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 == The Higher-Rationality Hypothesis==
-An alternative approach would suggest that what seems self-defeating, dumb, and ineffective might look irrational at first sight only, but reveal a certain sense and rationality if seen in a larger context. Seemingly irrational phenomena in politics might turn out to be rational as part of a larger scheme. That is the idea of George Tsebelis in his book on Nested Games. Why not lose a game if losing it creates the conditions for winning the next and decisive one? Maybe the Vietnam War was like a lost battle, and winning the Cold War was like victory in the other, much greater game?
+An alternative approach would suggest that what seems self-defeating, dumb, and ineffective might look irrational at first sight only, but reveal a certain sense and rationality if seen in a larger context. Seemingly irrational phenomena in politics might turn out to be rational as part of a larger scheme. That is the idea of George Tsebelis in his book on ''Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics'' (1990).
+Tsebelis asks why actors confronted with a series of choices sometimes do not pick the alternative that appears to be the best, but rather a more or less evidently irrational or outright foolish one in which there is a less than optimal correspondence between ends and means. The secret is, according to Tsebelis, that there is often not only just one two-sided game that is being played, but that there are often two or multiple arenas as well as different games in these arenas with variable payoffs. To make it more complex: there are also games in which the payoffs of the game in the principal arena are influenced by the prevailing conditions in another, secondary, arena. In other words: there can be a dominating game and a subgame, and mutual influences determining differential payoffs.
+Applied to the Syrian conflict, a reconstruction may look like this:
+(1) In the Syrian arena itself the game is "who owns Syria?". U.S. policy did neither bring peace to Syria nor well-being for the Syrian people. Much to the contrary, it further hurt the U.S.' reputation and interests in and around Syria, strengthening jihadist propaganda, recruitment and terrorism. Verdict: U.S. policy is irrational and foolish.
+(2) In the Near East arena at large the game is "who owns the Near East?". U.S. policy is dominated by elite theory that says the population cannot be trusted, and elites (military etc.) have to be relied on for partnership that respects U.S. interests. If that means reliance on the strongest regional power-holders at the expense of mass participation and development, so it be. If smaller powers are getting lost in the whirlpool of events, that is still better than having to deal with a functioning government that could reveal itself as a troublemaker. An "endless war" in Syria eliminates a potential troublemaker
+Why not lose a game if losing it creates the conditions for winning the next and decisive one? Maybe the Vietnam War was like a lost battle, and winning the Cold War was like victory in the other, much greater game?