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:After downing the enemy plane in January, 1916, the German pilot Oswald Boelke landed close to the wreck and found the two person crew alive. After getting Mr. Somervill and Mr. Formilli to a hospital and engaging in conversation, he took a letter written by Formilli to let his superiors and his family know that they were alive and relatively well. Boelke then flew over the British lines and dropped the letter that did indeed reach its destination, only to be auctioned almost a century later together with pictures that had been taken of the incident ... | :After downing the enemy plane in January, 1916, the German pilot Oswald Boelke landed close to the wreck and found the two person crew alive. After getting Mr. Somervill and Mr. Formilli to a hospital and engaging in conversation, he took a letter written by Formilli to let his superiors and his family know that they were alive and relatively well. Boelke then flew over the British lines and dropped the letter that did indeed reach its destination, only to be auctioned almost a century later together with pictures that had been taken of the incident ... | ||
In the Syrian conflict, stories of just how gentlemanly combatants behaved, even in grim battle, do not abound. There seems to be no such thing as agonal partnership. Quite to the contrary: like in other "small" wars, there is a distinctive lack of chivalry and empathy, of respect for humanitarian law, of a willingness (and ability) to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. All this creates a vicious circle of de-humanizing stereotypes and activities such as rape, torture, and arbitrary killings. The irregularity of the partisan militia also affects conventional forces who tend to assimilate their own behavior to match that of the others. | In the Syrian conflict, stories of just how gentlemanly combatants behaved, even in grim battle, do not abound. There seems to be no such thing as agonal partnership. Quite to the contrary: like in other "small" wars, there is a distinctive lack of chivalry and empathy, of respect for humanitarian law, of a willingness (and ability) to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. All this creates a vicious circle of de-humanizing stereotypes and activities such as rape, torture, and arbitrary killings. The irregularity of the partisan militia also affects conventional forces who tend to assimilate their own behavior to match that of the others. These wars are fought in deserts as well as cities in Syria, but also on bridges and market places in Central Europe. With blurred boundaries between war and peace, computerized warfare and the use of makeshift weapons like trucks or cars, nothing is less likely to flourish than agonal partnership. | ||
Their irregularity makes unconventional parties vulnerable to be defined as terrorists. This label paves the way for extermination rather than negotiation. As White House Speaker Scott McClellan said when asked how the United States would react to Usama bin Laden's offer to negotiate a truce in 2006, "We don't negotiate with terrorists. We put them out of business" (Buncombe 2006). As soon as you call your enemies "terrorists" you promise yourself and others not to negotiate with them for both pragmatic (lack of trustworthiness) and deontologial ("thou shalt not negotiate with terrorists") reasons. | |||
= Agonal Autism = | = Agonal Autism = |