Agonal Autism in the Syrian Conflict: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

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There are many reasons for speedy and efficient negotiations to end the civil war in Syria. For one thing, Syria is drowning in chaos and human misery; the country is beyond redemption or repair - it has been declared dead years ago in the sense that there is no possibility of any future government being able to control all of what used to be the modern state of Syria (cf. Jenkins 2014); today, if anything, Syria is even deader than it was then. The military stalemate and the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict will prevent any revitalization. Secondly, the internationalization of the Syrian War makes it ever more likely that it leads the whole region into the abyss of large-scale hostilities. Since the local beginnings of the Syrian conflict and the foundation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, many groups joined the fighting. They include ISIL with a sizeable number of fighters from around the world, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Ex-Nusra Front), Hezbollah, Iranian and Afghan fighters, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - the latter dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). In addition, states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States provided weapons and materiel to rebel groups. Turkish troops and special forces (backed by the FSA) launched attacks against Kurdish milita fighters who in turn had been supported by the USA. Israel carried out air strikes inside Syria against Hizbollah arm deliveries and other targets. For some observers, the situation is so hot it can spark a regional explosion at any time that might affect the whole area from Turkey over Lebanon and Iran all the way to Qatar and Yemen - with neither Russia nor the USA very likely to just sit there and watch.
There are many reasons for speedy and efficient negotiations to end the civil war in Syria. For one thing, Syria is drowning in chaos and human misery; the country is beyond redemption or repair - it has been declared dead years ago in the sense that there is no possibility of any future government being able to control all of what used to be the modern state of Syria (cf. Jenkins 2014); today, if anything, Syria is even deader than it was then. The military stalemate and the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict will prevent any revitalization. Secondly, the internationalization of the Syrian War makes it ever more likely that it leads the whole region into the abyss of large-scale hostilities. Since the local beginnings of the Syrian conflict and the foundation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, many groups joined the fighting. They include ISIL with a sizeable number of fighters from around the world, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Ex-Nusra Front), Hezbollah, Iranian and Afghan fighters, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - the latter dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). In addition, states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States provided weapons and materiel to rebel groups. Turkish troops and special forces (backed by the FSA) launched attacks against Kurdish milita fighters who in turn had been supported by the USA. Israel carried out air strikes inside Syria against Hizbollah arm deliveries and other targets. For some observers, the situation is so hot it can spark a regional explosion at any time that might affect the whole area from Turkey over Lebanon and Iran all the way to Qatar and Yemen - with neither Russia nor the USA very likely to just sit there and watch.


Close to the abyss, opportunities to negotiate still seem to disappear swifter than they arise. Chances for peace are treated as if they were a nuisance. As Michel Aoun (2013) said, it was a great mistake of historic proportions not to accept Assad's offer to negotiate Syria's future. Assad had offered at the beginning of the uprising to talk about the role of the Baath Party, and admitted that this party was not capable anymore to lead the country; he even conceded that new parties would have to be allowed. - In September 2015, The Guardian revealed that the USA had refused a Russian offer as early as in 2012 to have [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside Assad step aside for a negotiated peace deal]. And none less then Ahtisaari said that the West should have and could have prevented all this from happening. He called the Syrian war "a self-made disaster", and when speaking of the flow of refugees to Europe, he stated that he saw no other option "but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.”
Strangely enough for such a risky situation, opportunities to negotiate still seem to disappear swifter than they arise. Chances for peace are treated as if they were a nuisance. As Michel Aoun (2013) said, it was a great mistake of historic proportions not to accept Assad's offer to negotiate Syria's future. Assad had offered at the beginning of the uprising to talk about the role of the Baath Party, and admitted that this party was not capable anymore to lead the country; he even conceded that new parties would have to be allowed. - In September 2015, The Guardian revealed that the USA had refused a Russian offer as early as in 2012 to have [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside Assad step aside for a negotiated peace deal]. And none less then Ahtisaari said that the West should have and could have prevented all this from happening. He called the Syrian war "a self-made disaster", and when speaking of the flow of refugees to Europe, he stated that he saw no other option "but to take good care of these poor people … We are paying the bills we have caused ourselves.”


As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes: "Die beiden großen Syrien-Konferenzen der UN, im Juni 2012 und im Januar 2014 in Genf, sind gescheitert, weil die 'Freunde des syrischen Volkes' auf einer Übergangsregierung bestanden, der Assad und idealerweise das gesamte Regime nicht mehr angehören sollten. Warum hätte er sich, warum hätten sich Russland und der Iran darauf einlassen sollen? Zur ersten Syrien-Konfernz war Teheran gar nicht erst eingeladen worden. Bei der zweiten suchte UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon, diesen Fehler zu korrigieren und lud die iranische Führung ein, um sie kurz vor Konferenzbeginn in einem beispiellosen Akt der Demütigung auf amerikanischen Druck hin wieder ausladen zu müssen. Die Politik der USA zwischen beiden Konferenzen war wesentlich darauf fokussiert, immer wieder Moskau und Peking zu geißeln. Vor allem Außenministerin Hillary Clinton tat sich hervor mit verbalen Angriffen: Russland und China würden ihre Unterstützung Assads 'teuer bezahlen', beider Verhalten sei 'verabscheuungswürdig', sie betrieben 'Obstruktion' und 'missbrauchten' die Vereinten Nationen, und so weiter. Im Übrigen wurden weitere Sanktionen gegen Damaskus verhängt, drohten die USA wiederholt mit militärischem Eingreifen, sagten aber die allseits erwartete Intervention nach dem Einsatz von Chemiewaffen im August 2013, mutmaßlich durch das Regime, überraschend ab. (...) Fehlende Diplomatie udn Kompromissbereitschaft im Umgang mit Russland und dem Iran haben ebenso wie das Festhalten an der vermeintlichen Alternative einer 'gemäßigten' Opposition den Weg geebnet für den weiteren Staatszerfall und den Vormarsch des 'Islamischen Staates' auch in Syrien. Gleichzeitig wurde Syrien neben dem Irak zum Schlachtfeld eines Stellvertreterkrieges zwischen Saudi-Arabien und dem Iran, eines zunehmend gefährlicheren Showdowns zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, dessen Folgen noch gar nicht abzusehen sind." According to Lüders (2015: pp. 78) it was not the lack of resolve to topple Assad that had paved the way for ISIL to enter Syria, but the contrary is true. What made ISIL strong in Syria was the USA's determination to topple Assad. Had they succeeded, ISIL would now reign in Syria. - More recently, attempts to enter negotiations at Geneva, Lausanne, and Astana ended with no result. Looking back, the most striking aspect of the Syrian conflict is the absence of communication and negotiation. The question is legitimate: What is behind the catastrophical absence of communication - purpose or accident, madness or badness?
As Michael Lüders (2015: pp. 73) writes: "Die beiden großen Syrien-Konferenzen der UN, im Juni 2012 und im Januar 2014 in Genf, sind gescheitert, weil die 'Freunde des syrischen Volkes' auf einer Übergangsregierung bestanden, der Assad und idealerweise das gesamte Regime nicht mehr angehören sollten. Warum hätte er sich, warum hätten sich Russland und der Iran darauf einlassen sollen? Zur ersten Syrien-Konfernz war Teheran gar nicht erst eingeladen worden. Bei der zweiten suchte UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon, diesen Fehler zu korrigieren und lud die iranische Führung ein, um sie kurz vor Konferenzbeginn in einem beispiellosen Akt der Demütigung auf amerikanischen Druck hin wieder ausladen zu müssen. Die Politik der USA zwischen beiden Konferenzen war wesentlich darauf fokussiert, immer wieder Moskau und Peking zu geißeln. Vor allem Außenministerin Hillary Clinton tat sich hervor mit verbalen Angriffen: Russland und China würden ihre Unterstützung Assads 'teuer bezahlen', beider Verhalten sei 'verabscheuungswürdig', sie betrieben 'Obstruktion' und 'missbrauchten' die Vereinten Nationen, und so weiter. Im Übrigen wurden weitere Sanktionen gegen Damaskus verhängt, drohten die USA wiederholt mit militärischem Eingreifen, sagten aber die allseits erwartete Intervention nach dem Einsatz von Chemiewaffen im August 2013, mutmaßlich durch das Regime, überraschend ab. (...) Fehlende Diplomatie udn Kompromissbereitschaft im Umgang mit Russland und dem Iran haben ebenso wie das Festhalten an der vermeintlichen Alternative einer 'gemäßigten' Opposition den Weg geebnet für den weiteren Staatszerfall und den Vormarsch des 'Islamischen Staates' auch in Syrien. Gleichzeitig wurde Syrien neben dem Irak zum Schlachtfeld eines Stellvertreterkrieges zwischen Saudi-Arabien und dem Iran, eines zunehmend gefährlicheren Showdowns zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten, dessen Folgen noch gar nicht abzusehen sind." According to Lüders (2015: pp. 78) it was not the lack of resolve to topple Assad that had paved the way for ISIL to enter Syria, but the contrary is true. What made ISIL strong in Syria was the USA's determination to topple Assad. Had they succeeded, ISIL would now reign in Syria. - More recently, attempts to enter negotiations at Geneva, Lausanne, and Astana ended with no result. Looking back, the most striking aspect of the Syrian conflict is the absence of communication and negotiation. The question is legitimate: What is behind the catastrophical absence of communication - purpose or accident, madness or badness?
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