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== The March-of-Folly Hypothesis==
== The March-of-Folly Hypothesis==


The question does not seem to be "If" there is a cognitive distortion in the Western narrative, but "Why". How is it possible that the world's only remaining superpower comes up with such a distored narrative? How can it be so blind to its own mistakes, and how can it be following such a stupid strategy that kept on excluding all possible negotiating partners for a lasting peace deal in Syria? Such questions have been asked before with regard to other similarly compellin g paradoxes of American History. Why is it that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests - from Vietnam over the counterproductive War on Terror all the way to Syria?
The question does not seem to be "If" there is a cognitive distortion in the Western narrative, but "Why". How is it possible that the world's only remaining superpower comes up with such a distored narrative? How can it be so blind to its own mistakes? How can a government follow an evidently self-defeating policy even though it knows that there is an alternative path of action? Such questions have been asked before with regard to other similarly compelling politica paradoxes. Why is it that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests - from Vietnam over the counterproductive War on Terror all the way to Syria?


In the tradition of Barbara Tuchman's book on The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (1984), it has been the dominant response of more or less well-meaning liberal critics that sometimes, decision-makers are just too ill-informed and ill-tempered, so they take foolish decisions that they (and others) will later regret.
In the tradition of Barbara Tuchman's book on The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (1984), it has been the dominant response of more or less well-meaning liberal critics that sometimes, decision-makers are just too ill-informed and ill-tempered, so they take foolish decisions that they (and others) will later regret.


The lesson to be learned is clear: let us elect more intellectually capable leaders, or, if that does not work, let us at least try to educate those in power to the highest degree possible with the best adivsors imaginable. And maybe, one or the other of our leaders could see a talking therapist.
The lesson from this kind of thinking leads to a simple conclusion even if that may be hard to realize in practice: let us elect more intellectually capable leaders, or, if that does not work, let us at least try to educate those in power to the highest degree possible with the best adivsors imaginable. And maybe, one or the other of our leaders could see a talking therapist.


== The Higher-Rationality Hypothesis==
An alternative approach would suggest that what seems self-defeating, dumb, and ineffective might look irrational at first sight only, but reveal a certain sense and rationality if seen in a larger context. Seemingly irrational phenomena in politics might turn out to be rational as part of a larger scheme. That is the idea of George Tsebelis in his book on Nested Games. Why not lose a game if losing it creates the conditions for winning the next and decisive one? Maybe the Vietnam War was like a lost battle, and winning the Cold War was like victory in the other, much greater game?


s in the White House and beyond. of seemingly paradoxical and ill-informed government policies leading to self-inflicted defeats", by the somehow tautological idea that those in charge are sometimes too stupid to do the right thing, even though they know that there are alternative paths of action.


For a neutral observer, the U.S. narrative shows a clear cognitive distortion, also  the application of the concept of discrepant punctuation to the arms race. In a way, though, such a focus on faulty communication tends to belittle the relevance of socio-economic interests, power structures, and legitimizing discourses. To say that conflict parties just do not talk enough and that they do not talk enough because they have different perceptions of  who started it all and who is responsible for the conflict ("discrepant punctuation") simply does not grasp the fact that international politics are not governed by naively distorted perceptions, but that - as a rule - they at least contain a large portion of strategic modelling for purposes of generating sufficient support on the home front. In the end, the official political discourse and the mainstream media discourse might look very similar to the one-sidedness of a husband's narrative in a couple conflict, but while the husband may be given the benefit of naiveté, the White House Syria (or Iran) narrative should be given credit for having been more carefully constructed to serve the foreign policy interests as defined by those in that House.  
For a neutral observer, the U.S. narrative shows a clear cognitive distortion, also  the application of the concept of discrepant punctuation to the arms race. In a way, though, such a focus on faulty communication tends to belittle the relevance of socio-economic interests, power structures, and legitimizing discourses. To say that conflict parties just do not talk enough and that they do not talk enough because they have different perceptions of  who started it all and who is responsible for the conflict ("discrepant punctuation") simply does not grasp the fact that international politics are not governed by naively distorted perceptions, but that - as a rule - they at least contain a large portion of strategic modelling for purposes of generating sufficient support on the home front. In the end, the official political discourse and the mainstream media discourse might look very similar to the one-sidedness of a husband's narrative in a couple conflict, but while the husband may be given the benefit of naiveté, the White House Syria (or Iran) narrative should be given credit for having been more carefully constructed to serve the foreign policy interests as defined by those in that House.  
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In other words: political actors in asymmetric conflicts are all too often not really unable to develop communicative strategies, but rather unwilling to do so for rational reasons.  
In other words: political actors in asymmetric conflicts are all too often not really unable to develop communicative strategies, but rather unwilling to do so for rational reasons.  


===The rationality of irrational action ===
==The rationality of irrational action ===
In a couple conflict, the inability of spouses to reach a meta-level of communication and to have a distant look at what is happening, can prevent mutual understanding, self-reflection, and a negotiated peace accord. In the Syrian conflict, it may seem that it is exactly the same thing that is lacking, but the difference is that in the latter, there are institutions and elaborate policy bodies that should be able to extensively check options and rationally chose the best one sine ira et studio. Therefore, an assumption of a higher rationality should be justified - even though such an assumption leads directly to a new riddle - the paradox of higher rationality and low-quality outcome.  
In a couple conflict, the inability of spouses to reach a meta-level of communication and to have a distant look at what is happening, can prevent mutual understanding, self-reflection, and a negotiated peace accord. In the Syrian conflict, it may seem that it is exactly the same thing that is lacking, but the difference is that in the latter, there are institutions and elaborate policy bodies that should be able to extensively check options and rationally chose the best one sine ira et studio. Therefore, an assumption of a higher rationality should be justified - even though such an assumption leads directly to a new riddle - the paradox of higher rationality and low-quality outcome.  


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*Lüders, Michael (2015) Wer den Wind sät. Was westliche Politik im Orient anrichtet. München: C.H. Beck.
*Lüders, Michael (2015) Wer den Wind sät. Was westliche Politik im Orient anrichtet. München: C.H. Beck.
*[http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html Syria's civil war explained from the beginning. Al Jazeera 16.05.2016]
*[http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html Syria's civil war explained from the beginning. Al Jazeera 16.05.2016]
*Tsebelis, George (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: U of California Press.
*Tuchman, Barbara W (1984) The March of Folly. From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Knopf.
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