Agonal Autism in the Syrian Conflict: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

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Two facts emphasize the need for a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict. Firstly, Syria's plunge into chaos. The country being beyond repair, something new will (have to) emerge soon. Even though Brian Jenkins had signed the country's death certificate as early as 2014 (cf. Jenkins 2014), the country has become even deader ever since. Secondly, the military stalemate. None of the warring parties stands a chance to ever gain control over the whole territory. Strangely enough, and in spite of these two facts, chances for a negotiated settlement regularly seem to disappear much swifter than they appear. One may ask where such a catastrophical absence of negotiations comes from - purpose or accident, madness or badness.
Two facts emphasize the need for a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict. Firstly, Syria's plunge into chaos. The country being beyond repair, something new will (have to) emerge soon. Even though Brian Jenkins (2014) diagnosed Syria's death already years ago, continued savagery and dismemberment of institutions has done a lot to make it even deader now. Secondly, the military stalemate. None of the warring parties stands a chance to ever gain control over the whole territory. Strangely enough, and in spite of these two facts, chances for a negotiated settlement regularly seem to disappear much swifter than they appear. One may ask where such a catastrophical absence of negotiations comes from - purpose or accident, madness or badness.
 
One plausible hypothesis would be the following: while it has always been difficult to to change from sword to talk, this has become much more complicated in our new age of small, asymmetric, and unconventional warfare with its recurrent complaint by state parties that they suffer from a "lack of partners for peace".  


Building upon Michael Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' I hope to present one or the other conceptual tool that might be of use to reach a fuller understanding of what went wrong in Syria - and what could prevent a repetition of the kind of thought, actions, and strategies that caused the Syrian tragedy in the first place.
Building upon Michael Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' I hope to present one or the other conceptual tool that might be of use to reach a fuller understanding of what went wrong in Syria - and what could prevent a repetition of the kind of thought, actions, and strategies that caused the Syrian tragedy in the first place.


= Lack of Agonal Partnership =
= Lack of Agonal Partnership =
It may sound terribly nostalgic of traditional warfare to say that it was a great advantage of "old" wars that they were culturally embedded in a network of practices, customs, rules, and meta-rules that allowed for institutionalized communication even with soldiers still fighting. Ethnologist Wilhelm E. Mühlmann (1940) had referred to such phenomena as "agonal partnership". The existence of a meta-level of partnership in the middle of armed conflict produced things like the Christmas Truce 1914, but also episodes very difficult to imagine in the present-day Syrian conflict:  
One plausible hypothesis would be the following: while it has always been difficult to to change from sword to talk, this has become much more complicated in our new age of small, asymmetric, and unconventional warfare with its recurrent complaint by state parties that they suffer from a "lack of partners for peace". It may sound terribly nostalgic of traditional warfare to say that it was a great advantage of "old" wars that they were culturally embedded in a network of practices, customs, rules, and meta-rules that allowed for institutionalized communication even with soldiers still fighting. Ethnologist Wilhelm E. Mühlmann (1940) had referred to such phenomena as "agonal partnership". The existence of a meta-level of partnership in the middle of armed conflict produced things like the Christmas Truce 1914, but also episodes very difficult to imagine in the present-day Syrian conflict:  


:While German and British fighter pilots in World War I were the deadliest of enemies, stories of chivalry are not as rare as might be expected. In one case, German pilot Oswald Boelke shot down a British plane in January, 1916. Boelke then landed and was delighted so see that he had brought down the enemy plane with its two-person crew alive. He had a long talk with the pilot, saw to it that they were both taken in a car to the hospital, and later visited crewmember Fomilli in hospital, who wrote a letter to a Captain Babington of the Royal Flying Corps telling that they were alive and wanted their families to know that. The Germman pilot took the letter and dropped it over the British lines where it reached the captain and ultimately the crew member's family ("Gentlemen of the skies: German flew behind enemy lines to deliver letter from Brit he shot down. MailOnline 8 September 2012).
:While German and British fighter pilots in World War I were the deadliest of enemies, stories of chivalry are not as rare as might be expected. In one case, German pilot Oswald Boelke shot down a British plane in January, 1916. Boelke then landed and was delighted so see that he had brought down the enemy plane with its two-person crew alive. He had a long talk with the pilot, saw to it that they were both taken in a car to the hospital, and later visited crewmember Fomilli in hospital, who wrote a letter to a Captain Babington of the Royal Flying Corps telling that they were alive and wanted their families to know that. The Germman pilot took the letter and dropped it over the British lines where it reached the captain and ultimately the crew member's family ("Gentlemen of the skies: German flew behind enemy lines to deliver letter from Brit he shot down. MailOnline 8 September 2012).
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