Agonal Autism in the Syrian Conflict: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

Agonal Autism in the Syrian Conflict (Quelltext anzeigen)

Version vom 12. Juni 2017, 20:27 Uhr

1.217 Bytes entfernt , 20:27, 12. Jun. 2017

keine Bearbeitungszusammenfassung

Tiao

Bürokraten, Administratoren

31.738

Bearbeitungen

@@ Zeile 3: / Zeile 3: @@
 Strangely enough for such a risky situation, opportunities to negotiate still seem to disappear swifter than they arise. Chances for peace are treated as if they were a nuisance. As Michel Aoun (2013) said, it was a great mistake of historic proportions not to accept Assad's offer to negotiate Syria's future. Assad had offered at the beginning of the uprising to talk about the role of the Baath Party, and admitted that this party was not capable anymore to lead the country; he even conceded that new parties would have to be allowed. - In September 2015, The Guardian revealed that the USA had refused a Russian offer as early as in 2012 to have [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside Assad step aside for a negotiated peace deal]. And none less then Ahtisaari said that the West should have and could have prevented all this from happening. He called the Syrian war "a self-made disaster", and when speaking of the flow of refugees to Europe, he stated that he saw no other option "but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.”
-As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes: "Die beiden großen Syrien-Konferenzen der UN, im Juni 2012 und im Januar 2014 in Genf, sind gescheitert, weil die 'Freunde des syrischen Volkes' auf einer Übergangsregierung bestanden, der Assad und idealerweise das gesamte Regime nicht mehr angehören sollten. Warum hätte er sich, warum hätten sich Russland und der Iran darauf einlassen sollen? Zur ersten Syrien-Konfernz war Teheran gar nicht erst eingeladen worden. Bei der zweiten suchte UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon, diesen Fehler zu korrigieren und lud die iranische Führung ein, um sie kurz vor Konferenzbeginn in einem beispiellosen Akt der Demütigung auf amerikanischen Druck hin wieder ausladen zu müssen. Die Politik der USA zwischen beiden Konferenzen war wesentlich darauf fokussiert, immer wieder Moskau und Peking zu geißeln. Vor allem Außenministerin Hillary Clinton tat sich hervor mit verbalen Angriffen: Russland und China würden ihre Unterstützung Assads 'teuer bezahlen', beider Verhalten sei 'verabscheuungswürdig', sie betrieben 'Obstruktion' und 'missbrauchten' die Vereinten Nationen, und so weiter. Im Übrigen wurden weitere Sanktionen gegen Damaskus verhängt, drohten die USA wiederholt mit militärischem Eingreifen, sagten aber die allseits erwartete Intervention nach dem Einsatz von Chemiewaffen im August 2013, mutmaßlich durch das Regime, überraschend ab. (...) Fehlende Diplomatie udn Kompromissbereitschaft im Umgang mit Russland und dem Iran haben ebenso wie das Festhalten an der vermeintlichen Alternative einer 'gemäßigten' Opposition den Weg geebnet für den weiteren Staatszerfall und den Vormarsch des 'Islamischen Staates' auch in Syrien. Gleichzeitig wurde Syrien neben dem Irak zum Schlachtfeld eines Stellvertreterkrieges zwischen Saudi-Arabien und dem Iran, eines zunehmend gefährlicheren Showdowns zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, dessen Folgen noch gar nicht abzusehen sind." According to Lüders (2015: pp. 78) it was not the lack of resolve to topple Assad that had paved the way for ISIL to enter Syria, but the contrary is true. What made ISIL strong in Syria was the USA's determination to topple Assad. Had they succeeded, ISIL would now reign in Syria. - More recently, attempts to enter negotiations at Geneva, Lausanne, and Astana ended with no result. Looking back, the most striking aspect of the Syrian conflict is the absence of communication and negotiation. The question is legitimate: What is behind the catastrophical absence of communication - purpose or accident, madness or badness?
+As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes, the two UN Syria conferences of June 2012 and January 2014 did not produce results, because the "Friends of Syria" insisted on the removal of Assad's regime even before installing any transitional government - and on the exclusion of Iran from the negotiating table. Iran had not been invited to the first conference, and it was being disinvited under humiliating circumstances due to US pressure from the second one. The US policy of lambasting Moscow and Peking and of ever increasing the pressure of sanctions against Damascus lacked intelligence and sensibility. Bad diplomacy and lack of readiness for compromise with Russia and Iran as well as clinging on to the supposed alternative of a "moderate" opposition paved the way for the weakening of the Syrian state and the rise of ISIL. Simultaneously, Syria turned into the arena of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which gave the conflict an ever stronger sectarian character as a war between the shia and the sunnni factions of Islam - a development with consequences hard to assess.
+With hindsight, the most striking aspect of the Syrian conflict is the absence of communication and negotiation. The question therefore must be answered: What is behind the catastrophical absence of communication - purpose or accident, madness or badness?
 Building upon Michael Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' this paper looks into the (f)utility of one or the other conceptual tool to further our understanding of what went wrong in Syria - and what continues to push the whole region ever closer to the abyss.