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Two facts emphasize the need for a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict. Firstly, Syria's plunge into chaos. The country being beyond repair, something new will (have to) emerge soon. Brian Jenkins had | Two facts emphasize the need for a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict. Firstly, Syria's plunge into chaos. The country being beyond repair, something new will (have to) emerge soon. Even though Brian Jenkins had signed the country's death certificate as early as 2014 (cf. Jenkins 2014), the country has become even deader ever since. Secondly, the military stalemate. None of the warring parties stands a chance to ever gain control over the whole territory. Strangely enough, and in spite of these two facts, chances for a negotiated settlement regularly seem to disappear much swifter than they can be made show themselves. Obviously, to change the sword for the pen is more easily said than done. And while one might argue this to be a constant in human history, things seem to have become increasingly diffcult in our new age of small, asymmetric, and unconventional warfare and its chronic "lack of partners for peace". | ||
Comprehensive analyses like Michal Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' have found an audience, but failed to reach a breakthrough against the political establishment's glass ceiling of defense and denial. The following argument tries to add some provisional ideas to Lüders' analysis in the hope that one or the other conceptual tool might be of some use to reach a fuller understanding of what went wrong - and what could prevent a repetition of the kind of thought, actions, and strategies that caused the Syrian tragedy in the first place. | Comprehensive analyses like Michal Lüders' (2015) ''Wer Wind sät'' have found an audience, but failed to reach a breakthrough against the political establishment's glass ceiling of defense and denial. The following argument tries to add some provisional ideas to Lüders' analysis in the hope that one or the other conceptual tool might be of some use to reach a fuller understanding of what went wrong - and what could prevent a repetition of the kind of thought, actions, and strategies that caused the Syrian tragedy in the first place. |