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During the Cold War, there was much talk about that. It went something like this: If one could reveal the blind spots of both sides' views of East-West conflict during the Cold War, one might help governments to overcome those perceptual limitations and prejudices, and conflicts could be resolved in almost no time at all. The hottest candidate was Carl Rogers' person-centered talking therapy. Did not Rogers himself propagate that? And even if this might be a false memory, it is a proven fact that Watzlawick himself did apply the concept of discrepant punctuation to the case of the East-West arms race (Watzlawick et al. 1967), implying that - given a third party to help them climb the meta-level of communication - things could be easily resolved. And it is not implausible at all that such a thought was behind more recent attempts to apply the concept of discrepant punctuation to the interaction sequences between the United States and Al Qaida in the War on Terror. Thanks to Malick's (2011) analysis, it can be treated as an established fact that there are indeed mutually irreconcilable narratives in the Al Qaida conflict - and it would come as a great surprise if the same were not true in the case of Syria that we are dealing with today.
During the Cold War, there was much talk about that. It went something like this: If one could reveal the blind spots of both sides' views of East-West conflict during the Cold War, one might help governments to overcome those perceptual limitations and prejudices, and conflicts could be resolved in almost no time at all. The hottest candidate was Carl Rogers' person-centered talking therapy. Did not Rogers himself propagate that? And even if this might be a false memory, it is a proven fact that Watzlawick himself did apply the concept of discrepant punctuation to the case of the East-West arms race (Watzlawick et al. 1967), implying that - given a third party to help them climb the meta-level of communication - things could be easily resolved. And it is not implausible at all that such a thought was behind more recent attempts to apply the concept of discrepant punctuation to the interaction sequences between the United States and Al Qaida in the War on Terror. Thanks to Malick's (2011) analysis, it can be treated as an established fact that there are indeed mutually irreconcilable narratives in the Al Qaida conflict - and it would come as a great surprise if the same were not true in the case of Syria that we are dealing with today.


== The March-of-Folly Hypothesis==
=== The March-of-Folly Hypothesis===


The question does not seem to be "If" there is a cognitive distortion in the Western narrative, but "Why". How is it possible that the world's only remaining superpower comes up with such a distored narrative? How can it be so blind to its own mistakes? How can a government follow an evidently self-defeating policy even though it knows that there is an alternative path of action? Such questions have been asked before with regard to other similarly compelling politica paradoxes. Why is it that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests - from Vietnam over the counterproductive War on Terror all the way to Syria?
The question does not seem to be "If" there is a cognitive distortion in the Western narrative, but "Why". How is it possible that the world's only remaining superpower comes up with such a distored narrative? How can it be so blind to its own mistakes? How can a government follow an evidently self-defeating policy even though it knows that there is an alternative path of action? Such questions have been asked before with regard to other similarly compelling politica paradoxes. Why is it that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests - from Vietnam over the counterproductive War on Terror all the way to Syria?
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The lesson from this kind of thinking leads to a simple conclusion even if that may be hard to realize in practice: let us elect more intellectually capable leaders, or, if that does not work, let us at least try to educate those in power to the highest degree possible with the best adivsors imaginable. And maybe, one or the other of our leaders could see a talking therapist.
The lesson from this kind of thinking leads to a simple conclusion even if that may be hard to realize in practice: let us elect more intellectually capable leaders, or, if that does not work, let us at least try to educate those in power to the highest degree possible with the best adivsors imaginable. And maybe, one or the other of our leaders could see a talking therapist.


== The Higher-Rationality Hypothesis==
=== The Higher-Rationality Hypothesis===
An alternative approach would suggest that what seems self-defeating, dumb, and ineffective might look irrational at first sight only, but reveal a certain sense and rationality if seen in a larger context. Seemingly irrational phenomena in politics might turn out to be rational as part of a larger scheme. That is the idea of George Tsebelis in his book on ''Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics'' (1990).
An alternative approach would suggest that what seems self-defeating, dumb, and ineffective might look irrational at first sight only, but reveal a certain sense and rationality if seen in a larger context. Seemingly irrational phenomena in politics might turn out to be rational as part of a larger scheme. That is the idea of George Tsebelis in his book on ''Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics'' (1990).


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(1) In the Syrian arena itself the game is "who owns Syria?". U.S. policy did neither bring peace to Syria nor well-being for the Syrian people. Much to the contrary, it further hurt the U.S.' reputation and interests in and around Syria, strengthening jihadist propaganda, recruitment and terrorism. Verdict: U.S. policy is irrational and foolish.
(1) In the Syrian arena itself the game is "who owns Syria?". U.S. policy did neither bring peace to Syria nor well-being for the Syrian people. Much to the contrary, it further hurt the U.S.' reputation and interests in and around Syria, strengthening jihadist propaganda, recruitment and terrorism. Verdict: U.S. policy is irrational and foolish.


(2) In the Near East arena at large the game is "who owns the Near East?". U.S. policy is dominated by elite theory that says the population cannot be trusted, and elites (military etc.) have to be relied on for partnership that respects U.S. interests. If that means reliance on the strongest regional power-holders at the expense of mass participation and development, so it be. If smaller powers are getting lost in the whirlpool of events, that is still better than having to deal with a functioning government that could reveal itself as a troublemaker. An "endless war" in Syria eliminates a potential troublemaker
(2) In the Near East arena at large the game is "who owns the Near East?". A realistic view sees U.S. interests best preserved  by reliance on powerful elites (instead of "Arab Spring movements"). Nuclear regional powers, strong military rulers and highly armed autocrats are seen as best friends. To legitimized this alliance, it is good to have terrorist organizations as "suitable enemies" (Nils Christie). It may be both necessary and fruitful to engage in an endless war against such enemies. The longer it lasts, the more deviant governments can be eliminated on the way - see Qatar - and the more stable and friendly the whole environment will be in the completely transformed region that will be characterized by, among other things, an effective incapacitation of all shiite governments, movements, populations, and organizations.  


(3) In the World arena that game is "who rules the world?". Security and prosperity of the West can either be guaranteed by cooperation in a multi-polar word, or it can be pursued maybe more effectively by a hegemonic strategy of preventing the formation of any power or coalition of powers able to challenge U.S. supremacy. The hegemonic strategy would stress military and economic supremacy, while the multipolar cooeration strategy would invest in creating markets by spreadig economic buying power over the globe's population. A hegemonic strategy can afford and even strive to destroy government structures and social fabric in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and other potential troublemaker countries, since it gives the more reliable regional powers space to breathe and act as they wish. Even an "endless war" in the Near East and other parts of the world is better than reconstructing countries that - due to their traditions and interests - can only be regarded as potential troublemakers.


Why not lose a game if losing it creates the conditions for winning the next and decisive one? Maybe the Vietnam War was like a lost battle, and winning the Cold War was like victory in the other, much greater game?
Seen from the nested games perspective, a famous Shakespearean line come to mind: Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't. What liberal thinkers see as the equivalent of a declaration of intellectual bankruptcy suddenly appears as highly rational. One just has to admit that there is more than just one game, and that the destruction of a few countries in the Near East can fit a calculation of ends and means in another arena where there is a game being played that promises much higher payoffs than any peace deal.


To sum it up: to the neutral observer, the U.S. narrative shows a clear cognitive distortion. In a way, though, such a focus on faulty communication tends to belittle the relevance of socio-economic interests, power structures, and legitimizing discourses. To say that conflict parties just do not talk enough and that they do not talk enough because they have different perceptions of  who started it all and who is responsible for the conflict ("discrepant punctuation") simply does not grasp the fact that international politics are not governed by naively distorted perceptions, but that - as a rule - they at least contain a large portion of strategic modelling, and be it only for securing popular support in the electorate. While the political and the media discourses might look similar to the one-sidedness of a husband's narrative in a couple conflict, one should not rush to conclusions. While the husband may be given the benefit of naiveté, the White House discourse on Syria should be given credit for having been more carefully constructed to serve the foreign policy interests as defined by those in that House. Instead of being unable to prevent cognitive distortions in their perceptions and discourses, political actors in asymmetric conflicts are normally unwilling to refrain from distoring facts because they calculate that to do that kind of talking and to pursue  that kind of walking will serve their most important objectives best. What they need, then, from those who believe in the power of justice and solidarity, is not therapy, but resistance.


For a neutral observer, the U.S. narrative shows a clear cognitive distortion, also  the application of the concept of discrepant punctuation to the arms race. In a way, though, such a focus on faulty communication tends to belittle the relevance of socio-economic interests, power structures, and legitimizing discourses. To say that conflict parties just do not talk enough and that they do not talk enough because they have different perceptions of  who started it all and who is responsible for the conflict ("discrepant punctuation") simply does not grasp the fact that international politics are not governed by naively distorted perceptions, but that - as a rule - they at least contain a large portion of strategic modelling for purposes of generating sufficient support on the home front. In the end, the official political discourse and the mainstream media discourse might look very similar to the one-sidedness of a husband's narrative in a couple conflict, but while the husband may be given the benefit of naiveté, the White House Syria (or Iran) narrative should be given credit for having been more carefully constructed to serve the foreign policy interests as defined by those in that House.
= Chances for peace =
 
In other words: political actors in asymmetric conflicts are all too often not really unable to develop communicative strategies, but rather unwilling to do so for rational reasons.
 
==The rationality of irrational action ===
In a couple conflict, the inability of spouses to reach a meta-level of communication and to have a distant look at what is happening, can prevent mutual understanding, self-reflection, and a negotiated peace accord. In the Syrian conflict, it may seem that it is exactly the same thing that is lacking, but the difference is that in the latter, there are institutions and elaborate policy bodies that should be able to extensively check options and rationally chose the best one sine ira et studio. Therefore, an assumption of a higher rationality should be justified - even though such an assumption leads directly to a new riddle - the paradox of higher rationality and low-quality outcome.
 
 
 
This is not very satisfactory, and this is where a bit of game theory can do some good. What seems irrational to informed observers of the Syrian conflict - the West's refusal to talk with the Iranian leadership to solve the Syrian conflict, e.g.  - may not appear so irrational at all when the Syrian conflict is not regarded in isolation, but as just one "game" among others. The theory of nested games
 
 
Elemente des agonalen Autismus:
 
    Ursachen-Narrativ selbstbezogen und selbstgerecht (diskrepante Interpunktion).
    Eskalation im Vertrauen auf den totalen Sieg.
    Dämonisierung des Feindes
    Regellosigkeit der Gewalt
 
== Chances for peace ==
*[http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/michel-aoun-im-f-a-z-gespraech-es-ist-kein-fruehling-es-ist-die-hoelle-12020554.html Es ist kein Frühling, es ist die Hölle, FAZ 11.01.2013, Interview mit Michel Aoun]: "Es ist ein großer historischer Fehler, das Angebot Assads zu Verhandlungen über die Zukunft Syriens nicht anzunehmen. Schon zu Beginn des Aufstands vor fast zwei Jahren hat er sich bereit erklärt, über die Sonderrolle der Baath-Partei zu reden, weil sie nicht mehr in der Lage ist, das Land zu dirigieren. Auch der Gründung neuer Parteien hat er zugestimmt."
*[http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/michel-aoun-im-f-a-z-gespraech-es-ist-kein-fruehling-es-ist-die-hoelle-12020554.html Es ist kein Frühling, es ist die Hölle, FAZ 11.01.2013, Interview mit Michel Aoun]: "Es ist ein großer historischer Fehler, das Angebot Assads zu Verhandlungen über die Zukunft Syriens nicht anzunehmen. Schon zu Beginn des Aufstands vor fast zwei Jahren hat er sich bereit erklärt, über die Sonderrolle der Baath-Partei zu reden, weil sie nicht mehr in der Lage ist, das Land zu dirigieren. Auch der Gründung neuer Parteien hat er zugestimmt."
*[http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside west ignored Russian offer in 2012 The Guardian sept. 2015]
*[http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside west ignored Russian offer in 2012 The Guardian sept. 2015]
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Der vierte große Fehler ist der Glaube, dass wir die Guten und die anderen die Bösen sind. Wir übersehen dabei, dass ein Großteil der Menschheit ein Leben in Ohnmacht führt, vielfach entrechtet und ohne Chance. Wir begreifen nicht, dass es an der Zeit ist, die Selbstgerechtigkeit und den heuchelnden Moralismus abzulegen. Wenn Menschenrechte dazu dienen, eigene Machtpolitik zu tarnen oder unliebsame Politiker anzugehen, während sie sonst - man denke an die Verbündeten Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien u.a. - keine Rolle spielen, werden sie zu Worthülsen und machen den Westen nicht gerade zum Lieblingskind derjenigen, die das Spiel durchschauen.
Der vierte große Fehler ist der Glaube, dass wir die Guten und die anderen die Bösen sind. Wir übersehen dabei, dass ein Großteil der Menschheit ein Leben in Ohnmacht führt, vielfach entrechtet und ohne Chance. Wir begreifen nicht, dass es an der Zeit ist, die Selbstgerechtigkeit und den heuchelnden Moralismus abzulegen. Wenn Menschenrechte dazu dienen, eigene Machtpolitik zu tarnen oder unliebsame Politiker anzugehen, während sie sonst - man denke an die Verbündeten Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien u.a. - keine Rolle spielen, werden sie zu Worthülsen und machen den Westen nicht gerade zum Lieblingskind derjenigen, die das Spiel durchschauen.


== Weblinks and Bibliography ==
= Weblinks and Bibliography =
*[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronik_des_Bürgerkriegs_in_Syrien_2011 Chronik des Bürgerkriegs in Syrien 2011, in: de.wikipedia.org]
*[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronik_des_Bürgerkriegs_in_Syrien_2011 Chronik des Bürgerkriegs in Syrien 2011, in: de.wikipedia.org]
*Clausewitz, Carl von (1966) Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, gehalten auf der Kriegs-Schule 1810 und 1811, in: Clausewitz, Carl von: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe, Bd. 1, hrsg. von Werner Hahlweg, Göttingen: 208-599.
*Clausewitz, Carl von (1966) Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, gehalten auf der Kriegs-Schule 1810 und 1811, in: Clausewitz, Carl von: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe, Bd. 1, hrsg. von Werner Hahlweg, Göttingen: 208-599.
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