries more often than not seem to take their advice not from their widely postulated ideals, but from a far more pragmatic primer, half a millenium old, once compiled by a mediocre poet for a ruthless Florentine prince. They betray democratic movements, ignore democratic elections, support military coups and hail repressive regimes. | |||
There are many reasons for speedy and efficient negotiations to end the civil war in Syria. For one thing, Syria is drowning in chaos and human misery; the country is beyond redemption or repair - it has been declared dead years ago in the sense that there is no possibility of any future government being able to control all of what used to be the modern state of Syria (cf. Jenkins 2014); today, if anything, Syria is even deader than it was then. The military stalemate and the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict will prevent any revitalization. Secondly, the internationalization of the Syrian War makes it ever more likely that it leads the whole region into the abyss of large-scale hostilities. Since the local beginnings of the Syrian conflict and the foundation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, many groups joined the fighting. They include ISIL with a sizeable number of fighters from around the world, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Ex-Nusra Front), Hezbollah, Iranian and Afghan fighters, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - the latter dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). In addition, states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States provided weapons and materiel to rebel groups. Turkish troops and special forces (backed by the FSA) launched attacks against Kurdish milita fighters who in turn had been supported by the USA. Israel carried out air strikes inside Syria against Hizbollah arm deliveries and other targets. For some observers, the situation is so hot it can spark a regional explosion at any time that might affect the whole area from Turkey over Lebanon and Iran all the way to Qatar and Yemen - with neither Russia nor the USA very likely to just sit there and watch. | There are many reasons for speedy and efficient negotiations to end the civil war in Syria. For one thing, Syria is drowning in chaos and human misery; the country is beyond redemption or repair - it has been declared dead years ago in the sense that there is no possibility of any future government being able to control all of what used to be the modern state of Syria (cf. Jenkins 2014); today, if anything, Syria is even deader than it was then. The military stalemate and the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict will prevent any revitalization. Secondly, the internationalization of the Syrian War makes it ever more likely that it leads the whole region into the abyss of large-scale hostilities. Since the local beginnings of the Syrian conflict and the foundation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, many groups joined the fighting. They include ISIL with a sizeable number of fighters from around the world, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Ex-Nusra Front), Hezbollah, Iranian and Afghan fighters, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - the latter dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). In addition, states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States provided weapons and materiel to rebel groups. Turkish troops and special forces (backed by the FSA) launched attacks against Kurdish milita fighters who in turn had been supported by the USA. Israel carried out air strikes inside Syria against Hizbollah arm deliveries and other targets. For some observers, the situation is so hot it can spark a regional explosion at any time that might affect the whole area from Turkey over Lebanon and Iran all the way to Qatar and Yemen - with neither Russia nor the USA very likely to just sit there and watch. | ||
Strangely enough for such a risky situation, opportunities to negotiate still seem to disappear swifter than they arise. Chances for peace are treated as if they were a nuisance. As Michel Aoun (2013) said, it was a great mistake of historic proportions not to accept Assad's offer to negotiate Syria's future. Assad had offered at the beginning of the uprising to talk about the role of the Baath Party, and admitted that this party was not capable anymore to lead the country; he even conceded that new parties would have to be allowed. - In September 2015, The Guardian revealed that the USA had refused a Russian offer as early as in 2012 to have [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside Assad step aside for a negotiated peace deal]. And none less then Ahtisaari said that the West should have and could have prevented all this from happening. He called the Syrian war "a self-made disaster", and when speaking of the flow of refugees to Europe, he stated that he saw no other option "but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.” | Strangely enough for such a risky situation, opportunities to negotiate still seem to disappear swifter than they arise. Chances for peace are treated as if they were a nuisance. As Michel Aoun (2013) said, it was a great mistake of historic proportions not to accept Assad's offer to negotiate Syria's future. Assad had offered at the beginning of the uprising to talk about the role of the Baath Party, and admitted that this party was not capable anymore to lead the country; he even conceded that new parties would have to be allowed. - In September 2015, The Guardian revealed that the USA had refused a Russian offer as early as in 2012 to have [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside Assad step aside for a negotiated peace deal]. And none less then Ahtisaari said that the West should have and could have prevented all this from happening. He called the Syrian war "a self-made disaster", and when speaking of the flow of refugees to Europe, he stated that he saw no other option "but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.” | ||
As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes | As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes, the two UN Syria conferences of June 2012 and January 2014 did not produce results, because the "Friends of Syria" insisted on the removal of Assad's regime even before installing any transitional government - and on the exclusion of Iran from the negotiating table. Iran had not been invited to the first conference, and it was being disinvited under humiliating circumstances due to US pressure from the second one. The US policy of lambasting Moscow and Peking and of ever increasing the pressure of sanctions against Damascus lacked intelligence and sensibility. Bad diplomacy and lack of readiness for compromise with Russia and Iran as well as clinging on to the supposed alternative of a "moderate" opposition paved the way for the weakening of the Syrian state and the rise of ISIL. Simultaneously, Syria turned into the arena of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which gave the conflict an ever stronger sectarian character as a war between the shia and the sunnni factions of Islam - a development with consequences hard to assess. | ||
With hindsight, the most striking aspect of the Syrian conflict is the absence of communication and negotiation. The question therefore must be answered: What is behind the catastrophical absence of communication - purpose or accident, madness or badness? | |||
Building upon Michael Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' this paper looks into the (f)utility of one or the other conceptual tool to further our understanding of what went wrong in Syria - and what continues to push the whole region ever closer to the abyss. | Building upon Michael Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' this paper looks into the (f)utility of one or the other conceptual tool to further our understanding of what went wrong in Syria - and what continues to push the whole region ever closer to the abyss. | ||
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*The war in Syria opened a window of opportunity for ISIL. Hama sunnites were looking for help against the shiite government forces, and ISIL saw a chance of toppling the shiite regime in Damascus. In 2012 and 2013, ISIL became active in Syria: holy scripture saying that the final victory will be handed to sunni moslems north of Aleppo close to the Turkish border at Al-A'maq or Dabiq against 42 armies (Lüders 2015: 88). | *The war in Syria opened a window of opportunity for ISIL. Hama sunnites were looking for help against the shiite government forces, and ISIL saw a chance of toppling the shiite regime in Damascus. In 2012 and 2013, ISIL became active in Syria: holy scripture saying that the final victory will be handed to sunni moslems north of Aleppo close to the Turkish border at Al-A'maq or Dabiq against 42 armies (Lüders 2015: 88). | ||
* | *To keep Iran under pressure, even though the country would be a natural ally against the sunni extremists, is ideologically motivated nonsense and a result of an erroneous solidarity with Israel and the Gulf states. ... To get out of the dead-end street, Western governments would have to include all stakeholders, including Russia and China. This will not happen, because the US policy follows a path of hegemonial reasoning that does not accept the idea of a world balance of powers, but that wants to defend and strengthen US global supremacy. Chances are that this lack of pragmatism will finally accelerate the downfall of this superpower(cf. Lüders 2015: 100). | ||
= Role of the USA = | |||
The USA proclaim Western values, but they only accept election results of their liking. See: Algeria 1992, the coup d'état against Mursi 2013. They did not object the nullification of the Egyptian elections 2011/12 by the highest court still loyel to Mubarak. - Whoever resists the imperial will of the USA is subjected to sanctions: Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Russia ... - When necessary, the USA wage dirty wars, often carried out by soldiers of fortune and always chasing terrorists: drone wars in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Iraq, and increasingly Syria. In Afghanistan this kind of warfare has been estimated to have killed 10 000 people during the occupation years (2001-14), mostly civilians counted as collateral damage" (Lüders 2015: 112). | |||
Verbündete der USA sind vorzugsweise Diktatoren und Feudalherrscher. Aber auch terroristische Organisationen. Das Ideal ist der "delegierte Krieg": andere bis hin zu guten Dschihadisten übernehmen, gewissermaßen im Franchise-Verfahren, Ordnungsaufgaben im Sinne der USA. (112 f.). | |||
Amerikas Freunde sind Ägypten und Saudi-Arabien, Kuweit und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate sowie - vor allem Israel. Sie bilden eine reaktionäre Heilige Allianz à la 1815, die im Namen der Terrorbekämpfung jeden Ansatz demokratischen Aufbegehrens in der Region zu unterdrücken sucht. | |||
Die Parteinahme für reaktionäre Autokratien beruht nicht zuletzt auf der Annahme, sie würde freiheitliche und liberale Werte gegenüber den Muslimbrüdern verteidigen. Man glaubt, dass sich die religiösen Überzeugungen von Islamisten nicht vereinbaren ließen mit der Respektierung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und Frauenrechten. Vor allem aber haben die Islamisten bestimmte vage Vorstellungen von einer arabischen Welt, mit Selbstbewusstsein und Unabhängigkeitsstreben - was man von den Allianzpartnern der USA glücklicherweise nicht zu befürchten hat. (vgl. Lüders 2015: 127 f.). | |||
Wer den Wahabismus, Al-Qaida oder den IS geschwächt sehen möchte, tut gut daran, in den Muslimbrüdern eine Alternative zu erkennen. (130). Westliche Politik begeht aber den Fehler, sich immer enger an die wahabitischen Saudis und an das Dreieck Saudi-Arabien, Ägypten, Israel anzulehnen und (ausgerechnet) die Muslimbrüder als Bedrohung zu sehen. Richtig wäre es andersherum. | |||
Der zweite große Fehler besteht in dem Glauben, eine sunnitische Koalition aus Golfstaaten und Türkei könnte den IS besiegen. Das kann aber nicht gelingen. So laufen die USA und Europa Gefahr, "in einen Krieg der Golfstaaten gegen die Schiiten im Irak und im Iran hineingezogen zu werden" (134). | |||
Der dritte große Fehler ist die Iran-Politik: seit 1993 "dual containment" against Irak and Iran. Auf Israel-Lobby zurückzuführen. Hat auch mit der israelischen Hizbollah-Obsession zu tun. Hatte Israel nach langer Besatzung (1982-2000) zum Abzug genötigt. Israel und AIPAC April 1995: Comprehensive U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action.. - AIPAC verfolgt zwei geostrategische Ziele: Iran politisch und wirtschaftlich zu isolieren und Gründung eines palästinensischen Staates verhindern (135). Reformer Chatami (1997-2005) läuft gegen eine Wand. Nach 11. September 2001 geht Bush von Containment zur Strategie regionaler Transformation über: Regimewechsel in Irak und Iran. Nachdem Iran 2002 zur Achse des Bösen kam, erschienen 2003 reihenweise Artikel, die auf einen Krieg gegen Iran und regime change hinarbeiteten. Mit erstaunlichem Erfolg überzeugt Israel die USA und Europa, dass eine Atommacht Iran mit allen Mitteln verhindert werden müsse (136). Ahmadineschad (2005-2013) war Wasser auf die israelischen und amerikanischen Mühlen. El Baradei beschreibt, wie die USA vielfach in letzter Minute eine Einigung im Atomstreit verhinderten und stattdessen die Sanktionsschraube weiter andrehten (136-138). | |||
Der vierte große Fehler ist der Glaube, dass wir die Guten und die anderen die Bösen sind. Wir übersehen dabei, dass ein Großteil der Menschheit ein Leben in Ohnmacht führt, vielfach entrechtet und ohne Chance. Wir begreifen nicht, dass es an der Zeit ist, die Selbstgerechtigkeit und den heuchelnden Moralismus abzulegen. Wenn Menschenrechte dazu dienen, eigene Machtpolitik zu tarnen oder unliebsame Politiker anzugehen, während sie sonst - man denke an die Verbündeten Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien u.a. - keine Rolle spielen, werden sie zu Worthülsen und machen den Westen nicht gerade zum Lieblingskind derjenigen, die das Spiel durchschauen. | |||
= Weblinks and Bibliography = | |||
*[http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/michel-aoun-im-f-a-z-gespraech-es-ist-kein-fruehling-es-ist-ie-hoelle-12020554.html Aoun, Michel (FAZ 11 January 2013) Es ist kein Frühling, es ist die Hölle. Interview mit Michel Aoun] | |||
*Blom Crocker, Terri (2015) The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. | |||
*[http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/well-put-bin-laden-out-of-business-says-us-523771.html Buncombe, Andrew (The Independent, 20 January 2006) We'll put Bin Laden out of business, says US]. | |||
*[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronik_des_Bürgerkriegs_in_Syrien_2011 Chronik des Bürgerkriegs in Syrien 2011, in: de.wikipedia.org] | |||
*Clausewitz, Carl von (1966) Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, gehalten auf der Kriegs-Schule 1810 und 1811, in: Clausewitz, Carl von: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe, Bd. 1, hrsg. von Werner Hahlweg, Göttingen: 208-599. | |||
*[https://www.thelocal.ch/20170306/genevas-syria-talks-end-on-more-positive-note Geneva's Syria talks end on 'more positive' note. AFP 6 March 2017] | |||
*[http://www.bpb.de/apuz/26279/krieg-und-politik-im-21-jahrhundert?p=all Hoch, Martin (2002) Krieg und Politik im 21. Jahrhundert. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 20/2001] | |||
*Kaplan, Howard B. (1980) Deviant Behavior in Defense of Self. San Diego: Academic Press. | |||
*Lüders, Michael (2015) Wer den Wind sät. Was westliche Politik im Orient anrichtet. München: C.H. Beck. | |||
*[http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2199749/Gentlemen-skies-The-German-flying-ace-shot-British-World-War-I-pilots--risked-life-deliver-letter-telling-superiors-alright.html Seamark, Michael (Daily Mail Online, 7 September 2012) Gentleman of the skies: German flew behind enemy lines to deliver letter from Brit he shot down] | |||
*[http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html Syria's civil war explained from the beginning. Al Jazeera 16.05.2016] | |||
*Thomas, William I. & Dorothy S. Thomas (1928) The child in America: Behavior problems and programs. New York: Knopf, 1928. | |||
*[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Civil_War Syrian Civil War, in: en.wikipedia.org] | |||
*Tsebelis, George (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: U of California Press. | |||
*Tuchman, Barbara W (1984) The March of Folly. From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Knopf. | |||
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/congress-and-lebanon_b_107439.html Zunes, Stephen (HuffPost 25 June 2008, reposted from Foreign Policy in Focus 10 June 2008) Congress and Lebanon] | |||
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== 2015 == | == 2015 == | ||
*September: Russia launches a bombing campaign against what it referred to as "terrorist groups" in Syria, which included ISIL as well as rebel groups backed by western states. Russia has also deployed military advisers to shore up Assad's defences. | *September: Russia launches a bombing campaign against what it referred to as "terrorist groups" in Syria, which included ISIL as well as rebel groups backed by western states. Russia has also deployed military advisers to shore up Assad's defences. | ||
*October: the US scrapped its controversial programme to train Syrian rebels, after it was revealed that it had spent $500m but only trained 60 fighters. | *October: the US scrapped its controversial programme to train Syrian rebels, after it was revealed that it had spent $500m but only trained 60 fighters. | ||
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*At the UN Security Council, Russia has vetoed eight Western-backed resolutions on Syria, while China vetoed six resolutions. | *At the UN Security Council, Russia has vetoed eight Western-backed resolutions on Syria, while China vetoed six resolutions. | ||
*US administration claims it found evidence of a crematorium in the notorious Saydnaya prison. According to the reports, the Syrian regime is using the crematorium to cover up the number of those killed in prison. | *US administration claims it found evidence of a crematorium in the notorious Saydnaya prison. According to the reports, the Syrian regime is using the crematorium to cover up the number of those killed in prison. | ||
*According to the SDF, Tabqa and the adjacent dam were recaptured from ISIL, which leaves no other major ISIL-held urban settlements on the eastern road to Raqqa. | *According to the SDF, Tabqa and the adjacent dam were recaptured from ISIL, which leaves no other major ISIL-held urban settlements on the eastern road to Raqqa. | ||